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Abstract
Auditor independence has been a key focus for the auditing profession and regulators. 
Recently, considerable attention has been paid to auditor provided non-audit services 
(APNAS) and the governance from audit committees. The purpose of this study is to 
examine the association, if any, between the board of directors, audit committee and 
the purchase of APNAS.
The monitoring hypothesis predicts that the stronger the board (and audit committee), 
the less APNAS the firm will buy. It was also expected that the relationship between 
APNAS and the board and audit committee variables will significantly alter after 
2001 due to the intense scrutiny following the spectacular corporate collapses of the 
year. Finally, it seeks to test the substitutability of monitoring from boards and audit 
committee and that from the external audit by examining companies with different 
investment-production attributes.
The results for the 4-year pooled sample 1999-2002 shows relationships between 
APNAS (relative to the total fee paid to auditors) and board size, multiple board 
directorships board financial literacy and audit committee size consistent with the 
monitoring hypothesis. When the same regression was estimated for just 2002, it 
produced a much lower adjusted R2 compared to those of the previous three years. 
The results also find that only board size and multiple board directorships remain 
consistent with the monitoring hypothesis. However this has to be interpreted in light 
of the fact that the regression results for the 3 previous years individually were weaker 
as well. This could be due to their smaller sample size which reduced the power of
4
the test. Finally the tests found little evidence that monitoring from effective boards 
and audit committees were being substituted by the quality of the external audit.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE
1.1 Introduction
Since the high profile corporate collapses such as Enron in the USA and HIH 
Insurance in Australia, the issue of auditor independence has been a key focus for the 
auditing profession, regulators and users in the market for financial information. In 
particular considerable attention has been paid to the joint provision of audit and 
auditor provided non-audit services by accounting firms (see for example Levitt 
2000a,b,c; Thomson 2001; Byrnes et al. 2002; Nussbaum 2002; Deloitte Touche 
Tohmatsu 2002). A non-audit service (NAS) is simply defined as a service provided 
by an auditor that is not part of the external auditing process. Auditor provided non­
audit services (APNAS) is where an incumbent audit firm provides NAS to the same 
organization it audits. When this happens, it has been argued that there is an increase 
in fee dependency and conflicts of interest, which results in a threat to auditor 
independence, lower quality audit and investor confidence. On the other hand, audit 
firms claim that they always maintain high levels of independence and that the 
provision of NAS can be beneficial to the audit.
Public debate over auditor independence in general and APNAS in particular has been 
heated in recent years in Australia and in much of the developed world. This 
heightened debate is likely to increase directorial awareness of potential threats to 
auditor independence. The Ramsay Report’s (2001) recommendation for a 
‘declaration of independence’ by the auditor is being adopted as best practice by first 
tier auditors and this is likely to further heighten awareness. The corporate collapses 
may also have the effect of increasing scepticism among regulators and stakeholders
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regarding the quality of the external audit performed (Hepworth 2001, Davis 2002), 
thereby altering the sensitivity of boards to potential threats to auditor independence 
and quality.
Prior evidence regarding the impact of APNAS on auditor independence has had 
mixed results. One line of research seeks to find a relationship between APNAS 
purchases and the investor’s perception1 23 while another line looks to associations 
between APNAS and indications of poor audit quality such as evidence of earnings 
management , auditor changes that appear unjustifiable , probability of issuing a 
favourable audit report when not deserved4 and restatements of a firm’s previously 
issued financial statement5.
A different line of research identifies which firms are likely to desire higher quality 
audit and tests whether there is a relationship between those firms and APNAS 
purchase, the argument being that higher audit quality is associated with lower 
APNAS. To identify these firms, agency costs6 and corporate governance7 variables 
have been used in several previous studies. A possible weakness of these studies is
1 Frankel et al. (2002) and Brown et al. (2006) found that investors ‘punish’ firms with high APNAS 
however, Ashbaugh et al. (2003) did not. In addition, Francis and Ke (2004), Ghosh et al. (2004), 
Krishnan et al. (2005) and Gul et. al. (2006) find that APNAS is negatively related to the firms ERC,
2 Frankel et al. (2002) and Ferguson et al (2004) found support for APNAS leading to lower auditor 
independence. However, Ashbaugh et al. (2003), Chung and Kallapur (2003), Larcker and Richardson 
(2004), Reynolds et al. (2004) and Antle et al. (2004) find that the results in Frankel et al. (2002) are 
sensitive to sample selection and model specification.
3 DeBerg et al. (1991) and Barkess and Simnett (1994) found no association between APNAS and 
auditor change while Li et al. (2003) found no relationship between APNAS and auditor tenure.
4 Wines (1994) and Sharma and Sidhu (2001) find that high APNAS led to a lower likelihood of being 
issued unfavourable audit reports. However, Barkess and Simnett (1994); Craswell (1999); DeFond et 
al. (2002) did not. Li et al. (2003) found evidence in only one of three years investigated.
^Ferguson et al (2004) found that firms with high APNAS were more likely to restate prior financial 
statments, while Kinney et al. (2004) found limited evidence of it. However, Raghunandan et al. 
(2003) found no relationship between APNAS and likelihood of restatement of financial statements.
6 Parkash and Venable (1993), Firth (1997) and Houghton and Ikin (2001) found support for a variety 
of agency cost variables as determinants of APNAS.
7 Abbott et al. (2002) found that firms with an effective audit committee are related to lower APNAS.
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that it ignores firm specific attributes that may affect the quality of audit or encourage 
increased threats to auditor independence.
This study extends the second line of research by examining how firm specific 
attributes are related to the perceived impact of APNAS on the monitoring role of the 
external audit. In particular the time period under investigation is 1999-2002 where 
audit firms faced an increasing level of criticism on the relatively high APNAS fees 
many companies are paying them and particularly in 2001 which witnessed the 
spectacular collapses of HIH in Australia and Enron in the US which resulted in 
several regulatory changes in both jurisdictions.
The purpose of this study is to further examine the association, if any, between the 
board of directors (and related audit committee) and the purchase of APNAS. The 
board and the audit committee (as a board sub-committee) are mechanisms that 
warrant investigation given that members of these governance structures may have 
access to additional (private) infonnation about the quality of audit that is not publicly 
available nor directly observable. In addition the board and/or audit committee hold 
significant influence over the selection of the auditor8 and the purchase of NAS, 
providing board members with the ability to influence policy changes on this matter. 
The audit committee, a sub-committee of the board generally delegated with specific 
financial oversight responsibilities, is examined specifically because it is promoted as 
a market mechanism to enhance audit quality and particularly auditor independence 
(eg Ramsay Report 2001). This study contributes to the existing literature by
s Jubb and Houghton (1999) found that director characteristics (in particular director-auditor links) 
were significant in explaining auditor choice.
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providing evidence about the board’s implicit perception of the impact APNAS has on 
audit quality.
Finally, the events of 2001 have increased the visibility of potential threats to auditor 
independence from APNAS. This serves as an ideal opportunity to investigate 
whether such increased public scrutiny resulted in a change in the relationship 
between APNAS and board characteristics, which are used as an indication of 
governance quality.
1.2 Motivation
There is a growing body of work studying the effects of the joint provision of audit 
and non-audit services. Within this literature, the relationship between the board of 
directors and the auditee’s purchase of APNAS is of interest for the following 
reasons. First, the board of directors plays a pivotal role in the corporate governance 
structure of the auditee. Part of this role includes responsibility for the representations 
made in the annual financial report, and oversight of the quality of the external audit 
carried out on that report. Second, it has significant influence over the choice of 
auditor and the provider(s) of NAS as well as the amount spent on each of audit and 
NAS, giving it the ability to manage perceived audit quality through its decision on 
choice of auditor and the relative level of APNAS. In addition, since audit quality is 
not generally observable externally, the board may have additional (private) 
knowledge regarding audit quality that is not generally available. Hence examination 
of this relationship should provide insights into the board’s perception of any impact 
APNAS is likely to have on audit quality.
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One of the studies that investigated this relationship was Abbott et al. (2003) who 
found that companies with a strong audit committee bought less APNAS than other 
companies, suggesting that such companies demanded higher audit quality from their 
auditors. However they only investigated auditor diligence and independence, 
measured using audit committee meetings and whether the members of the committee 
are independent directors. They did not control for variation in the full board of 
directors characteristics nor other audit committee characteristics such as its size, 
multiple audit committee memberships and financial literacy. The board is an 
important element to investigate given that it heads the internal control framework of 
the company, and that it has significant influence over the selection of auditor and 
purchase of NAS.
This study replicates and extends Abbott et al. (2003) by using more comprehensive 
board and audit committee variables as well as a using longer time frame and a more 
stable data set.
On the other hand, Anderson et al. (1993) and Matolcsy et al. (2000) argued a 
substitution hypothesis in which various corporate governance mechanism are can be 
substituted for each other. In particular, that monitoring provided by a strong board 
can be substituted for higher audit quality and they found evidence that certain firms 
rely relatively more on board monitoring and others rely more on auditor monitoring. 
This study seeks to provide additional evidence in this area by examining empirically 
which hypothesis is dominant and whether it is possible to predict for which group of 
firms each of the two hypotheses will dominate.
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Also, another motivation for this study arises from increased contemporary debate 
regarding audit quality, one of the main points being the provision of APNAS. 
Debate over APNAS has particularly come to public attention in the U.S. in 2000 as 
the SEC sought to introduce a revised rule for auditor independence, with APNAS a 
frequent target in public speeches by the then SEC chainnan Arthur Levitt9. This was 
followed by very public corporate collapses in 2001 such as HIH in Australia and 
Enron in the U.S. (both of which are the largest collapses in the history of their 
respective jurisdictions). In both cases, auditor independence has been called into 
question and in particular, large spending on APNAS has drawn criticism of the 
accounting profession (see for example Thomson 2001; Weber et al. 2002; Byrnes et 
al. 2002; and Nussbaum 2002). As a result of these collapses, critics of APNAS have 
renewed calls for restrictions on audit firms providing other services to their clients. 
This research aims to enrich the debate by providing additional insights into the 
impact APNAS may have on audit quality.
1.3 Theoretical development
This study examines the relationship between levels of APNAS bought by the firm 
and its board of directors and audit committee from an agency costs perspective.
The agency problem arises as a result of conflicts of interests between the managers 
and shareholders. Corporate governance encompasses the set of institutional and 
market mechanisms that are used to resolve these conflicts (Denis 2001). Among the
9 see for example a speech at the Natioanl Association of State Boards of Accountancy (Levitt 2000a) 
and the opening speech for an open meeting of the SEC on Market Structure Initiatives In the Options 
and Equities Markets, and Rules Governing Auditor Independence (Levitt 2000c).
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various types of corporate governance mechanism, internal control mechanisms can 
be the most effective (Jensen 1993).
Perhaps one of the most important of these mechanisms is the board of directors, 
which heads and monitors the internal control mechanisms of the firm (Jensen 1993; 
Fama and Jensen 1983a). A crucial sub-committee of the board is the audit 
committee, which is typically delegated specific financial oversight responsibility 
(Menon and Williams 1994b). A primary part of this responsibility is auditor 
selection and retention with a mind to maintain the quality of the audit.
Some would also say that another corporate governance mechanism is the general 
purpose financial report issued by companies (Watts 1977). By conveying some of 
the management’s private information about the firm, it seeks to reduce the 
information asymmetry between the two, lowering the monitoring costs of the 
shareholders. External auditors are engaged to provide assurance that the financial 
report is true and fair (Chow 1982). Thus the extent to which the financial report can 
reduce agency costs is heavily dependent of the quality of the audit, which in turn is 
dependent on the independence of the auditor (DeAngelo 1981).
Given that one of the roles of the board of directors is to monitor the internal control 
mechanisms of the firm, the board should monitor the quality of the external audit. 
One possible threat to the independence of the auditor (and consequently audit 
quality) is the joint supply of audit and non-audit services to the same client (IFAC 
Ethics Committee 2001; Ramsay 2001; ICAA and CPAA 2001). As such, the board,
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and the audit committee, should monitor the purchase of APNAS within the firm. 
Indeed one of the requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 in the 
United States is for the audit committee to monitor and formally pre-approve any 
APNAS purchases, and CLERP 9 in Australia now requires that the board of directors 
make a statement on whether they are satisfied that the provision of NAS by their 
auditors do not compromise the general standard of audit independence required by 
the Corporations Act.
Finns with a strong board of directors will seek to minimise agency costs. One way 
to do this is to maintain a high quality external audit. Given that there is a potential for 
APNAS to threaten the perceived independence of the auditor, the monitoring 
hypothesis predicts that finns with strong boards and audit committees will purchase 
less APNAS compared to other firms.
This study investigates the period 1999-2002. The period begins with increasing 
regulatory scrutiny and criticism on APNAS in the US as the growing consultation 
arms of the major international audit firm generate increasing levels of APNAS fees 
relative to their audit fees. This was then followed by a number of high profile 
corporate collapses in the US and Australia, particularly that of Enron in the US 
which eventually lead to the collapse of Andersen, one of the Big 5 audit firms at the 
time. The scale of the failures brought with it major regulatory changes (such as SOX 
in the US and CLERP 9 in Australia). Therefore, it is expected that these events will 
lead to a significant change in the relationship between the boards and audit 
committee and APNAS.
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Finally the substitution hypothesis was put forward as an alternative to the monitoring 
hypothesis. It has been argued that firms rely on a bundle of corporate governance 
mechanisms to manage agency cost, and that some of these mechanisms may be 
substituted for each other (Rediker and Seth 1995). This leads to the substitution 
hypothesis which predicts an opposite relationship between board and audit 
committee and APNAS spending.
To determine whether the substitution or monitoring hypothesis is dominant, the 
firms’ production-investment attributes are examined. Firms with higher assets-in- 
place have a greater need for monitoring from auditors, while firms with higher 
growth options rely more on the monitoring from directors (Anderson et al. 1993). So 
it is argued the substitution hypothesis is dominant in finns at the two extreme ends of 
the production-investment spectrum, while the monitoring hypothesis is expected to 
be dominant in finns with moderate levels of assets-in-place and growth options.
1.4 Overview of research method
The base model is a multivariate regression where variables that proxy for the quality 
and independence of the board of directors and audit committee are regressed against 
the ratio of non-audit fees to total fees paid to the auditor. This is estimated on the 4- 
year pooled sample for 1999-2002.
To investigate whether the events of 2001 significantly alter the relationship between 
APNAS and boards and audit committees, the model is estimated for 2002 and 
compared with those from the 3 previous years.
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To test the substitution hypothesis, the sample is then split into three sub-samples with 
the firms ranked on their ratio of assets-in-place to growth options and separate 
regressions are estimated on each sub-sample.
1.5 Summary of the findings
The base model regression for the 4-year pooled sample 1999-2002 shows 
relationships between APNAS/TFEE and board size, multiple board directorships 
board financial literacy and audit committee size consistent with the monitoring 
hypothesis in support of Hl. 1, H 1.2, HI .4 and H3.1.
Next, the composite audit committee effectiveness (ACE) variable used in Abbott et 
al. (2003) was replicated and a series of regressions were estimated to analyse its 
relationship with APNAS. It was found that in Australia, ACE was unexpectedly 
positively related to APNAS, suggesting that effective audit committees are 
associated with higher APNAS spending. This was found to be mainly driven by the 
frequency of audit committee meetings. However, when board and other audit 
committee characteristics were controlled for, the significance of ACE as well as audit 
committee meeting frequency was lost.
The main regression model was then estimated for 2002, which produced a much 
lower adjusted R2 (of 14.8%) compared to those of 1999-2001 (pooled sample at 19.3 
%; and individually 20%, 20.9%, and 19.4% respectively). The results also find that 
only board size and multiple board directorships remain consistent with the 
monitoring hypothesis. This supports H5. However this has to be interpreted in light 
of the fact that the regression results for the 3 years individually were weaker as well.
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In particular, it seems that the 2000 regression has the strongest results, while 2001 
the weakest. It is possible that the reduced sample size of the individual years 
reduced the power of the test producing weaker results.
To try to avoid the possible effects of mulitcollinearity among the test variables, the 
board variables were estimated without the audit committee variables and vice versa. 
While the board variables only model produced similar results compared to the full 
model the audit committee variables only model produced significant negative 
relationship between APNAS and audit committee size, multiple audit committee 
membership and the financial literacy of the audit committee, supporting H3.1, H3.2 
and H3.4.
This largely mimics the results found in the board variables where size, multiple 
directorship and financial literacy was also found to be negatively associated. This 
suggests that while audit committee characteristics are related to APNAS/TFEE, it 
provided little additional explanation as to variations in APNAS/TFEE over and 
above that provided by the board variables.
Finally the firm years was separated into 3 sub-samples ranked on their production- 
investment attributes. The regression estimated however provided little evidence of 
substitution between monitoring by the board and audit committee with monitoring 
from the external audit, with the assumption that high APNAS leads to an decrease in 
audit quality, failing to support H6.1 and H6.2..
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However, care should be taken in interpreting the above results given that the various 
regressions estimated in the study shows some sensitivity of the results to model 
specification and sample selection.
1.6 Significance of the results
Regulators such as the Australian Treasury (2002), Auditing and Assurance Standards 
Board (AUASB 2001), professional bodies (ICAA and CPAA 2004) and the 
Australian Stock Exchange (ASX 2003) have focused recent efforts on improving 
audit quality, and examined various issues including APNAS as well as the audit 
committee.
This study contributes to the literature on the use of the audit committee as well as the 
board of directors as a monitoring tool for corporate governance, and its relationship 
with APNAS. The results of the study do show that the quality and financial literacy 
for the board as well as the resources available to the audit committee are inversely 
related to APNAS purchases. This suggests that the directors view APNAS as a threat 
to independence either in fact or in perception, and effective boards and audit 
committees restricts its purchase by their company.
An interesting result of the study is that the percentage of outside directors or audit 
committee members were not associated with APNAS, suggesting that independent 
directors by themselves do not significantly add to the governance of the company in 
respect of APNAS unless they have a financial background or governance expertise 
(measured by multiple directorships/audit committee memberships).
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It also provides some evidence on the substitutability of monitoring from boards and 
audit committee and that from the external audit. Examining partitions of the sample 
where one form of monitoring is more valuable then the other, little evidence was 
found to support the hypothesis that high quality boards and audit committees would 
allow increased APNAS that may threaten the quality of the audit, or that companies 
would seek a less effective board/audit committee while maintaining a high quality 
audit.
1.7 Organisation of thesis
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the agency problem 
and its relationship with various corporate governance mechanisms focusing on the 
board of directors, audit committee and the external audit function. How APNAS 
might affect the quality of the external audit is then examined and the relationship 
between APNAS, the board of directors and the audit committee is discussed. 
Chapter 3 develops the testable hypotheses. Chapter 4 describes the sample selection 
and explains the research methods and describes the variables used in the model. 
Chapter 5 presents and analyses the empirical results of the tests. Chapter 6 provides 
a summary of the study and explains its significance and limitations and suggests 
avenues for further research.
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CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1 Introduction
This chapter outlines the theoretical framework that underpins the present research. 
In doing so, it describes how conflicts of interests between managers and shareholders 
can lead to agency costs. Corporate governance mechanisms are the set of 
institutional and market mechanisms used to resolve this agency problem. Two such 
mechanisms are the board of directors and the external audit. The ability of the 
external audit to lower agency costs is dependent on its perceived quality, which is 
dependent on the perceived independence of the auditor that performs the audit. The 
perception of auditor independence might be threatened if the audit firm jointly 
provide NAS and audit services to the same client.
Section 2.2 briefly describes the agency problem and while section 2.3 outlines the 
major types of corporate governance mechanisms that are used to control this 
problem. One of the corporate governance mechanisms of interest in this study is the 
board of directors which examined in greater detail in Section 2.4. Sub-sections 2.4.1 
and 2.4.2 describes the quality and independence of the board and how it might affect 
the ability of the board of directors to effectively act as a corporate governance 
mechanism. Sub-section 2.4.3 looks into one of the sub-committees of the full board, 
the audit committee. Section 2.5 examines another corporate governance mechanism, 
the external audit. Section 2.6 introduces non-audit services and describes how 
purchasing NAS from the firm’s incumbent auditor can affect audit quality. This can 
be broken down into how it affects auditor competence (which is described in sub­
section 2.6.1) and auditor independence (which is described in sub-section 2.6.2).
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Section 2.7 explains what impact the board of directors can have on a firm’s purchase 
of APNAS as well as putting forward the monitoring hypothesis. Finally section 2.8 
provides a summary and conclusion to this chapter.
2.2 Agency costs
It is widely acknowledged in much of the extent literature that conflicts of interests 
between the managers and shareholders can arise, leading to agency costs (see Jensen 
and Meckling 1976, Faina 1980, and Fama and Jensen 1983a,b). However, for many 
large corporations, diffused shareholders and the ‘free rider’ problem makes it 
inefficient for shareholders to act as effective monitors of management. Corporate 
governance encompasses the set of institutional and market mechanisms that are used 
to resolve these conflicts (Denis 2001). The theory that underlies modem corporate 
governance research and explicitly defines these conflicts is agency theory. The 
agency problem arises from the separation of ownership and control within the 
contractual view of the firm (see Jensen and Meckling 1976, Fama 1980, and Fama 
and Jensen 1983a,b). This occurs when an agent (management) has differing 
objectives to the principals (owners) and therefore has incentives to act against the 
best interest of the principal. This problem gives rise to agency costs, which are 
comprised of (1) monitoring costs which are the costs of monitoring the agent’s 
behaviour; (2) bonding costs which are mechanisms that encourage the agents to act 
in the interests of the principals; and (3) residual loss, which is where even with 
monitoring and bonding, the agents’ and principals’ interests do not fully align.10
10 Monitoring costs are borne by the principals in first instance but and transferred to the agent when 
determining their remuneration. Bonding costs are borne by the agent and are incurred to the extent 
that the marginal cost of bonding equals the marginal reduction in monitoring costs.
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2.3 Corporate governance
As described above, conflicts of interests between the managers and shareholders can 
arise, leading to agency costs. However, for many large corporations, diffused 
shareholders and the free rider problem makes it inefficient for shareholders to act as 
effective monitors of management. To convince shareholders to part with their 
money and trust management, various mechanisms have evolved to manage and 
reduce such agency costs to a level that is sustainable in the long run. Such 
mechanisms are generally referred to as corporate governance mechanisms.
Jensen (1993) outlines four basic categories of individual corporate governance 
mechanisms. These are:
1. Legal / political / regulatory mechanisms,
2. Product and factor markets,
3. Capital markets, and
4. Internal control mechanisms.
The legal / political / regulatory framework is the basic control mechanism that 
protects shareholders from managers. However, Jensen (1993, 850) criticises these 
mechanisms as being “far too blunt an instrument to handle the problems of wasteful 
managerial behaviour effectively”. In addition, while this framework ‘protect the 
public interest’, they are not designed to produce optimal performance from the 
managers.
Jensen (1993) points out that while the product and factor markets are slow to act as a 
control mechanism, their discipline is inevitable. To survive, the firm must be able to
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produce products for which there is a demand with a cost structure (including agency 
costs) that allows them to sell at a competitive price. Poor performance will 
ultimately lead to financial distress. Unfortunately, by the time market discipline 
takes effect, it may be too late to save much of the firm in whatever form it may exist 
at the time. It can be argued that both Enron and HIH are examples of this.
In terms of capital markets, Jensen (1993) was mainly interested with the takeover 
market. In addition to the discipline enforced by product market competition, 
management teams are also under pressure from the competition of other management 
teams. Finns that are performing poorly are more likely to be targets of takeover bids 
(Palepu 1985, Morck et al. 1988) and managers of poorly perfonning targets are more 
likely to be removed if the bid is successful (Martin and McConnell 1991), ideally to 
be replaced by a superior management team that will drive a higher level of corporate 
perfonnance.
However, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) note several reasons why the takeover market 
might not be an effective corporate governance mechanism. First, takeovers are 
sufficiently expensive such that only major performance failures are likely to be 
addressed. Also the existence of a fluid takeover market might increase agency costs 
for the bidding firm. Since bidders frequently pay a premium for the target firm’s 
shares, the takeover may be a negative NPV purchase motivated by excessive empire 
building (which is a type of agency cost).
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Given that legal/regulatory mechanisms are “too blunt an instrument”, product market 
competition is “too slow” and the takeover market is “not effective”, the remaining 
control mechanisms are those within the firm.
However, Jensen (1993, 850-851) notes that while internal control mechanisms have 
“generally failed to cause managers to maximise efficiency and value ... there are 
firms that have proved to be flexible in their responses to changing market conditions 
in an evolutionary way”. This suggests that the quality of corporate governance for 
internal control mechanisms vary from firm to firm.
Denis (2001) lists the primary internal mechanisms as the board of directors, 
executive compensation and the firms’ ownership and debt structures. This study then 
focuses on the board of directors and the audit committee, as internal control 
mechanisms".
2.4 The board of directors as a corporate governance mechanism
For the reasons given above, the internal control mechanisms of the firm are the most 
flexible and cost effective corporate governance mechanisms to achieve equilibrium 
with minimal agency costs. The board of directors heads the internal control 
mechanisms with the power to hire, fire and compensate top-level managers and to 
ratify and monitor important decisions (Jensen 1993; Fama and Jensen 1983a). To the 
extent that they are effective monitors of management, boards can reduce agency 
costs by safeguarding the interests of the shareholders.
11 see Core et al. (2002) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) for further information regarding other internal 
corporate governance mechanisms.
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Even though corporations are required by law to have a board of directors (which may 
consist of as few as a single director), there is relatively little regulation in Australia 
and much of the modem world regarding the composition of the board, members’ 
qualifications, and their relationships with other parties such as the firm’s 
management, creditors, suppliers, or auditor. As such, firms with different agency 
cost structures can seek out appropriate directors who will provide the best 
equilibrium position with minimum agency costs. The board in turn fulfils its 
monitoring role by managing the various other internal control mechanisms.
Although Hermalin and Weisbach (2002) pointed out that there is little formal 
economic theory on boards, there has been substantial empirical work, the majority of 
which focuses on the effectiveness and the relative independence of the board.
2.4.1 Quality o f the board
The quality of the board refers to its ability to manage the other internal control 
mechanisms available to it, which it uses to monitor management and at times to set 
general policies of the firm. One can argue that high quality board will seek to tailor 
the control mechanisms of the firm to achieve an optimal equilibrium with the firm’s 
existing agency cost structure and the cost of maintaining the control mechanisms.
2.4.2 Independence o f the board
Just as important as a high quality board is one that is primarily independent of 
management. One of the main functions of the board is to monitor management on 
behalf of the shareholders. This includes ensuring that management does not act in a 
way that is self-beneficial but against the best interests of shareholders. If
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management is successful in “capturing” the board, then a compliant board is unlikely 
to stop, limit or penalize such behaviour. Such a board does not bring value to the 
firm in terms of its monitoring capability as it simply follows the lead of management. 
The independence of the board is particularly vulnerable, since it is usual that some of 
the senior management members also act as executive directors, and thus there may 
exist a conflict of interest where there is a dual role of self-monitoring.
2.4.3 Audit committee
An effective audit committee is a vital part of the internal control mechanisms 
(Cadbury 1995; BRC 1999; NACD 2000; Ramsay 2001). The audit committee is a 
sub-committee of the full board of directors and is typically delegated specific 
financial oversight responsibilities (Menon and Williams 1994b). A primary part of 
this responsibility is auditor selection and retention with a mind to maintain the 
quality of the audit.
While most companies have an audit committee, there is currently no legal 
requirement in Australia for a company to have one. However, the Australian Stock 
Exchange does require listed companies to disclose whether an audit committee 
exists, and if not, to explain why, but it does not provide any prescription as to 
composition if one does exist. However, companies that are included in the S&P All 
Ordinaries Index at the beginning of its financial year must have an audit committee 
during that year (ASX 2005).
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Similar to the full board, the effectiveness of the audit committee in carrying out its 
monitoring role is dependent on the quality of its members and the independence of 
the committee.
Given its specific responsibilities, the quality and independence of the audit 
committee is likely to have considerable impact on any monitoring activity that is 
related to the financial report and the auditing perfonned on it.
2.5 The external audit as a corporate governance mechanism
Another internal instrument to lower agency costs is the general purpose financial 
report issued by companies (Watts 1977). Such financial reports convey some of 
management’s private information to shareholders and can aid in reducing the 
information asymmetry between the two, thereby lowering the monitoring costs of 
shareholders. However, since the managers are able to influence the financial 
statements, which are in turn used to evaluate them, they have incentives to manage 
the reports in their favour. As a result, this generates a demand for external auditing 
to provide assurance that the accounts are both true and fair.
External audits are used to increase the reliability of the financial statements (Chow
I 91982) by limiting the extent to which managers can manage their accounts. The 
extent to which financial statements can reduce agency costs is then dependent in part 
on the quality of the audit as well as the board. To the extent that the reduction in
12 An alternative source of demand for audit services is the ‘insurance hypothesis’ where in the event 
that there is a loss in investment the audit firm is treated as a major source of financial recovery if it can 
be proven that some form of audit failure occurred (Wallace 1987; Menon and William 1994a). 
However given the relatively low instance of audit litigation in Australia, the influence of the insurance 
hypothesis is likely to be low.
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agency costs exceeds the cost of the audit, the audit can be seen as a value-adding 
activity.
2.5.1 Audit quality
DeAngelo (1981) defines audit quality as the joint probability that an auditor will (1) 
detect a material misstatement in the financial report if one exists (which leads to 
auditor competence), and (2) report the misstatement if it is detected (which leads to 
auditor independence). This definition partitions audit quality into two dimensions, 
competence and independence.
The need for a competent auditor is self-explanatory. An incompetent audit is one 
where the probability of the auditor detecting material misstatements is low. As such, 
it is unlikely that the audit has altered the manager’s representation of the firm and the 
value of the financial statements will be little different compared to before the audit. 
As audit competence increases, the probability of discovering misstatements 
increases, and if reported, will increase the reliability and hence value of the financial 
statements.
Equally important is auditor independence. A lack of auditor independence will erode 
audit quality by increasing the reluctance to report any misstatements that have been 
detected. Also, if the auditor is reluctant to report misstatements, the audit effort 
made ex ante may be reduced. A high level of competence and independence is 
compulsory for a high quality audit.
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Auditors are bound by standards set by the professional body(ies) to which they 
belong . These standards are in part concerned with the levels of competence and 
independence exhibited by the auditor, setting a minimum level of acceptable quality. 
Breaching this minimum level may result in sanctions by the professional body and 
regulators (such as the ASIC), litigation and subsequent loss of reputation. However, 
because audit quality is not directly observable by external parties, auditors may 
produce lower quality audits as long as the incentives to do so outweigh the 
disincentives and the probability of discovery.
2.6 Joint supply of audit and Non-audit services and its impact on audit quality
As stated before, the external audit is a mechanism used to improve the reliability of 
financial statements released to shareholders, reducing information asymmetry (and 
resulting agency costs) between managers and shareholders.
The provision of APNAS is a service that may have consequences for the quality of 
audit performed. There has been significant debate over the joint provision of audit 
and NAS because it can have two conflicting impacts on the quality of audit. On one 
hand it has the ability to increase the competence of the audit firm, but it also may 
increase the probability of a threat to the independence of the auditor.
2.6.1 Impact o f APNAS on competence
NAS can impact on competence in two different ways. First, the general supply of 
NAS (to any client) by the audit firm increases the scale of the firm. This results in
13 In May 2006, the Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (AUASB) in Australia issued the revised 
Australian Auditing Standards, which will be legally enforceable under the Corporations Act 2001, 
whereas, previously they did not have the force of law.
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greater resources as well as an increased number and level of experts available within 
the firm, especially those that specialise in non-audit areas. The existence of a market 
for the firm’s NAS justifies retaining such resources and expertise within the firm, 
which can then be applied, if needed, on certain audits in a more cost efficient 
manner.
This impact on auditor competence will be unaffected if audit firms are restricted 
(either by internal policy or external regulation) from supplying NAS to their audit 
client14.
A second and more specific impact, Arrunada (1999) argues that supplying both non­
audit and audit services can be beneficial with reductions in total cost and increased 
technical competence as the result of knowledge spillovers where audit and NAS 
share infonnation both as a product and as a process. This occurs where the APNAS 
produces firm specific information that may be useful in conducting the external 
audit.
Understandably, audit firms hold the same view - that NAS can improve the quality of
audit services by increasing the audit firm’s competence:
Audits in today's complex and increasingly international marketplace require a 
level of expertise and sophistication unimaginable when the Securities Act 
was enacted 67 years ago. Today's audits are extremely complex and require 
careful analysis of large amounts of specialized information in short periods 
of time. To effectively manage these complexities, many accounting firms 
rely on a wide array of audit and non-audit resources in conducting audits.
14 This assumes that such restriction will not reduce the scale of the NAS division within the audit firm 
where the firm will seek clients that are not audited by them. However given the scale of their auditing 
division, such a restriction will remove a large number of potential clients. The relatively recent split 
of the consulting arms of several top tier accounting firms suggest this may be the case. A reduction in 
the scale of the NAS sections of the audit firm may result in reduced access to non-audit expertise 
available within the firm which may be needed in the conduct of an audit.
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Non-audit competencies are needed to produce a quality audit for corporations 
with complex financial structures. (Deloitte & Touche 2000)
Also, the Panel on Audit Effectiveness (2000) found that NAS can have a positive 
impact on audit effectiveness in about a quarter of the engagements in which both 
types of services had been provided to the client.
Simunic (1984), Palmrose (1986), Davis et al. (1993), Butterworth and Houghton 
(1995), Craswell et al. (1995) and Antle et al. (2004) all report a positive association 
between audit fees and NAS. Although unexpected, the results are still consistent 
with APNAS improving audit quality under an assumption that the demand for audit 
services is price elastic.
2.6.2 Impact o f APNAS on independence
The main argument against the provision of both audit and NAS to the same client is 
that it will result in conflicts of interest, which threaten both real and perceived 
independence. It is this argument that has been strongly pressed in recent times in 
respect of corporate failures.
The Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants, published by the International 
Federation of Accountants (IFAC Ethics Committee 2001) and the revised 
Professional Statement F.l of the Code of Professional Conduct, jointly issued by The 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia and CPA Australia (ICAA and CPAA 
2004)15 both list various threats to independence. The Ramsay Report (2001)
15 The Code of Professional Conduct in Australia has been replaced by the Code of Ethics for 
Professional Accountants in 2006, issued by the Accounting Professional and Ethical Standards Board 
(APESB)
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highlighted the fact that many specific NAS commonly provided by major accounting 
firms have the potential to be threats to independence.
The “self-interest threat” occurs when the auditor could benefit from a financial 
interest in, or other self-interest conflict with the auditee. The “familiarity threat” 
occurs when a relationship between the auditor and auditee develops such that the 
auditor becomes too sympathetic to the client’s interests. Both threats may occur 
where the auditor is recruiting senior management for the assurance client.
The “self-review threat” may occur where the firm audits any of the other services it 
provides, which includes valuation services, internal audit services, IT system 
services, legal services and corporate finance services.
The “advocacy threat” may occur where the audit finn has to promote its client in any 
other fashion besides that of its auditor, such as when it provides legal services or 
corporate finance services, advice or assistance (Ramsay 2001).16
In addition to the specific NAS, the purchase of any APNAS will increase the fee 
dependence of the auditor on the auditee. An “intimidation threat” occurs when the 
auditor is deterred from acting objectively by threats, actual or perceived, from the 
auditee. This and “self-interest threats” may occur if the provision of current and 
future NAS is affected by conflicts that arise during the external audit process.
16 The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) conducted a survey of the Group of 
100 companies, of which 67 replied. ASIC found that as a percentage of total fee paid to the audit 
firm, 53.2% was for the audit service, 16.6% for tax advice, 4.6% for IT consultation, 4.5% for advice 
on funding or structure, 3.7% on the internal audit, 1.5% on recruitment, 1.5% for accounting advice 
and support, 0.6% on legal services, and 0.2% on insolvency and liquidation, leaving 12.5% on other 
services (ASIC 2002).
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This view is reflected in a testimony given by the former chairman of the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission, Arthur Levitt to a Senate subcommittee:
As auditing becomes an ever-smaller portion of a finn's business with an audit 
client, it becomes harder to assume that the auditor will challenge 
management when he or she should, if to do so might jeopardize a lucrative 
consulting contract for the auditor's firm. Similarly, when an auditor's 
compensation is tied to his or her ability to cross-sell the finn's non-audit 
services to the audit client, the auditor has a direct economic incentive to 
avoid friction with management. Moreover, by providing consulting services 
to an audit client, a finn puts itself in the position of simultaneously serving 
two masters - as a consultant serving management, and as an auditor serving 
the public. In addition, certain services by their very nature raise 
independence issues. If, for example, an auditor is hired by an audit client to 
value an asset, to establish the amount of a reserve for an insurance company, 
or to prepare the accounting records, when the time comes for the same 
auditor to examine the financial statements, the auditor now must review his 
or her own work. In any of these situations, the auditor cannot, in any 
meaningful sense, be considered to be independent of the client. (Levitt 2000)
However, The Panel on Audit Effectiveness states that it was “not aware of any 
instances of non-audit services having caused or contributed to an audit failure or the 
actual loss of auditor independence.” (The Panel on Audit Effectiveness 2000).
Using questionnaires and interviews with Malaysian auditors, loan officers and senior 
managers of public listed companies, Muhamad Sori and Karbhari (2006) found that 
the majority of respondents agreed with the statement that the provision of NAS to 
audit clients by the audit engagement team would threaten independence. On the 
other hand, the majority of respondents agreed that auditor independence would not 
be threatened if the provision of audit and NAS were provided by staff from a 
separate department and entity.
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There has also been regulatory tightening up in the area of auditors providing NAS to 
their client due in part to recent large public corporate collapses. In the US, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 prohibits the auditor from providing most NAS, 
including financial information system design and implementation services, internal 
audit services, legal and expert services unrelated to the audit. Audit committees will 
also need to pre-approve any allowed non-audit services.
In Australia, the Treasury enacted the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program 
(Audit Reform & Corporate Disclosure) Act in 2004 (referred to as the CLERP 9 Act) 
which requires that directors make a statement on whether they are satisfied that the 
provision of NAS by their auditors do not compromise the general standard of audit 
independence required by the Corporations Act.
2.7 Impact of the board of directors on APNAS
An important role of the board of directors is to oversee various internal control 
mechanisms within the firm. This oversight function extends to the content of the 
annual financial report, for which it is responsible. Due to this, the board must also 
monitor the quality of the external audit as it has a direct impact on the ability of the 
financial report to function as a control mechanism. Since APNAS is one factor that 
may potentially affect the audit quality, it is likely that the board of directors will 
monitor the purchase of APNAS within the firm.
2.7.1 Board o f directors, audit committees, APNAS and audit quality
As detailed above, APNAS can have two different impacts on audit quality. It could 
increase quality through improved auditor competence as a result of knowledge
37
spillovers. However, it could also decrease quality due to an increased threat to 
auditor independence.
When circumstances generate a demand for NAS, the entity will then have to choose 
from whom to source the service. Management frequently seeks the auditor as a 
supplier of first choice because of favourable interpersonal relationships, and the audit 
firm’s pre-existing knowledge of the auditee’s operation, which may lead to shorter 
engagement times and lower costs (Houghton 2002).
If, as argued by Arrunada (1999), APNAS produces firm specific information that is 
useful in conducting the external audit, it can have a positive effect on auditor 
competence. This may increase the probability of discovering a misstatement. But 
the quality of the audit is determined in the first instance through the scope (or extent) 
of the audit. Where there is a demand for increased audit quality, the scope of the 
audit is increased. Therefore, an increase in competence can be obtained more 
directly through the purchase of additional audit services. Hence board and audit 
committees that seek a high quality audit will purchase more audit services rather than 
increasing APNAS purchase.
However, if APNAS has a negative effect on auditor independence as argued by 
Levitt (2000), it will reduce the quality of the audit which will in turn lower the 
probability of the auditor reporting any misstatements. Therefore boards and audit 
committees that seek a high quality audit will restrict management’s purchase of NAS 
from its incumbent auditor.
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Incidentally, those NAS that are likely to have the greatest impact on the quality of 
financial statements are those which are most likely to result in significant threats to 
independence, such as outsourced internal auditing. This suggests that if APNAS has 
the dual impact of increasing competence and decreasing independence, it is likely 
that the negative impact on independence will be dominant17.
Hence the following ‘independence proposition’:
Firms with boards and audit committees that seek higher quality audit will purchase 
significantly less APNAS.
2.7.2 Monitoring hypothesis
Finns whose board and audit committee are good monitors will then seek to maximise 
the reduction of agency costs. As a result, the board will try to improve the ability of 
the annual financial report to reduce agency costs by maintaining a high quality 
external audit.
In support of this argument, Carcello et al. (2002) find that superior boards tend to 
spend more in audit fees. Also, Beasley and Petroni (2001) find that for property- 
liability insurance companies, the likelihood that a specialist brand name (Big 6) 
auditor is employed is positively related to the percentage of outsiders on the board, 
where specialist brand name auditor was used as a proxy for audit quality.
Abbott et al. (2003) found that firms with an independent and active audit committee
bought less APNAS than other firms, which is supportive of the monitoring
17 There is anecdotal evidence that this is now more keenly seen with auditees and auditors 
withdrawing from such joint supply.
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hypothesis. This study extends Abbott et al. (2003) by examining a more 
comprehensive list of audit committee characteristics as well as the board of directors.
Taken together with the independence proposition above, this will produce the 
following ‘monitoring hypothesis’:
Finns with stronger boards and audit committees will purchase significantly less
18APNAS compared to other firms.
2.8 Summary and conclusions
This chapter outlines the theoretical framework that this research is based on, 
illustrating the link between the board of directors and APNAS. It describes how 
conflicts of interests between managers and shareholders lead to agency costs. These 
agency problems are resolved by a set of institutional and market mechanisms 
referred to as corporate governance mechanisms. Two such mechanisms are the 
board of directors and the external audit.
The ability of the external audit to lower agency costs is dependent on its perceived 
quality, which is in turn dependent on the perceived independence of the auditor that 
performs the audit. The perception of auditor independence might be threatened if the 
audit finn jointly provide NAS and audit services to the same client. The board of 
directors who oversees various internal control mechanisms within the firm monitors 
the quality of the external audit.
IS An alternative argument by Rediker and Seth (1995) is that different mechanisms may substitute for 
each other, suggesting an opposite relationship -  that increasing monitoring from the board may be 
related to decreasing monitoring from the external auditors. This ‘substitution hypothesis’ is explored 
further as an additional test in section 11
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This leads to the monitoring hypothesis, which predicts that finns with stronger 
boards will purchase less APNAS compared to other firms. This is further explored in 
Chapter Three where various aspects of the board as examined in greater detail.
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CHAPTER 3. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
3.1 Introduction
The previous chapter examined the theoretical framework of the agency problem, and 
the relationship between board of directors, the audit committee, the external audit 
and auditor provided non-audit services. First this chapter provides an overview of 
the literature looking for evidence of APNAS affecting auditor independence. In the 
previous chapter it was predicted that levels of APNAS are negatively related to 
stronger boards and audit committees. In this chapter, testable hypotheses are 
developed regarding different aspects of the board and audit committee, looking at 
both the quality of the board and sub-committee, and their independence.
Section 3.2 reviews the literature of empirical research regarding the effect of APNAS 
on auditor independence. Sub-section 3.2.1 reviews prior literature regarding 
investor’s perception of APNAS while Sub-section 3.2.2 examines the relationship 
between APNAS and evidence of systematic earnings management. Sub-section 3.2.3 
looks at how researchers try to link levels of APNAS to a few more highly visible 
aspects of the audit. Finally sub-section 3.2.4 looks at the relationship between levels 
of APNAS and a firm’s willingness to appoint its auditor as a provider of NAS. 
Section 3.3 starts the discussion on the board of directors, and specific testable 
hypotheses are developed regarding the quality of the board of directors in section 3.4 
and the independence of the board in section 3.5. Section 3.6 introduces the audit 
committee while section 3.7 and 3.8 develops the hypotheses for the audit committee. 
Section 3.9 looks at recent events and 2001 as an event year. Section 3.10 introduces 
and develops the substitution hypothesis which suggests that monitoring from various
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corporate governance mechanisms can be substituted for one another. Section 3.11
provides a summary and conclusion for the chapter.
3.2 Effects of APNAS on auditor independence
There is an increasing number of studies dedicated to finding evidence of the effect of 
APNAS on auditor independence. The results of these empirical studies are mixed.
3.2.1 APNAS and investor perception
One approach was to investigate the investor’s perceptions about the impact APNAS 
had on auditor independence. To this end, Frankel et al. (2002) found a negative 
association between APNAS and abnormal returns. They also modelled APNAS and 
found that the abnormal component (unexpected fees), scaled by total fees, was 
likewise negatively associated with abnormal returns. This suggests that investors did 
perceive excessive APNAS spending as impairing auditor independence. However 
when Ashbaugh et al. (2003) controlled for other firm specific disclosures in the 
proxy statements, they found no market reaction.
Brown et al. (2006) also found the negative association between APNAS and 
abnormal returns. In addition, when estimating the expected APNAS (and hence the 
unexpected component), they controlled for organisational attributes (such as other 
corporate governance structures) and they used prior year data. They found that the 
coefficient of the unexpected fee ratio was significant while that of the expected fee 
ratio was not. This suggests that the market was efficient in pricing the impact 
relative APNAS purchases might have on firm value based on previously available
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information and that when new information is released, firms with higher than 
expected APNAS were further punished.
Rather than looking at abnormal returns, several studies investigated the relationship 
between APNAS and the earnings response coefficient (ERC), which would reflect 
the market’s perception about the uncertainty of a firm’s audit/eamings quality and 
thus the market valuation of the firm’s earnings surprises. Francis and Ke (2004) find 
that firms with high APNAS had a lower ERC, suggesting that investors view that 
high APNAS lead to lower audit quality.
In addition, Krishnan et al. (2005) also found that both relative and absolute levels of 
APNAS spending were negatively associated with the ERC in the three quarters in 
2001 following the first-time disclosure of APNAS fees. They also modelled APNAS 
and found that the abnormal component (unexpected fees) was also negatively 
associated with the ERC in the second and third quarters following the release of the 
proxy.
Ghosh et al. (2004) also find that ERC decreases as APNAS fee ratio or client 
importance (measured as total fee divided by the auditor’s total revenue from all 
clients) increases. However, when both measures are included, only client importance 
is statistically significant. They also found that there is no statistically significant 
change in ERC when non-audit fees increase or decrease (by more than 30 percent). 
This suggests that investors do not interpret these APNAS changes as the firm’s 
“bribes or punishment” of auditors through APNAS, as suggested by Coffee (2004).
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Gul et al. (2006) using Australian data also find a negative association between the 
ERC and APNAS. The also find that this association is stronger for firms audited by 
non-big 6 firms (they used 1993 and 1994 data), suggesting that the market perceive 
that big 6 firms are better able to maintain their independence when their clients 
purchase NAS from them.
3.2.2 APNAS and evidence o f earnings management
Another way to observe the quality of the audit is to seek systematic evidence of 
earnings management. In those audits where independence is compromised, 
managers will have greater discretion to aggressively manage their earnings to 
produce favourable financial reports. Therefore, if APNAS has a detrimental effect 
on auditor independence, one would expect to find evidence of relatively more 
earnings management activity within finns with large APNAS purchases compared to 
those with lower levels of APNAS.
Also in the US, Frankel et al. (2002) found that finns with high APNAS are more 
likely to meet analyst forecasts and also tend to report higher absolute discretionary 
accruals, compared to firms with lower levels of APNAS. Both findings suggest a 
greater magnitude of earnings management in those firms. This suggests that APNAS 
does have a negative impact on auditor independence and that auditors tolerate a 
higher degree of earnings management in their clients with large APNAS spending. 
This argument was also supported by Ferguson et al. (2004) who found that UK firms 
with high APNAS purchases had higher mean absolute value of discretionary 
accruals.
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However, a number of studies have challenged the results and generalisation of those 
results found in Frankel et al. (2002). In relation to firms with high APNAS being 
more likely to meet analyst forecast, Ashbaugh et al. (2003) was unable to find 
significance evidence that firms with high levels of APNAS meet or beat analyst 
forecasts.
Ashbaugh et al. (2003) also find that it is the income-decreasing discretionary accruals 
that drive the relationship between the APNAS fee ratio and absolute discretionary 
accruals suggesting that finns with high levels of APNAS tend to adopt a more 
conservative application of GAAP, whereas it is a more opportunistic application of 
GAAP that signals problems with auditor independence (Becker et al. 1998).
Chung and Kallapur (2003) find that after controlling for industry effects, the 
coefficient of the APNAS fee ratio loses its significance. Similar insignificant results 
were found when 3 industries (SIC codes 34 - manufacturing: fabricated metal 
products; 36 -  manufacturing: electrical and electronic equipment; and 73 -  business 
services including advertising, software, data processing, etc) were removed from the 
sample. However, they did not report if they found a relationship between high 
APNAS and absolute discretionary accruals in these three industries. Chung and 
Kallapur (2003) also used a different measure of the auditor’s incentive to 
compromise their independence, namely, the importance of the client to the auditor. 
To proxy for this, they used a number of measures being, the ratio of (1) the client’s 
total fees to the audit firm’s total revenues, and (2) the client’s non-audit fees to the 
adit firm’s total revenues. Based on a few assumptions, they also calculated a 
surrogate measure of the practice-office revenues and used it to replace the audit
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firm’s total revenues in the above two ratios. They find that none of these ratios have 
any significant association to abnormal accruals.
Larcker and Richardson (2004) also find a statistically positive association between 
APNAS to total fee ratio and abnormal accruals in support of Frankel et al. (2002). 
However they find that this relationship only occurs for approximately 8.5% of the 
total sample, which have on average smaller market capitalization, lower book-to- 
market ratio, lower institutional holdings, and higher insider holdings. Similar to 
Chung and Kallapur (2003) they also used two additional measure of auditor 
independence, that is the ratio of APNAS and total fee to the audit firms total fee 
revenue. In addition, they used an audit fee model (from Simunic 1984 and Craswell 
et al. 1995) to estimate industry coefficients for both audit and non-audit fees and 
using the estimated residuals as abnormal audit fees and non-audit fees. They expect 
that the auditor will face greater threats to independence for firms with positive 
abnormal audit or non-audit fees since they are being paid higher than the industry 
norm and are presumably a more profitable client. In contrast to their earlier results, 
when using these four measures of auditor independence, they found a negative 
relationship between them and earnings quality, suggesting that auditors are less 
likely to allow abnormal accrual choices for firms where they have the greatest 
financial interest or dependence on.
Frankel et al. (2002)’s model was also replicated by Reynolds et al. (2004) who found 
the same relationship between high APNAS purchase and abnormal accruals. When 
the Finns were divided into quartiles, the relationship was found to be unique to the
47
second smallest quartile. And that the relationship disappears after controlling for 
IPOs, industry and recent asset growth.
Antle et al. (2004), using both UK and US data, estimated a set of three simultaneous 
equations for audit fee, non-audit fees and abnormal accruals. From that system of 
simultaneous equations, they find a significant, negative effect of non-audit fees on 
abnormal accruals in the UK, and an insignificant relationship in the US, contrary to 
the results of Frankel et al. (2002).
3.2.3 APNAS and the externally visible aspects o f the audit
Rather that investigate perceived auditor independence, researchers have also looked 
to possible impact APNAS has on independence in fact. One line of research has 
been to find a relationship between APNAS and the externally visible aspects of the 
audit quality. If APNAS impairs the independence of the external auditor, it may 
have an impact on the audit service supplied.
It has been argued that the joint provision of both services will lead to the possibility 
of fee dependencies and reluctance to jeopardize the contracting for NAS if an audit 
client is in conflict with the auditor. However, DeBerg et al. (1991) found no 
evidence of an association between the decision to change auditor and the levels of 
APNAS purchased. There was no difference in the levels of APNAS purchased by 
companies changing and not changing auditor and the level of APNAS did not help 
identify firms likely to change auditor. This suggests that audit firms are not more 
likely to retain audit clients who purchase high rather than low levels of APNAS. 
Assuming that a change in auditor may rise from auditor-client disagreement, high
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levels of APNAS did not deter auditors from disagreeing with managers, suggesting 
that their independence was not compromised. Similarly, Barkess and Simnett (1994) 
found no relationship between auditor change and the level of APNAS purchased. 
Investigating New Zealand firms, Li et al. (2003) also found no significant 
relationship between non-audit fees and the stability of audit tenure.
A breach of independence will lead to a lower probability to report a detected 
misstatement. If this occurs, a lower incidence of audit qualifications is expected for 
firms where auditor independence is lower. Consistent with this argument, Wines 
(1994) found that firms with high levels of APNAS received a lower number of 
qualified audit opinions. Also, Shanna and Sidhu (2001) found that in a sample of 
bankrupt Australian companies, auditors had a tendency to not issue a going-concern 
qualification to clients with a high proportion of APNAS to total fees. However, 
Barkess and Simnett (1994), Craswell (1999) and Geiger and Rama (2003) found no 
relationship between levels of APNAS and the instances of audit qualifications. Also, 
DeFond et al. (2002) found no relationship between APNAS and the propensity to 
issue going concern opinions. Using New Zealand data, Li et al. (2003) found that 
only in one of three years under investigation (2000 from the period 1999-2001) there 
was a significant relationship between non-audit fees and audit qualifications or 
modifications.
Restatements of a firm’s previously issued financial statement is another signal of 
possible audit failure. Raghunandan et al. (2003) compared the fees of firms that are 
identified as having restated their financial statements against firms without a
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restatement. They found no statistically significant differences between the group in 
their APNAS, relative APNAS and total fee, as well as their unexpected component.
Kinney et al. (2004) also looked at firms that restated their financial statements and 
compared them with a matched sample. They found (1) no statistically significant 
positive association between fees for financial information system design and 
implementation services or internal audit services and restatements, (2) a positive 
association between unspecified NAS fees and restatements, and (3) a negative 
association between tax services fees and restatements. So the highly criticised (and 
banned under Sarbanes-Oxley) information systems design and internal audit services 
did not lead to a higher probability of restatements, while tax services (which is 
allowed under Sarbanes-Oxley) lead to a lower likelihood of restatements. However 
there are some unspecified NAS that is related to a higher probability of restatement.
Also, Ferguson et al. (2004) found that UK firms with high APNAS purchases (1) had 
a higher likelihood of their accounting practices being publicly criticised or subject to 
regulatory investigation, and (2) were more likely to restate prior financial statements 
or adjust current year results upon adoption of Financial Reporting Standard No. 12.
Given that there are severe consequences for providing low quality audit if 
discovered, it is likely that auditors would avoid independence threats that may result 
in changes in the perceived level of audit quality. This coupled with the low 
incidences of auditor changes and audit qualifications may be the reason for the mixed 
evidence in the studies reviewed above.
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3.2.4 APN AS and a firm ’s willingness to appoint
Another line of research was to relate a firm’s “willingness to appoint” (Houghton and 
Ikin 2001) with levels of APNAS purchased. One of the main factors influencing the 
willingness of the firm to purchase NAS from its incumbent auditor is its desire for a 
high quality audit. If APNAS lowers the actual or perceived independence of the 
auditor, then it is expected that firms identified as desiring high quality audit will 
purchase less APNAS19.
Since one of the primary desired effects of an audit is to reduce agency costs, these 
costs have been used to measure the level of tolerance for lower independence. 
Parkash and Venable (1993) found that agency cost variables (management 
ownership, owner dispersion and leverage) could explain variations in the level of 
APNAS purchased. Firth (1997) also found support using agency cost variables 
(director shareholdings, large shareholdings and financial distress). Houghton and 
Ikin (2001) found that firms with large block holders (percentage of ownership held 
by the top five stockholders) and firms in industries with high political costs (highly 
regulated industries and industries with generous tax concessions) purchased less 
APNAS.
Corporate governance variables have also been used to measure the level of tolerance 
for lower auditor independence. Since corporate governance mechanisms are used to 
reduce agency costs, it is expected that corporate governance is related to APNAS.
19 A related concept is the audit firm’s “willingness to supply”. It is often assumed that the audit firm is 
always willing to supply NAS to its auditee. However, if the audit firm feels that the joint supply will 
negatively affect the quality of audit (either perceived or in actuality) and if it is unacceptable to the 
firm, it will either refuse to supply the NAS or end the audit contract. Although such behaviour has not 
been documented in prior studies, it is likely that the audit firm’s willingness to supply will decrease if 
there is increased public perception that APNAS has a detrimental effect on audit quality.
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Abbott et al. (2003) found that firms with audit committees comprised solely of 
outside directors and meeting at least four times annually, purchase less APNAS than 
other firms.
This study substantially extends Abbott et al. (2003) by examining a longer time 
frame, and using more comprehensive corporate governance variables to describe the 
audit committees. In addition, it examines the board of directors which Abbott et al. 
does not. Also the use of Australian data provides a more stable data set for 
hypothesis testing, Australia having had mandated APNAS disclosure for many years.
3.3 Board of directors
The board of directors is something that should be taken into account given that the 
board holds significant influence over the selection of the auditor and the purchase of 
NAS. Similar to the quality of audit, the strength of monitoring provided by directors 
is dependent on the effectiveness/quality of the directors sitting on the board and their 
independence. The external auditors (and in some cases the consultants) are one 
avenue by which the board discharges its monitoring duties. If the joint provision of 
audit and NAS jeopardises the independence (and hence quality) of the audit function, 
it is expected that the board will exercise its influence to either change the selection of 
auditors or the provider of the NAS.
3.4 Quality of the board of directors
The quality of the board refers to the board’s ability to monitor the firm and its 
executives and to safeguard the interests of the shareholders.
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3.4.1 Size o f the board
Jensen (1993) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992) argue that large boards are relatively 
ineffective and are easier for the CEO to control. It is argued that a large board is 
unwieldy and also increases problems such as director “free riding”. Also, in large 
boards it becomes more difficult for the directors to express their ideas and opinions 
in the limited time available to them. This is supported by Yermack (1996) who 
found that there was a significant negative relationship between Tobin’s Q and board 
size. They also find that there was a weaker link between performance and CEO 
turnover for companies with large boards, which suggests that large boards are less 
likely to punish the CEO for poor performance.
On the other hand, Chaganti et al. (1985) posit that larger boards are valuable for the 
breadth of their services. Klein (2002b) suggests that if the board of directors are 
small, the number of directors available to serve on the audit committee will also be 
limited, and find that board size is positively related to audit committee independence. 
Also, Xie et al. (2003) find that board size was negatively related to discretionary 
accruals suggesting that firms with larger boards have less aggressive earnings 
management and Anderson et al. (2004) find that the cost of debt was inversely 
related to board size suggesting greater creditor confidence in the integrity of financial 
accounting reports.
The primary concern regarding the board’s monitoring in this paper deals only with 
one particular aspect of their expertise, which is their financial oversight. In addition, 
the contracting of APNAS is done primarily by management, with the board
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restricting it if they felt it compromises the independence of the external audit. Since 
the model is mainly testing board’s ability to restrict management, it is expected that 
the first argument will be dominant, that is, the larger the board, the more ineffective 
it is at restricting APNAS spending.
This leads to the following hypothesis:
H 1.1: Entities with smaller boards will purchase less APNAS (relative to total fee20), 
other things being equal.
3.4.2 Multiple directorships
Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that multiple board appointments may be a measure of 
a director’s quality. The appointment to multiple boards may be a result of superior 
performance by a company of which an individual is a director. If the market for 
directors is tied to corporate performance, the reputation of a director may generate 
additional offers of directorships. This reputation effect was supported by Ferris et al. 
(2003) who found that the previous performance of firms affects both the number of 
directorships the directors hold as well as their ability to attract additional board 
appointments. In addition, Kaplan and Reishus (1990) found that top executives of 
Finns that cut dividends are less likely to obtain additional directorships and 
Shivdasani (1993) find that outside directors of firms that are targets of hostile bids 
are likely to hold fewer directorships than directors of non-target firms.
20 As argued above, purchase of APNAS is expected to result in a lower perception of audit quality by 
the board and audit committee. The extent to which this happens is measured by the ratio of APNAS 
fee to total fee, where total fee is defined as audit fee plus APNAS fee. It is possible that the 
perception of audit quality is altered by both the levels of APNAS purchased as well as the amount 
purchased relative to the total fee paid to auditors. However, given that Australian regulations require 
the disclosure of both audit fee and APNAS fee, it is likely that shareholders and boards would focus 
more on the relative measure compared to a levels measure. This approach is consistent with much of 
the prior literature regarding APNAS which used APNAS relative to either audit fee (such as Firth 
1997 and Abbott et al. 2003) or total fee (such as DeFond et al. 2002 and Frankel et al. 2002).
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Directors with multiple directorships also have more to lose as poor performance in 
one firm may influence not only further appointments but also the current 
directorships held. This is supported by the results of Gilson (1990) who found that 
outside directors that leave boards of financially distressed firms hold approximately 
one-third fewer directorships three years after their departure.
However, an alternate argument posits that directors with multiple directorships are 
poor monitors for their company as they have insufficient time and resources to 
monitor numerous firms effectively. Core et al. (1999) report that firms with directors 
holding multiple appointments is associated with excess CEO compensation 
suggesting that such directors provide an inadequate check on management. Also, 
while Cotter et al. (1997) finds that firms that are the target of tender offers tend to 
have received higher premiums when independent directors dominate the board, 
multiple directorships did not seem to affect the premium offered.
However, Ferris (2003) found no evidence to support that multiple directorship was 
linked to a decrease in monitoring provided by the directors. They found that multiple 
directorships was not negatively related to firm value and that the announcement of a 
multiple director being appointed produced positive abnormal returns, suggesting that 
the market does not believe multiple directorships harm firm value. The multiple 
directors also tend to serve on more committees and attend more committee meetings, 
that they also serve on the more important audit and compensation committees with 
greater frequency and that the chair committees with greater frequency as well. They 
also found no statistically significant evidence of a relation between multiple
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directorships and the likelihood that the finn will be named in a securities fraud
lawsuit.
In addition, Shivdasani (1993) found that the monitoring capabilities of directors 
holding multiple board membership lie with the independent (or non-affiliated) non­
executive directors.
This leads to the following hypothesis:
HI.2: Entities where the directors have a larger average number of multiple 
directorships among the outside directors will purchase less APNAS (relative 
to total fees) other things being equal.
3.4.3 Diligence
One of the recommendations made by Lipton and Lorsch (1992) concerns the 
frequency of meetings of the board. A concern is that board effectiveness may 
decline if there is insufficient time to complete board duties. Vafeas (1999) found that 
years of abnormally high meeting frequency follow periods of poor performance. In 
turn, operating performance rises following years of abnormally high meeting 
frequency. Xie et al. (2003) also found board meeting frequency to be associated with 
reduced levels of discretionary accruals.
This leads to the following hypothesis:
HI.3: Entities where the board meets more often will purchase less APNAS (relative 
to total fees), other things being equal.
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3.4.4 Financial literacy
DeZoort (1997) and Bull and Sharp (1989) find that it was important for audit 
committee members to have accounting and auditing expertise. This was reflected by 
the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit 
Committees (1999) and National Association of Corporate Directors (2000) which 
suggested that all audit committees members need to be financially literate for the 
audit committee to work effectively. Also Ramsay (2001, 155) notes that financial 
literacy is “an important component of the general standards of care, skill and 
diligence required of company directors”. DeZoort and Salterio (2001) found that 
audit committee members with greater audit knowledge were more likely to support 
an auditor who advocated a “substance over form” approach in dispute with client 
management. However, Xie et al. (2003) find that directors who are current or past 
executives in financial institutions were unrelated to discretionary current accruals.
While the monitoring activity of the board extends beyond financial matters, the 
particular monitoring activity of interest in this study is the quality of the external 
audit. It is expected that financial literacy is important and is a key determinant of the 
effectiveness of the director for this particular monitoring activity.
This leads to the following hypothesis:
HI.4: Entities where the board is made up of a higher proportion of financially
literate outside directors will purchase less APNAS (relative to total fees), 
other things being equal.
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3.5 Independence of the board of directors
As a monitoring tool, the value of the board of directors relies heavily on the 
independence of the board.
3.5.1 Outside directors
Non-executive directors have been argued to improve board quality by increasing its 
independence from management and working for the best interest of the shareholders 
(Cadbury 1995). They also have incentives to develop reputations as experts in 
decision control and monitoring (Fama and Jensen 1983).
Prior studies have found positive relationships between the independence of the Board 
of Directors with actions that are in the best interest of shareholders. Rosenstain and 
Wyatt (1990) found positive excess stock return around the announcement of a non­
executive director appointment and no stock reaction when an executive director 
appointment was announced.
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) go one step further by differentiating non-executive 
directors as outside directors and ‘grey’ directors. They define grey directors as one 
that is connected with the company either as a manager or as a substantial customer or 
supplier of goods and services.
Brickley et al. (1994) found the average stock-market reaction to announcements of 
poison pills is positive when the board has a majority of outside directors and negative 
when it does not. Byrd and Hickman (1992) found that firms with a majority of 
outside directors experienced significantly higher announcement-date abnormal
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returns during tender offer bids. Beasley (1996) compared firms with financial 
statement fraud against those that do not, finding that the no-fraud firms have 
significantly higher percentages of outside directors. Cotter et al. (1997) also found 
that in firms where outside directors have the voting control of the board, the initial 
tender offer premium, the bid premium revision, and the target shareholder gains over 
the entire tender offer period are higher.
Also, Klein (2002a) found a negative relation between board independence and 
abnormal accruals, suggesting independent boards are better at limiting earnings 
management, and Anderson et al. (2004) found that the cost of debt was inversely 
related to board independence suggesting greater creditor confidence in the integrity 
of financial accounting reports.
Being financially independent of management, independent directors have the ability 
to withstand pressure from the firm to manipulate earnings. However, independent 
directors are liable for negligent monitoring of their firm. As such, they have 
incentives to ensure that management is not conducing fraudulent earnings 
management activity. In support of this monitoring role of independent directors, 
Dechow, et al. (1996) and Beasley (1996) both find that there is a negative 
relationship between the number independent directors and incidence of financial 
statements fraud.
A high quality audit is one way in which directors can improve their monitoring of the 
firm. This is supported by Beasley and Petroni (2001) who found that for property-
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liability insurance companies, the likelihood of employing a specialist brand name 
auditor is positively related with the percentage of independent directors on the board.
This leads to the following hypothesis:
H2.1: Entities where the board is made up of a higher proportion of outside directors 
will purchase less APNAS (relative to total fees), other things being equal.
3.5.2 Outside chairman
Cadbury (1995) recommends that the role of the chairman of the board of directors 
should be separate from that of the CEO. An important factor in determining the 
independence of the board is its independence from the CEO (Hennalin and 
Weisbach. 2002). It is argued that where the two roles are combined in one person, it 
will represent a considerable concentration of power, and it is more likely that the 
CEO will be able to control the board reducing its independence from management.
Boyd (1994) and Mallette et al. (1995) found that when one person serves as both the 
CEO and board chairman, CEO compensation is higher compared to firms where the 
two roles are separate. Also Phan and Lee (1995) found that CEO/chair duality 
lowers the probability of CEO dismissal21. On the other hand, Xie et al. (2003) found 
no relationship between CEO duality and discretionary current accruals.
This leads to the following hypothesis:
H2.2: Entities with an outside director as chairman will purchase less APNAS
(relative to total fees), other things being equal.
21 However it is rare in Australia for companies to have an executive chairman. If there are relatively 
small number of firms, they may be deleted and the variable removed from the model.
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3.6 Audit Committee
The audit committee is a sub-committee of the full board and is typically delegated 
specific financial oversight responsibilities (Menon and Williams 1994b). This 
usually includes financial reporting, internal controls to address key risks, and auditor 
activity (BRC 1999; NACD 2000; AUASB et al. 2001). The audit committee is 
therefore an important and integral part of any test of the board and APNAS. A 
primary part of this responsibility is auditor selection and retention with a mind to 
maintain the quality of the audit, hence it is expected that a strong audit committee 
will result in improved audit and financial statement quality.
The stronger link between audit quality and the audit committee may result in 
increased sensitivity between characteristics of audit committee members and the 
willingness to purchase APNAS, compared with the board more generally. This 
could be due to several reasons. First, Reinstein et al. (1984) argue that in the event 
of an audit failure, outside, non-audit committee directors may be able to demonstrate 
fulfilment of their fiduciary duties by stating that they relied upon audit committee 
representations. This results in increased legal liability for committee members in 
matters regarding the firms relationship with its external auditor. Also Abbott et al. 
(2003) argue that audit committee service increases the reputation capital of these 
directors but a financial misstatement may also exacerbate reputation damage. Hence, 
audit committee directors have increased incentives to ensure that the financial 
statements are free of misstatements.
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3.7 Quality of the audit committee
The quality of the audit committee refers to the committee’s ability to monitor the 
firm and its executives and to safeguard the interests of the shareholders, within the 
scope of their financial oversight responsibility.
3. 7.1 Size o f the audit committee
Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) propose that audit committee effectiveness can be 
perceived as a function of audit committee power. Larger audit committees are 
legitimized by a meaningful designation from the board of directors and are thus more 
likely to be acknowledged as an authoritative body by the external and internal audit 
function.
Likewise, Anderson et al. (2004) argue that larger audit committees are consistent 
with boards committing more resources to improve financial reporting quality. In 
support of this, they found that yield spreads (being the difference between the yield 
to maturity on the firm’s publicly traded debt and that of a Treasury security) are 
negatively related to audit committee size.
However, Abbott et al. (2004) found no relationship between auditor size and the 
likelihood of financial restatement. Also, Bedard et al. (2004) found no significant 
association between the audit committee size with the likelihood of aggressive 
earnings management.
This leads to the following hypothesis:
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H3.1: Entities with larger audit committees will purchase less APNAS (relative to
total fee), other things being equal.
3.7.2 Multiple committee memberships
Multiple audit committee memberships are likely to have the same reputation effects 
and relationship to quality that multiple board directorships do.
Carcello and Neal (2003) found that firms with audit committee members holding 
multiple directorships are related to a lower incidence of auditor dismissal after the 
issuance of going-concem reports. Likewise, Bedard et al. (2004) found that firms 
with audit committee members holding multiple directorships are less likely to show 
evidence of aggressive earnings management. However, Krishnan (2005) found no 
relationship between the presences of committee members with multiple directorships 
and the incidence of internal control problems being reported by an outgoing auditor.
This leads to the following hypothesis:
H3.2: Entities where the audit committee members have a larger average number of 
multiple audit committee memberships among the outside members will 
purchase less APNAS (relative to total fees), other things being equal.
3.7.3 Diligence
Prior studies have found that firms with more frequent meetings of the audit 
committee were more likely to use specialist auditors (Abbott and Parker 2000); have 
smaller yield spreads (Anderson et al. 2004);; and smaller likelihood of restatements
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of annual results (Abbott et al. 2004). On the other hand, Krishnan (2005) found no 
relationship between frequency of audit committee meetings and incidence of internal 
control problems being reported by an outgoing auditor.
Also, Xie et al. (2003) found that frequent audit committee meetings are related 
reduced discretionary accruals. However, Bedard et al. (2004) ranked the firms in his 
sample of 3,451 firms based on the size of their abnormal accruals and selected the 
100 largest positive and 100 largest negative abnormal accruals, defining this group as 
the aggressive earnings management sub-sample. This was compared with a low 
earnings management sub-sample made up of firms with the lowest level of abnormal 
accruals centred around zero. They found no significant association between the 
frequency of audit committee meeting with the likelihood of aggressive earnings 
management.
This leads to the following hypothesis:
H3.3: Entities where the audit committee meets more often will purchase less 
APNAS (relative to total fees), other things being equal.
3.7.4 Financial literacy
A director’s financial literacy is arguably even more vital to carrying out the 
responsibility of a audit committee member compared to that of the board.
DeFond et al. (2005) found a positive market reaction (three-day cumulative abnormal 
return) to the appointment of a primarily accounting financial expert to the audit 
committee. Also audit committee with at least one member with a financial or
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accounting background (Bedard et al. 2004) and those who were from investment 
banking (Xie et al. 2003) were found to be associated with firms having less evidence 
of earnings management. While Krishnan (2005) found that financial literacy is 
related to decreased incidence of internal control problems being reported by an 
outgoing auditor.
However, Carcello and Neal (2003) found no evidence of a relationship between audit 
committee member’s financial literacy and incidences of auditor dismissal after the 
issuance of going-concern reports. Likewise, Anderson et al. (2004) did not find any 
relationship between audit committee member financial literacy and yield spreads.
This leads to the following hypothesis:
H3.4: Entities where the audit committee is made up of a higher proportion of
financially literate outside members will purchase less APNAS (relative to 
total fees), other things being equal.
3.8 Independence of the audit committee
Prior research found that independent audit committee members were more likely to 
use a specialist auditor (Abbott and Parker 2000); were negatively associated with the 
occurrences of restatements of annual results (Abbott et al. 2004); were related to a 
higher probability that a financially distressed firm will receive a going concern report 
from the auditor, suggesting greater auditor independence (Carcello and Neal 2000), 
and were related to a lower incidence of auditor dismissal after the issuance of going- 
concern reports (Carcello and Neal 2003); were associated with a significantly lower
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cost of debt financing (Anderson et al. 2004); were negatively associated with 
aggressive earnings management (Bedard et al. 2004); were related to decreased 
incidence of internal control problems being reported by an outgoing auditor 
(Krishnan 2005); and a negative relation to abnormal accruals (Klien 2002)
This leads to the following hypotheses:
H4.1: Entities where the audit committee is made up of a higher proportion of 
outside directors will purchase less APNAS (relative to total fees), other 
things being equal.
H4.2: Entities with an outside director as an audit committee chairman will purchase 
less APNAS (relative to total fees), other things being equal.
3.9 Background events and 2001 as an event year
3.9.1 Increasing scrutiny on APNAS
Of particular interest is whether the relationship between APNAS and the board 
and/or audit committee has changed over time given recent events.
Several developments in the business world have increased media attention and 
regulatory scrutiny on auditor independence, particularly in respect of APNAS. This 
has implications for the legal/political/regulatory mechanisms as well as the internal 
control mechanism of the firm.
One reason that APNAS has first come under criticism is due to its increasing 
prevalence and size relative to the audit services provided by accounting firms. Levitt
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(2000b) pointed out that NAS fee growth has been greater than audit fee over the past 
decade.
Consulting and other management advisory services now represent 50 percent 
of the revenues of the five largest firms -  up from j ust 13 percent in 1981...
from 1993 to 1999, the average annual growth rate for revenues from 
management advisory and similar services has been 26%, nearly three times 
the comparable growth rate for audit services (9%) and double the growth rate 
for tax services (13%) (Levitt 2000b).
Frankel et al. (2002) reported that the mean (median) ratio of APNAS to total fees is 
0.49 (0.51)22. Also, Abbott, Parker, Peter and Rama (2001) found that the ratio of 
APNAS fees to audit fees was greater than 1.01 for 25% of the sample firms with total 
assets smaller than $200 million, 53% of firms with total assets between $200 million 
and $1 billion, and 75% of firms with total assets greater than $1 billion2 ’.
These figures were similar to those found in Australia. Houghton and Ikin (2001) 
reported that APNAS as a percentage of total fees climbed from about 37% in 1990 to 
54% in 1999 for the top 1000 Australian companies. In a survey conducted by the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) of the Group of 100 firms 
(of which 67 responded) they find that 90% of the respondent bought NAS from their 
external auditor, and that these services amounted to 46.8% of the total fees paid to 
their external audit firm (ASIC 2002).
This trend in part has led the U.S. SEC to issue Proposed Rule S7-13-00, Revision of 
the Commission’s Auditor Independence Requirements in June 2000. The proposed
22 The sample of Frankel et al. (2002) is comprised of 3,074 firms with proxy statement in the SEC’s 
EDGAR database. This sample does not include financial institutions and firms that changed their 
auditors.
23 The sample of Abbott Parker, Peter and Rama (2001) is comprised of 265 firms that have filed their 
proxy and 10-K statements by the cut-off date.
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rule, among other things, restricted the provision of certain APNAS by accounting 
firms to their auditee (SEC 2000a). This was followed by a very public campaign by 
the then chairman of the SEC Arthur Levitt to restrict threats to auditor independence. 
This cumulated in the release of Final Rule: Revision of the Commission’s Auditor 
Independence Rules in November 2000. The rules regarding APNAS were much less 
restrictive than those in the proposed rules (SEC 2000b). However, these were 
subsequently greatly reinforced by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which is 
discussed further below.
3.9.2 Corporate collapses, 2001 as an event year
Another major reason that auditor independence has come under increased scrutiny is 
due to a number of high profile coiporate collapses of large companies. This has been 
coupled with allegations that auditor independence was compromised which 
prevented early discovery of the problems plaguing the failed companies. This led to 
concerns regarding the adequacy of regulations regarding auditor independence.
In March 2001, the ASIC put HIH Insurance Ltd into provisional liquidation. HIH
was Australia’s second largest insurer and is Australia’s largest ever corporate
collapse. Also, in April 2001, Harris Scarfe holdings Ltd went into receivership.
Both companies were criticised over the relationships they had with their auditors.
In 1999-2000, Harris Scarfe paid PwC $120,000 for the audit and another 
$211,284 for other services. A Harris Scarfe director, John Patten, who joined 
the board in 1996, is a former PwC partner. PwC replaced Ernst & Young as 
Harris Scarfe's auditor in 1998.
In 1999-2000, HIH's long-time auditor, Arthur Andersen (now called 
Andersen), was paid a $1.7 million audit fee and $1.6 million for other 
services. The HIH chairman, Geoffrey Cohen, and a former HIH director, 
Justin Gardener, are former Andersen partners. (Thomson 2001, 34).
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The debate revolving around the SEC-imposed regulations regarding auditor 
independence was largely confined to the US until Enron filed for the nation’s largest 
bankruptcy in December 2001. For the year 2000, Enron paid US$25 million for its 
audit services and paid another US$27 million to its auditors for other work.
Byrnes et al. (2002, 52) writes:
What Arthur Levitt couldn’t achieve in a year of public hearings, speeches, 
and backroom bargaining, the Enron scandal may now accomplish ...
... in many people’s minds the rising importance of consulting has contributed 
to a decline in auditor scepticism. It simply looks bad to have Andersen 
earning more on consulting to Enron than on auditing.
Also Nussbaum (2002, 39-40) writes:
With enormous pressures to produce earnings growth, auditors are being 
turned into enablers. They forsake their traditional role of outside skeptic for 
that of inside business partner and they reject their age-old function of 
discloser of information for that of master magician who hides the financial 
rabbit.
Investor confidence is crucial to the success of our economic system. This 
confidence is threatened by not only the Enron scandal but by the dramatic 
decline in accounting standards.
The unprecedented size of the HIH and Enron collapses has greatly increased concern 
over the quality of accounting and that of the external auditors. This has had some 
impact on the legal/political/regulatory mechanisms.
The biggest impact was the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) in 
the US. SOX, among other things, transformed the once largely self-regulated 
industry into one controlled by a quasi-govemmental agency, the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). Further, auditors were prohibited from
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provided most of the NAS to their audit client, including financial information system 
design and implementation services, internal audit services, legal and expert services 
unrelated to the audit. It also mandates the all firms must have an audit committee; 
that all its members must be independent of management; must state if the committee 
contains a financial expert, and if not, why not and that the audit committee is 
responsible for the appointment of the external auditor. In addition, the audit 
committee must approve the purchase of any APNAS that are not prohibited under 
SOX.
In Australia, the Ramsay Report was commissioned in part due to the high profile 
corporate collapses in 2001. Among its recommendations is to increase disclosure of 
the fees paid for APNAS divided into categories of services, as well as the audit 
committee (or in the absence of such a committee, the board of directors) to disclose 
whether the provision of such NAS was compatible with maintaining auditor 
independence. It also recommends the establishment of an Auditor Independence 
Supervisory Board whose task, in part, is to monitor the adequacy of NAS disclosure 
as well as strengthening the role of audit committees (Ramsay 2001).
Professional Statement F.l of the Code of Professional Conduct jointly issued by the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia (ICAA) and CPA Australia (CPAA) 
covers the professional conduct of accountants, including auditors. In December 
2001, the ICAA and CPAA released a re-exposure draft on F.l which was 
subsequently approved and issued by both professional bodies (ICAA and CPAA 
2004). The re-exposure draft covers in great detail cases where NAS are provided to
70
an audit client and the threats to independence that may arise, which should be 
avoided24.
While the Corporate Law Economic Reform Programme (CLERP) was in progress for 
several years, the contemporary events no doubt influenced the content and timing of 
the CLERP 9 discussion paper which was released in September 2002. The reform 
proposals led to the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform & 
Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004 (Cth) (i.e. the CLERP 9 Act) which became law on 
30 June 2004. Among other things, it requires that directors make a statement on 
whether they are satisfied that the provision of NAS by their auditors do not 
compromise the general standard of audit independence required by the Corporations 
Act. It also prescribes best practices in the structure of the board (majority of 
independent directors and independent chair) and audit committee (only non­
executive directors, a majority of independent directors, independent chair who is not 
chairperson of the board, at least three members) and requires companies to explain if 
they do not comply.
The circumstances described above are expected to decrease the willingness of 
auditees to purchase APNAS. Also the willingness of audit firms to supply APNAS 
is likely to decrease.
Also, the increasing publicity of APNAS as a threat to auditor independence may
decrease shareholders’ perception of audit quality in the presence of APNAS. This
then reduces their perception of the reliability of financial statements. This can have
24 The Code of Professional Conduct was replaced on 1 July 2006 by the Code of Ethics for 
Professional Accountants, issued by the newly established Accounting Professional and Ethical 
Standards Board (APESB)
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the effect of increasing the reluctance of the board to purchase NAS from the firm’s 
incumbent auditor in an attempt to prevent price protection by the shareholders.
H5: Relationship between the proportion of APNAS relative to total fees and board 
and audit committee characteristics will significantly alter between the period 
leading up to 2001 and 2002.
3.10 Substitution hypothesis
An alternative to the ‘monitoring hypothesis’ proposed above is the ‘substitution 
hypothesis’. Rediker and Seth (1995) argue that firms manage agency costs by 
depending on the efficiency of a bundle of corporate governance mechanisms rather 
than on the efficiency of any single mechanism, and that different mechanisms may 
substitute for each other. They find evidence for this when they considered the 
monitoring by outside directors against the monitoring by large outside shareholders, 
mutual monitoring by inside directors and the incentive effects of shareholdings by
25managers.
If the audited financial statements are taken as a corporate governance mechanism, 
then the ‘substitution hypothesis’ would suggests that finns that have other strong 
governance mechanisms may find an equilibrium agency cost minimisation position 
with a relatively lower quality audit. As a result, a strong board may be more tolerant
25 There are also evidence of more specific substitution effects among corporate governance 
mechanisms. For example, Anderson et al (1993) find that firms with greater assets-in-place have 
higher expenditures on auditing compared to directorships, and higher expenditure on internal auditing 
compared to external auditing. And Zajac and Westphal (1994) find that firms that are more risky are 
more likely to rely on board monitoring rather then incentive contracts for top managers arguably due 
to risk aversion. Also there has been some research into the substitutability of internal corporate 
governance mechanisms with external mechanisms, in particular the takeover market, (see Brickley and 
James 1987, Morck et al. 1983, Walsh and Seward 1990, and John and Senbet 1998)
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of threats to auditor independence, such as APNAS purchase because they have strong 
control mechanisms. This may be due to the increased monitoring ability of the 
board, which reduces the market’s estimation of the agency costs associated with 
APNAS, and the subsequent price protection. That is, the market is more tolerant of 
APNAS because they rely on the board to monitor audit quality and to ensure that the 
financial statements are of high quality.
Taken together with the independence proposition above will produce the following 
‘substitution hypothesis’:
Finns with stronger boards will purchase more APNAS compared to other firms.
Prior literature has suggested that the auditee’s production-investment attributes may 
influence whether the substitution or monitoring hypothesis is dominant. Anderson et 
al. (1993) argued that firms with higher assets-in-place have a greater capability to 
support debt and debt contracts which increases the reliance on accounting numbers. 
Hence there is a greater need for monitoring from auditors. On the other hand, firms 
with high growth options rely less on debt contracts and therefore less on accounting 
numbers and auditors in the determination of payoffs to claimholders. These 
claimholders are more concerned with the optimal exercise of the growth options to 
maximise the value of their claim. Directors are specialised in the role of monitoring 
managers who develop and exercise these options. Hence in high growth option 
firms, there is greater reliance on the monitoring from the board compared to auditors. 
In support of their argument, they found that firms with greater assets-in-place spent 
relatively more on auditing compared to directorships. This was also supported by 
Matolcsy et al. (2001) who found that firms with higher asset-in-place relative to
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growth options spend more on auditing compared to directorship. Also, they found 
that the percentage of outsiders on the board was value relevant for firms with high 
growth options but was not value relevant for low growth option firms.
This suggests that the auditee’s production-investment attributes may have different 
impacts on the demand for monitoring by auditors and the board. The substitution 
hypothesis is arguably dominant on the two extreme ends of the production- 
investment spectrum, that is firms with higher assets-in-place relative to growth 
options (which will substitute audit monitoring for board monitoring) and firms with 
higher growth options relative to assets-in-place (which will substitute board 
monitoring for audit monitoring). This is because for firms with higher assets-in- 
place (growth options) relative to growth options (assets-in-place) the value added 
from board (audit) monitoring will be less relative to audit (board) monitoring.
For firms with moderate levels of both assets-in-place and growth options, there is no 
ex ante expectation that the value of board is greater or less relative to audit 
monitoring. Hence the monitoring effect is more likely to be dominant for such firms.
This leads to the following two hypotheses.
H6.1: For entities with high levels of assets-in-place or growth options, those with 
stronger boards and audit committees will purchase more APNAS (relative to 
total fees) compared to other entities, other things being equal.
H6.2: For entities with moderate levels of assets-in-place and growth options, those 
with stronger boards and audit committees will purchase less APNAS (relative 
to total fees) compared to other entities, other things being equal.
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3.11 Summary and conclusions
This chapter reviews the literature looking for evidence of APNAS affecting auditor 
independence and develops the hypotheses to be tested in this study. The hypothesis 
are developed from the monitoring hypothesis in the previous chapter where it was 
predicted that levels of APNAS are negatively related to stronger boards and audit 
committees. Testable hypotheses are then developed regarding different aspects of 
the board and audit committee, looking at both the quality of the board and sub­
committee, and their independence.
In addition, background events are examined which impacted on the political and 
regulatory landscape which may have affected the relationship between APNAS and 
board / audit committee characteristics, in particular the year 2001.
Finally, the substitution hypothesis is developed as an alternative to the monitoring 
hypothesis, which predicts an opposite relationship between the APNAS spending and 
the board (and audit committee).
Chapter 4 describes the research methods used to test these hypotheses.
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C H A P T E R  4. RESEARCH M ETHOD
4.1 Introduction
The previous chapter reviewed the literature regarding the effect of APNAS on 
auditor independence and developed hypotheses to be tested in this study. This 
chapter looks at the setting and sample period to be investigated and introduces the 
base model to be used to test the hypotheses. The variables to be used in the study are 
defined and examined. Next, a replication of Abbott et al. (2003) is carried out and 
extended by introducing a more variables and also breaking their composite variable 
into its components. Then, the study is extended by examining changes to the 
relationship between APNAS and the test variables over the sample period and 
considering the substitution hypothesis as an alternative to the monitoring hypothesis.
Section 4.2 highlights the setting chosen for this study while section 4.3 discusses the 
sample period. Section 4.4 introduces the base multivariate regression model used to 
test the hypotheses. The dependent variable is defined in section 4.5. Section 4.6 
discusses the variables used to test the hypotheses. Sub-section 4.6.1 looks at the 
variables that proxy for the quality of directors, while sub-section 4.6.2 examines the 
variables used to proxy the independence of directors. Sub-sections 4.6.3 and 4.6.4 
then look at the variables that proxy for the quality and independence of the audit 
committee. Section 4.7 defines the control variables that will be used in the 
regression. Section 4.8 extends the research beyond the base model by looking into 
changes to the relationship between APNAS and the test variables over time. Sub­
section 4.9 discusses the methodology to test for the presence of the substitution
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hypothesis in the sample. Section 4.10 provides a summary and conclusion for the
chapter.
4.2 Setting
Australia was chosen as the setting for this study. This is because Australian firms are 
required to disclose in their financial report the amount of APNAS purchased during 
the year. While similar regulations exist in the U.S., they have only been active since 
February 2001. Using Australian data gives access to pre-2001 APNAS data. This 
provides data to compare pre- and post- 2001 APNAS purchasing data26. Since the 
year 2001 is the event year, it is likely that there will be increased noise from the 
event. Also as it is the first year that the disclosure regulation is active, there can be 
expected to be significant volatility in the reported figures for the next few years. 
This volatility may arise from changes in firm policy that may be a result of changing 
regulations. Also inconsistent measurement across firms may also induce volatility in 
the figures. Since the regulation in Australia was active for a longer time, the APNAS 
figure should be more stable in terms of firm policy choice and reliable in terms of 
measurement.
4.3 Sample period
As discussed above, the merger of Price Waterhouse and Coopers and Lybrand in July 
1998 might result in an abnormal increase in APNAS for the first year. This is 
because if a firm was audited by one and purchased NAS from the other, the merger 
will cause the NAS to be one that is provided by its auditor.
26 In Australia, only the total APNAS fee is needed to be disclosed, unlike in the US, where IT fees are 
separately disclosed. As such finer analysis of the different APNAS and their possible different effects 
cannot be made.
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Also, 2002 sees the integration of Andersen with Ernst and Young in Australia. 
Unlike the merger of Price Waterhouse with Coopers and Lybrand, the integration 
was a result of the collapse of Andersen which may carry with it additional 
confounding variables in the years that immediately follow. While the 2002 data for 
the firms that used to be audited by Andersen might have the same abnormal increase 
in APNAS for that first year, it is also the first year after the event period. Additional 
testing will be done removing firms audited by Andersen in 2001 from the 2002 
sample.
As a result, the period chosen for the research is 1999 to 2002 inclusive. This will 
avoid some of the noise associated with the formation of PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 
and the collapse of Andersen and allow the examination of the effects of the corporate 
collapses of 2001.
4.4 Base Model
Consistent with the extant APNAS literature, this study uses a pooled multivariate 
regression to address the research questions. The basic regression framework is 
shown below:
APNAS/TFEE = a  + ßj Board variables + ßj Audit committee variables 
+ßk Control variables + 8 
The full regression model is as follows:
APNAS/TFEE = a  + ß, B SIZE + ß2 B DSHIPS + ß3 B MEET
+ ß4 B FINLIT + ß5 B OUTSIDE + ß6 B CHAIR 
+ ß7 A MSHIP + ß8 A MEET + ß9 A FINLIT
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+ ß,0 A OUTSIDE + ßn A CHAIR + ß12 BLOCK + ß13 BIG5 
+ ß 14 AUD SPEC + ß ,5 ALOCKS + ß,6 MINING 
+ ß17 FININCIAL + ß18 UTILITIES + ß!9 ASSETS 
+ ß20 ALLSUBS + ß21 RESTRUCT + ß22 NEWCEO 
+ ß23 NEWISSUE + ß24 NEGROI + ß25 LEVERAGE 
+ ß26 NAS SPEC + ß27 US LIST + ß28 US SUB + ß29 YEAR1 
+ 8
This regression is estimated using pooled data from the four years 1999-2002. This is 
due to the large number of variables and relatively small sample derived from 
Australian data. While the pooled regression provides more efficient estimation, it 
assumes that the regression parameters do not change over time. Given the increasing 
level of debate regarding APNAS, the assumption may not hold. However, given that 
the change is expected to be only in one direction, and that the study only investigates 
relationships between the dependent and test variables (that is the study is not 
attempting to predict the dependent), the results of the pooled regression are still 
valid.
Separate yearly regressions are also done however their reduced sample size may 
reduce the power of the test.
The variables including control variables are defined and explained below.
Beyond the base model, a replication of Abbott et al. (2003) using Australian data will 
be conducted. Where possible the same or similar the control variables are used. As
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is discussed below, three of the variables are not available. The results will be 
compared against those found in their study (which used American data) and will be 
further analysed by considering a wider range of variables.
4.5 Dependent variable
The dependent variable (APNAS/TFEE) used in the multivariate regression model is 
the ratio of non-audit fees to the total fees paid to the auditor (sum of non-audit fees 
and audit fees). This is consistent with prior studies (Frankel et al. 2002 and DeFond 
et al 2002).
So as to determine if there is any sensitivity over the choice of dependent variable, 
several other dependent variables, used in prior studies, were also considered in the 
present study. In particular, the ratio of non-audit fees to audit fee (as used in Abbott 
et al. 2003) as well as levels of APNAS (such as DeBerg et al. 1991 and Barkess and 
Simnett 1994) by using the natural log of APNAS. Additional testing was done using 
these alternate variables, but the regression producing the best results used 
APNAS/TFEE as the dependent variable. The results of those tests are reported in 
Appendix 2.1
4.6 Test variables
Listed below are the independent variables used to test the hypotheses.
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4.6.1 Quality o f the board o f directors
B S1ZE is defined as equal to the number of directors on the board. Large boards are 
argued to be relatively less effective and of lower quality. Therefore support for H 1.1 
is found if the coefficient for B SIZE is positively significant.
B DSHIP is defined as equal to the average number of directorships held by outside 
directors in the board. The average number of directorships is calculated by taking 
the total number of board appointments held by outside directors divided by the 
number of directors on the board. The number of directorships held by the directors is 
counted only among those firms that are in the population of listed firms in the 
Connect 4 database for that year, which roughly equates to the top 500 firms. 
Multiple directorships are argued to be an indication of the quality of a director. Also, 
directors with multiple directorships have more to lose from poor performance so 
there is an increased incentive to be an effective director. Therefore support for HI.2 
is found if the coefficient for B DSHIP is negatively significant.
B ME E T  is defined as equal to the number of board meetings held for the reporting 
year. This number is calculated by taking the sum of the total number of meetings 
attended by each director divided by the number of directors. This is to take into 
account possible reduced diligence that may result from meeting absentees. Board 
effectiveness may decline if there is insufficient time to complete the board’s duties. 
Therefore boards who meet frequently are expected to be more effective. Hence, 
support for HI.3 is found if the coefficient for BMEET is negatively significant.
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BFINLIT  is defined as equal to the percentage of outside directors with a financial or 
accounting background in the board. A director is defined as having a financial 
background if he/she works or have worked in the banking, accounting, auditing, or 
financial industries, or is a member of accounting or financial professional bodies, or 
holds business related degrees. It is expected that directors with financial background 
to be more aware of the external audit process which is the particularly monitoring 
activity of interest in this study. HI.4 is supported if the coefficient for B FINLIT is 
negatively significant.
4.6.2 Independence o f the board o f directors
B OUTSIDE is defined as equal to the percentage of outside directors on the board. 
Outside directors are defined as non-executive directors with no connection to the 
firm other than as its director.
B CHA1R is defined as equal to 1 if the chairman of the board of directors is an 
outside director.
Directors with no other ties to the firm are expected to be independent from 
management and are able to carry out their monitoring duties without undue influence 
from the executives of the firm. H2.1 and H2.2 are supported if the coefficients for 
B OUTSIDE and B CHAIR are significantly negative.
4.6.3 Quality o f the audit committee
A SIZE is defined as equal to the number of members on the audit committee. Large 
audit committees are argued to be consistent with the board and firm committing more
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resources to improve financial reporting quality. Therefore support for H3.1 is found 
if the coefficient for A SIZE is negatively significant.
AMSHIPS  is defined as equal to the average number of audit committee 
memberships held by outside audit committee members in the audit committee. The 
average number of membership is calculated by taking the total number of audit 
committee memberships held by the audit committee members divided by the number 
of members. Similar to directors with multiple directorships, audit committee 
members with multiple memberships in audit committees are expected to be better 
monitors of the firm. Support for H3.2 is found if the coefficient for A MSHIP is 
significantly negative“ .
A_MEET is defined as equal to the number of audit committee meetings held for the 
reporting year. This number is calculated by taking the sum of the total number of 
meetings attended by each director divided by the number of directors. This variable 
is used to proxy for the diligence of the audit committee. H3.3 is supported if the 
coefficient for A MEET is significant and negative.
A FINLIT is defined as equal to the percentage of outside audit committee members 
with a financial or accounting background in the audit committee. A member is 
defined as having a financial background if he/she works or has worked in the 
banking, accounting, auditing, or financial industries, or is a member of accounting or
27 Prior studies (such as Carcello and Neal 2003, Bedard et al. 2004 and Krishnan 2005) used multiple 
directorships (as opposed to multiple audit committee membership) as a measure of the audit 
committee member’s quality or ‘governance expertise’. Because multiple board membership is already 
being investigated in the board variables, the audit committee A MSHIPS variable is refined to only 
include additional directorships in which the director is also a member of their audit committee, 
providing a stronger measurement of the committee member’s experience as a governance expert or its 
reputation effects.
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financial professional bodies, or holds of business related degrees. Given the 
financial oversight responsibilities of the audit committee, financial literacy is an 
important element for the audit committee to work effectively. H3.4 is supported if 
the coefficient for A FINLIT is negatively significant.
4.6.4 Independence o f the audit committee
A_OUTSIDE is defined as equal to the percentage of outside directors in the audit 
committee. Outside directors are defined as non-executive directors with no 
connection to the firm other than as its director.
ACHAIR  is defined as equal to 1 if the chairman of the audit committee is an outside 
director.
Since the audit committee is typically responsible for auditor selection and monitoring 
of the external independent audit, it is vital for the audit committee itself to be 
independent from management. An audit committee that is made up of directors with 
no other ties to the firm are expected to be independent from management and is able 
to carry out their monitoring duties without undue influence from the executives of 
the firm. H4.1 and H4.2 are supported if the coefficients for A OUTSIDE and 
A CHAIR are significantly negative.
4.7 Control variables
In addition to the test variables, the possible effects of the following variables on 
levels of APNAS being purchased relative to total fee are controlled for.
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4.7.1 Corporate governance variables
It is possible that other corporate governance mechanisms besides that of the board 
may be related to APNAS purchase, either as a complement or as a substitute to the 
monitoring aspects of the external audit.
BLOCK. Defined as the percentage of outstanding voting control held by investors 
holding at least 5 percent of such shares and who have no connection to the firm. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest that blockholders play a crucial role in successful 
corporate governance systems. This is because the blockholder’s share of the firm is 
significant enough to potentially give them the ability and incentive to monitor and 
influence what is happening in the firm (Denis 2001). Blockholder ownership was 
found to be significantly negative related to APNAS in Abbott et al. (2003). The 
expectation is that BLOCK will be negatively related to APNAS/TFEE.
4.7.2 Audit quality variables
There are several factors that affect the quality of the external audit in addition to 
APNAS, these include:
BIG5. Defined as equal to 1 if the firm’s auditor is a Big 5 audit firm. It is expected 
that BIG5 will be positively related to APNAS/TFEE, due to the wider array of 
expertise and services that they can provide.
AdD SPEC. Defined as equal to 1 if the firm’s auditor commands more than 15% of 
the audit service fees within that industry. Auditors that specialise in certain 
industries are argued to provide increased audit quality compared to other auditors
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(Craswell et al. 1995). In order to maintain that high quality, audit firms may be less 
willing to sell NAS to their audit clients. Audit firms identified as specialists will also 
affect the total fee if their clients pay a premium for their audit service. However the 
specialisation on audit services may not translate to NAS. Therefore there is no ex 
ante directional expectation for AUD SPEC.
ALOCKS is defined as the number of other firms that share the same auditor and 
directors. If an auditor is reluctant to disagree with board policy over an accounting 
issue for fear of disfavour by a director who currently sits on boards of other 
companies also audited by that auditor, auditor independence is potentially 
compromised (Jubb and Houghton 1999). It is expected that ALOCKS will be 
positively related to APNAS/TFEE.
4.7.3 Industry variables
The firm’s industry may have several effects on APNAS purchase. Firstly, the 
various audit firms may specialise in certain industries providing quality differentiated 
audit or NAS. This may affect the demand and supply for the audit and NAS. This is 
discussed in more detail elsewhere.
Secondly, certain industries have higher political costs involved. This results in 
greater scrutiny on the firms and increased incentives for high quality financial 
statements. As a result, these industries will have a lower tolerance for perceived 
threats to auditor independence and may purchase less APNAS if it is viewed as 
having a negative impact (Houghton and lkin 2001).
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To separate the possible influences from the 3 industry, each is assigned one 
dichotomous variable. MINING is defined as equal to 1 if the firm belongs to the 
Resource industries (industry codes 01, 02, 03 and 04 under the ASX classification 
and codes 1010 and 1510 under the GICS classification). FINANCIAL is defined as 
equal to 1 if the firm belongs to the Banking and Finance industries (industry codes 
16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 under the ASX classification and codes 4010, 4020 and 4030 
under the GICS classification). UTILITIES is defined as equal to 1 if the firm belongs 
to Infrastructure and Utilities industries (industry codes 05 and 18 under the ASX 
classification and codes 5010 and 5510 under the GICS classification).
It is expected that the three industry variables will be negatively related to 
APNAS/TFEE.
4.7.4 Variables to proxy for Audi tee ’s ex ante need for NAS
The amount of APNAS bought is dependent on the auditee’s ex ante demand for 
NAS, from any provider (Houghton and Ikin 2001). A fmn with low levels of 
APNAS may be simply due to the fact that it did not require any.
ASSETS is defined as natural log of total assets. It is expected that the larger the 
auditee, the greater its demand for services (Houghton and Ikin 2001). This may be 
due to increased complexity and/or the firm engaging in a wider range of activities. 
Palmrose (1986) and Abbott et al. (2003) found that larger firms are more likely to 
purchase higher APNAS. The expectation is that ASSETS will be positively related 
to APNAS/TFEE.
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ALLSUBS is defined as the natural log of the total number of subsidiaries. It is 
expected that the more complex the nature of company the greater the need for NAS 
(Houghton and Ikin 2001). It is expected that ALLSUBS will be positively related to 
APNAS/TFEE.
RESTRUCT is defined as equal to 1 if terms such as: “corporate restructuring”, 
“business rationalisation”, the “disposal of business segments”, the “installation of 
new, group-wide re-engineering (BPR)” are used to describe significant events, 
disclosed in the statement of profit and loss or elsewhere in the annual report, that 
have taken place during the financial year; equal to 0 otherwise. When the auditee 
undergo restructuring, there is a demand for a variety of services that the auditor can 
provide, such as strategic planning, implementation coordination, tax, management 
information systems, human resources, acquisition and merger, and finance advice 
(Houghton and Ikin 2001). It is expected that RESTRUCT is positively related to 
APNAS/TFEE.
NEWCEO is defined as equal to 1 if there is a change in CEO for that year; equal to 0 
otherwise. The recent appointment of a new CEO can herald a “shake-up” within the 
auditee (Houghton and Ikin 2001). Similar to restructuring, this may generate 
additional demand for services provided by the auditor. NEWCEO is expected to be 
positively related to APNAS/TFEE.
NEW1SSUE is defined as equal to 1 if the firm issued new stocks or equity for cash 
and/or has listed in another exchange during the current year; equal to 0 otherwise. 
An auditee that issues new stock is more likely to need expert advice which can be
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provided by the auditor (Houghton and Ikin 2001). It is expected that NEW1SSUE 
will be positively related to APNAS/TFEE
NEGROI is defined as equal to the two-year average ROI (operating profit before tax 
divided by book value of total assets at year end) if it is negative; equal to 0 
otherwise. Finns that are perfonning badly have additional incentives to seek external 
advice to improve the firm, generation demand for NAS (Houghton and Ikin 2001). 
Parkash and Venable (1993) find that finns with higher levels of profitability had 
higher APNAS. However, Firth (1997) and Abbott et al. (2003) did not find any 
significant relationship. NEGROI is expected to be negatively related to 
APNAS/TFEE.
4. 7.5 Other variables
LEVERAGE is defined as long-term debt to shareholder’s equity. The agency 
problem underlies the theory for the demand for good corporate governance and a 
quality audit. The leverage of the firm is a typical proxy for the extent of agency 
conflict. Firms with less agency conflict may have less need for monitoring. Parkash 
and Venable (1993) and Firth (1997) found that leverage was negatively related to 
APNAS. However, Abbott et al. (2003) did not. The expectation is that LEVERAGE 
will be negatively related to APNAS/TFEE.
NAS SPEC. Defined as equal to 1 if the firm’s auditor commands more than a given 
proportion of the APNAS within that industry (15% has been used in the literature 
before, see for example Houghton and Ikin 2001). If the auditor is an industry leader 
in the supply of NAS there is greater incentive (superior service) for the auditee to
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approach their auditor to supply NAS. This also reflects the auditor’s willingness to 
supply NAS to their own audit clients within that particular industry" . As a result, 
firms audited by auditors identified as APNAS specialists will tend to spend more on 
APNAS. Therefore NAS SPEC is expected to be positively related to 
APNAS/TFEE.
USLIST  is defined as equal to 1 if the firm is listed on a U.S. stock exchange. 
US SUB is defined as equal to 1 if the firm has subsidiaries in the U.S. This is 
expected to have an impact because firms with U.S. connections will have higher 
exposure to the APNAS debate revolving around the proposed changes to the SEC 
regulations during the sample period. Both US LIST and US SUB are expected to 
be negatively related to APNAS/TFEE.
YEAR 1. Defined as equal to 1 if it is the first year of an audit engagement. This is 
likely to have several conflicting effects on the APNAS purchased for that year. First, 
when a firm changes auditors, it may abnormally increase the level of APNAS. If the 
new auditor provided substantial NAS previously, that service will technically 
become APNAS. If the NAS contract lasts for multiple years, it may be inconvenient 
or costly to change sources causing firms to have higher or lower levels of APNAS in 
the years following the change than it would otherwise. On the other hand, if the new 
auditor did not provide substantial APNAS previously, the first year of the audit may 
result in the firm buying less APNAS then normal because it may still be unfamiliar 
with the new auditor and the range of NAS it provides. As it is unclear which effect is 
dominant, there is no ex ante directional expectation for YEAR1.
For example, in an industry with high political costs, auditors may be reluctant to supply particular 
NAS to their audit clients. As a result, even if they specialise in the provision of NAS in that industry, 
their reluctance to supply to their audit clients would result in low levels of APNAS.
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4.8 Background events with 2001 as an event year
As described in the previous chapter, there is an increasing level of scrutiny and 
public debate regarding APNAS over the time 1999-2002, which came to a peak at 
2001 which witnessed several high profile corporate collapses. To investigate 
whether this caused a significant change in the relationship APNAS and board and 
audit committee characteristics, the base model is estimated for the year 2002 and 
compared with the results from those from a 3-year pooled sample for 1999-2001. H5 
is supported if there is a substantial difference between the two.
How the relationship between APNAS and the test variables change will depend on 
the director’s reaction to the event. If on average, the directors increase their review 
of APNAS it would be expected that the relationship will strengthen, especially in 
regards to the independence variables of the board and audit committee.
On the other hand, the relationship between APNAS and the test variables might 
weaken if the variation of the director’s tolerance of APNAS is reduced to an extent 
where changes in the measures of directorial strength result in little change in the 
director’s tolerance of APNAS.
Despite this, given the high profile nature of the collapse and media scrutiny, it is 
expected the relationship between APNAS/TFEE and B DSHIP and A MSHIP will 
strengthen given their strong association to reputation effects for the director.
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As an additional test, the first three years are also separately estimated and compared. 
The increasing prevalence of APNAS may cause the relationship between APNAS 
and the board and audit committee to weaken as joint provision of audit and NAS 
become more commonplace. Alternatively, the increasing magnitude of APNAS fee 
relative to the audit fee may cause boards and audit committees to be more concerned, 
thereby increasing the sensitivity of relationship between APNAS and the board.
The increased debate regarding the negative impact APNAS may have on audit 
quality could mean that directors are becoming more educated and aware of the 
impact of APNAS. This would weaken the relationship between board quality and 
APNAS as increasingly “low” quality directors become aware of APNAS as a 
problem prior to the “shock” of 2001. On the other hand, these factors could lead to 
independent boards and audit committees being increasingly reluctant to approve of 
large APNAS spending.
4.9 Substitution hypothesis
To test the substitution hypothesis, the sample was first ranked by AIP/GO for each of 
their year, and then divided into 4 sub-samples based on the yearly quartiles of 
AIP/GO. Where, AIP is defined as the accounting book value of total assets. And GO 
is defined as the market value of common equity plus book value of total debt and 
preferred stock.
Three sub-samples were then created from the quartiles. The high AIP sub-sample, 
which is comprised of firms with the highest assets-in-place relative to growth option, 
is made up of the firms in the highest quartile of AIP/GO. The high GO sub-sample,
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which is comprised of firms with the highest growth options relative to assets-in- 
place, is made up of the firms in the lowest quartile of AIP/GO. The moderate sub­
sample, which comprises of firms with a moderate level of both, is made up of the 
firms in the remaining two quartiles. Additional testing was conducted where the sub­
samples were divided into thirds instead of quartiles, and their results are presented in 
Appendix 2.6.
The hypothesis testing is then done separately for the three sub-samples. Table 1 
summaries the predicted signs for each test variable and sub-sample.
Table 1 Predicted signs for the high growth option, moderate and high assets-in- 
place sub-samples
High
Growth Option
Moderate High
Assets-in-place
Board of Directors Variables
B SIZE - + -
B DSHIP + - +
B MEET + - +
B FINLIT + - +
B OUTSIDE + - +
B CHAIR + - +
Audit Committee Variables
A SIZE + - +
A MSHIP + - +
A MEET + - +
A FINLIT + - +
A OUTSIDE + - +
A CHAIR + - +
4.10 Summary and conclusions
The thesis investigates possible effects of APNAS on auditor independence by 
looking at its relationship with the board of directors and the audit committee. This
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chapter identifies the setting of the study in Australia and the sample period to be 
used.
To test the hypotheses developed in the previous chapter, a multivariate regression is 
used with the ratio of APNAS fee to total fee as a dependent variable. Variables that 
proxy for the quality and independence of the board of directors and audit committee 
are defined and examined. Also a list of other variables expected to explain variation 
in APNAS are defined and discussed. These are used as control variables in the 
regression. Table 2 below lists the variables used in this model, their expected sign 
and a brief definition.
Table 2 Summary of variables used and their predicted signs
Variable Predicted
sign
Definition
Dependent variable
APNAS/TFEE non-audit fees / total fees
Board of Directors Variables
B SIZE + number of board members
B DSHIP average number of directorships by outside directors on
- the board
B MEET - sum of board meetings attended by each director 
divided by the number of directors
B FINLIT percentage of outside directors with a financial
- background on the board
B OUTSIDE - percentage of outside directors on the board
B CHAIR - = 1 if chairman is an outside director; 0 otherwise
Audit Committee Variables
A SIZE - number of audit committee members
A MSHIP - average number of audit committee memberships by 
outside audit committee members on the board
A MEET - sum of audit committee meetings attended by each 
director divided by the number of directors
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A FINLIT - percentage of outside audit committee members with a 
Financial background on the board
A OUTSIDE - percentage of outside directors in the audit committee
A CHAIR - = 1 if chainnan of audit committee is an outside 
director; 0 otherwise
C o n tr o l V a r ia b le s
BLOCK - % owned by blockholders
BIG5 + = 1 if auditor is Big 5, 0 otherwise
AUD SPEC ? = 1 if auditor has > 15% of audit services
ALOCKS
+
natural log of the number of other Finns which has 
same auditor and director
MINING - = 1 if Resource; 0 otherwise
FINANCIAL - = 1 if Banking and Finance; 0 otherwise
UTILITIES - = 1 if Infrastructure and Utilities; 0 otherwise
ASSETS + natural log of total assets
ALLSUBS + natural log of the total number of subsidiaries
RESTRUCT + = 1 if Firm undergone restructuring; 0 otherwise
NEWCEO + = 1 if there is a change in CEO; 0 otherwise
NEWISSUE + = 1 if the Firm issued new stocks or equity for cash 
and/or has listed in another exchange during the current 
year; = 0 otherwise
NEGROI - = two-year average ROI if negative, =0 otherwise
LEVERAGE - long term debt to shareholder’s equity
NAS SPEC + = 1 if auditor has > 15% of APNAS
USLIST - = 1 if listed on an American stocks exchange, =0 
otherwise
US SUB - = 1 if it has an American subsidiary, =0 otherwise
YEAR1 ? = 1 if First year of audit engagement; =0 otherwise
The study is also extended by examining how events of 2001 might change the 
relationship between APNAS and the test variables. To this end, the relationship 
between APNAS/TFEE and the test variables in 2002 are compared with the 3 year 
period immediately preceding it.
Lastly, to test the substitution hypothesis developed in the previous chapter, the Finns 
are ranked by their ratio of AIP to GO. Three sub-samples are created by splitting the 
Finns into quartile, one for the Finns with the highest levels of AIP relative to GO, one
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for the finns with the highest levels of GO relative to AIP and one for moderate levels 
of both. Each of the sub-samples are then individually tested and compared.
Chapter 5 reports and discusses the results of the hypotheses testing carried out.
96
CHAPTER 5. DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
5.1 Introduction
This chapter reports and analyses the tests of the hypotheses that were developed in 
Chapter 4. The base model is a multivariate regression testing variables that proxy for 
the quality and independence of the board of directors and audit committee. This 
regression is estimated for the 4-year 1999-2002 pooled sample.
In addition, a replication of Abbott et el. (2003) is carried out and expanded using the 
variables from the base model of this study.
Supplementary regressions were also estimated for 2002 and the results are compared 
against those of 1999-2001, as well as individual regressions for each of the other 
three years.
Due to potential problems that may arise form the closely related test variables, the 
regression is run using only one set of variables, one testing only board of directors 
variables, and another testing only audit committee variables.
Next, to test the substitution hypothesis, the sample is then split into three sub­
samples with the firms ranked on their ratio of assets-in-place to growth options.
The sample selection process is described in section 5.2 while the descriptive statistics 
are discussed in section 5.3. Section 5.4 outlines the regression analysis from the base 
model using the 4-year pooled sample. Section 5.5 replicates the research design of
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Abbott et al. (2003) using Australian data and extends it by expanding the variables 
used. Section 5.6 reports the results of the regression analysis on the year 2002 and 
compares it with those of the previous three years while Section 5.7 outlines the 
results from the individual regressions for each of the remaining years. Section 5.8 
looks at the results when the regression is run with only one set of test variables, that 
is, testing with only board of director variables or only audit committee variables. 
Section 5.9 discusses the results for the regressions used to test the substitution 
hypothesis. Finally section 5.10 summarises the results found in this chapter while 
section 5.11 provides a summary and conclusion for the chapter.
5.2 Sample selection
The sample selection is made from the population of listed firms included in the 
Connect 4 database for the years 1999 to 2002 which roughly equates to the top 500 
firms of those years. Firms with insufficient data are eliminated from the sample, as 
are those that changed their financial year, and those whose financial report is 
denominated in a currency except the Australian dollar. Finally, several firms were 
deleted from each year for various reasons, including those that underwent IPO during 
the year, those with no activity in the year, or in the previous year, companies that 
follows US GAAP, those with negative shareholder’s equity, firms that underwent a 
merger or de-merger, and those under voluntary administration. After the elimination, 
samples for 1999 to 2002 were respectively 400, 387, 401 and 414 firms. Table 3 
shows the number of firms deleted from the each sample.
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Table 3 Firm sample selection procedure
1999 2000 2001 2002
Connect 4 sample 513 511 513 501
less Missing data 97 87 98 66
416 424 415 435
less change in financial year 7 17 7 6
409 407 408 429
less foreign currency 3 6 3 3
406 401 405 426
less others* 6 14 4 12
Final sample 400 387 401 414
*example: IPO, no activity in this year, no activity in previous year, company follows 
US GAAP, negative shareholder’s equity, merger or demerger, voluntary 
administration.
Table 4 shows the distribution of the sample firms by industry. Because of a change 
in 2001 from the old ASX industry codes to the Global Industry Classification 
Standard (GICS), the industry breakdown for 2002 is different from the other 3 years. 
As was expected, the resource and financial sectors are well represented in the 
sample.
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Table 4 Sample selection distribution by industry
In d u s try C o d e 1999 2 0 0 0 2001 In d u s try C o d e 2 002
G o ld 01 36 25 21
O th e r  M e ta ls 02 16 14 22
D iv e rs if ie d  re so u rc e s 03 4 2 2
M a te r ia ls 1510 76
E n e rg y 04 23 23 22 E n e rg y 1010 19
In fra s tru c tu re  &  
u til i t ie s 05 8 11 13
U tili t ie s 5 5 1 0 6
D e v e lo p e rs  &  
c o n tra c to rs 06 23 19 18
B u ild in g  M a te ria ls 07 13 12 9
A lc o h o l &  to b a c c o 08 12 10 8
F o o d  B e v e ra g e  &  
T o b a c c o 3 0 2 0 29
F o o d  &  h o u se h o ld 09 13 15 17 F o o d  &  S ta p le s 3 0 1 0 6
C h e m ic a ls 10 5 4 5
E n g in e e r in g 11 10 5 4
P a p e r  &  p a c k a g in g 12 5 6 6
C a p ita l G o o d s 2 0 1 0 27
C o m m e rc ia l S e rv ic e s  
&  S u p p lie s 2 0 2 0 25
R e ta il 13 23 25 22 R e ta ilin g 2 5 5 0 22
A u to m o b ile 2 5 1 0 4
C o n s u m e r  D u ra b le s  
&  A p p a re l 2 5 2 0 9
T ra n sp o rt 14 6 6 4 T ra n sp o r ta t io n 2 0 3 0 7
M e d ia 15 18 19 18 M e d ia 2 5 4 0 19
B a n k in g  &  fin a n c e 16 12 13 12 B a n k s 4 0 1 0 6
In su ra n c e 17 6 4 4 In su ra n c e 4 0 3 0 5
R e a l E s ta te 4 0 4 0 21
T e le c o m m u n ic a tio n s 18 15 15 14 T e le c o m m u n ic a tio n 5 0 1 0 7
In v e s tm e n t &  
fin a n c ia l se rv ic e s 19 43 4 0 37 D iv e rs if ie d  F in a n c ia ls 4 0 2 0 37
P ro p e rty  T ru s ts 20 10 11 8
H e a lth  ca re  &  
b io te c h n o lo g y 21 22 25 40 H e a lth  C a re 3 5 1 0 27
P h a rm a c e u tic a ls  &  
B io te c h n o lo g y 3 5 2 0 20
M isc e lla n e o u s
in d u s tr ia ls 22 49 55 67
D iv e rs if ie d  in d u s tr ia ls 23 14 14 13
T o u rism  &  le isu re 2 4 14 14 15
H o te ls  R e s ta u ra n ts  &  
L e isu re 2 5 3 0 13
S o ftw a re  &  S e rv ic e s 4 5 1 0 20
T e c h n o lo g y  
H a rd w a re  &  E q u ip 4 5 2 0 9
T o ta l 40 0 387 401 4 1 4
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Table 5 panel A shows the distribution of sample firms by their auditor, while panel B 
shows the same information in percentages. Unsurprisingly after their merger, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers holds the largest percentage of clients (roughly a quarter of 
the sample) except for 2002 where Ernst & Young absorbed many of Andersen’s 
partners (and clients). The percentage of firms employing a Big 5 audit firm for the 
period 1999 to 2002 respectively are 78.2%, 80.4%, 80.0% and 80.7%.
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Table 5 Sample selection distribution by auditor
Panel A: Distribution of observation by auditor 1999-2002
Auditor 1999 2000 2001 2002
Andersen 31 43 47 -
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu 47 44 46 46
Ernst & Young 59 58 63 105
KJPMG 78 74 79 81
PricewaterhouseCoopers 98 92 86 102
Non Big 5 87 76 80 80
Total 400 387 401 414
Panel B: Distribution of observation by auditor 1999-2002 in percentages
Auditor 1999 2000 2001 2002
Andersen 7.75 11.11 11.72 -
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu 11.75 11.37 11.47 11.11
Ernst & Young 14.75 14.98 15.71 25.36
KPMG 19.50 19.12 19.70 19.57
PricewaterhouseCoopers 24.50 23.78 21.45 24.64
Non Big 5 21.75 19.64 19.95 19.32
Total 1 1 1 1
5.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 6 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used for hypothesis testing for 
the 4-year 1999-2002 pooled sample as well as for each of the four years 1999-2002.
102
Table 6 Descriptive statistics
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for the 4-year pooled sample 1999-2002 (n = 1602)
Mean Standard
Deviation
quartile 1 Median / 
sum*
quartile 3
Audit A 377.4783 1022.916 54 116.1525 290.025
APNAS A 566.7654 1983.571 20 87.907 323.2423
APNAS/TFEE 0.411346 0.251605 0.211521 0.413427 0.615168
B SIZE 6.265918 2.091104 5 6 7
B DSHIPS 1.638874 0.663947 1.166667 1.5 2
B MEET 10.57526 4.160759 8 10.54861 12.46043
B FINLIT 0.442357 0.234289 0.25 0.428571 0.6
B OUTSIDE 0.622504 0.221964 0.5 0.666667 0.8
B CHAIR* 0.702871 0.457136 1126
AC * 0.915106 0.278811 1466
A SIZE 2.857054 1.281265 2 3 3
A MSHIP 1.361292 0.843458 1 1.25 1.666667
A MEET 2.861472 1.869319 2 2.666667 4
A FINLIT 0.490075 0.338448 0.25 0.5 0.666667
A OUTSIDE 0.687254 0.349063 0.5 0.75 1
A CHAIR * 0.870162 0.33623 1394
BLOCK 41.51788 23.52179 23.485 40.785 58.24
BIG5 * 0.798377 0.401337 1279
AUD SPEC * 0.501873 0.500153 804
ALOCKS 0.954432 1.441266 0 0 1
MINING * 0.190387 0.392729 305
FINANCIAL * 0.149189 0.356385 239
UTILITIES * 0.055556 0.229133 89
Total Assets A 3616336 24393640 58931 164521.9 683378
Subsidiaries 29.98002 62.38909 4 12 29.75
RESTRUCT * 0.131086 0.3376 210
NEWCEO * 0.089263 0.285213 143
NEWISSUE * 0.262797 0.44029 421
NEGROI -0.51628 10.76763 0 0 0
LEVERAGE 1.317706 23.26382 0.003857 0.223078 0.593308
NAS SPEC * 0.499376 0.500156 800
US LIST * 0.087391 0.282495 140
US SUB * 0.272784 0.44553 437
YEAR1* 0.064295 0.245354 103
AIP/GO 0.944059 0.943908 0.546672 0.880954 1.141177
* dichotomous variables expressed as the sum instead of median 
A the mean, medians, and quartiles of these variables are expressed at ($’000)
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Table 6 Descriptive statistics
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for 1999 (n = 400)
Mean Standard
Deviation
quartile 1 Median / 
sum*
quartile 3
Audit A 362.46 904.61 50 113.38 262.23
APNAS A 455.83 1462.9 14.045 61.5 253.21
APNAS/TFEE 0.3803 0.2450 0.1846 0.3751 0.5783
B SIZE 6.34 2.1981 5 6 7.25
B DSHIPS 1.7055 0.8032 1.1607 1.5 2
B MEET 10.446 4.0144 8 10.444 12.2
B FINLIT 0.4313 0.2391 0.25 0.4167 0.6
B OUTSIDE 0.6216 0.2240 0.5 0.6667 0.8
B CHAIR* 0.69 0.4631 276*
AC * 0.925 0.2637 370*
A SIZE 2.8575 1.2693 2 3 3
A MSHIP 1.4238 1.0964 1 1.25 1.6667
A MEET 2.9348 1.9464 2 2.667 4
A FINLIT 0.4874 0.3474 0.25 0.5 0.6667
A OUTSIDE 0.6936 0.3533 0.5 0.75 1
A CHAIR * 0.8675 0.3395 347*
BLOCK 41.271 23.562 22.923 40.63 57.854
BIG5 * 0.7825 0.4131 313*
AUD SPEC * 0.415 0.4933 166*
ALOCKS 1.0825 1.6240 0 0 1
MINING * 0.1975 0.3986 79*
FINANCIAL * 0.1525 0.3600 61*
UTILITIES * 0.0575 0.2331 23*
Total Assets A 3,197,430 19,308,932 64459 168368 618876
Subsidiaries 27.61 47.799 4 12 27
RESTRUCT * 0.1625 0.3694 65*
NEWCEO * 0.06 0.2378 24*
NEWISSUE * 0.2275 0.4197 91*
NEGROI -1.4692 20.179 0 0 0
LEVERAGE 3.3876 46.320 0.0082 0.2585 0.6143
NAS SPEC * 0.4725 0.4999 189*
US LIST* 0.0825 0.2755 33*
US SUB * 0.245 0.4306 98*
YEAR1* 0.035 0.1840 14*
AI P/GO 0.9485 0.7513 0.5893 0.9092 1.1721
* dichotomous variables expressed as the sum instead of median 
A the mean, medians, and quartiles of these variables are expressed at ($’000)
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Table 6 Descriptive statistics
Panel C: Descriptive statistics for 2000 (n = 387)
Mean Standard
Deviation
quartile 1 Median / 
sum*
quartile 3
Audit A 353.863 975.95 55.85 115 279.36
APNAS A 639.679 2176.2 21.75 99.349 341.5
APNAS/TFEE 0.42737 0.2669 0.2128 0.4357 0.6511
B SIZE 6.32558 2.0906 5 6 7
B DSHIPS 1.65030 0.6510 1.1429 1.4444 2
B MEET 10.6930 4.3507 7.6344 10.67 12.548
B FINLIT 0.45278 0.2378 0.2857 0.4286 0.6
B OUTSIDE 0.60688 0.2236 0.5 0.6154 0.7817
B CHAIR* 0.67959 0.4672 263*
AC * 0.90698 0.2908 351*
A SIZE 2.86047 1.3219 2 3 3
A MSHIP 1.33899 0.7940 1 1.25 1.6667
A MEET 2.87137 2.0340 2 2.667 4
A FINLIT 0.48432 0.3452 0.25 0.5 0.6667
A OUTSIDE 0.64734 0.3562 0.4643 0.6667 i
A CHA1R * 0.83721 0.3697 324*
BLOCK 41.6916 24.207 23.18 40.28 58.76
BIG5 * 0.80362 0.3978 311*
AUD SPEC * 0.48837 0.5005 189*
ALOCKS 0.94832 1.4096 0 0 1
MINING * 0.16538 0.3720 64*
FINANCIAL * 0.14729 0.3549 57*
UTILITIES * 0.06718 0.2507 26*
Total Assets A 3,861,449 25,752,296 72,542 189,655 711,220
Subsidiaries 30.8889 68.367 5 12 29
RESTRUCT * 0.23256 0.4230 90*
NEWCEO * 0.13437 0.3415 52*
NEWISSUE * 0.27907 0.4491 108*
NEGROI -0.0641 0.2760 0 0 0
LEVERAGE 0.74963 3.5501 0.0085 0.2750 0.6394
NAS SPEC * 0.48320 0.5004 187*
US LIST * 0.08786 0.2834 34*
US SUB * 0.28165 0.4504 109*
YEAR1* 0.02326 0.1509 9*
AIP/GO 1.02415 1.4106 0.5387 0.9328 1.1904
* dichotomous variables expressed as the sum instead of median 
A the mean, medians, and quartiles of these variables are expressed at ($’000)
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Table 6 Descriptive statistics
Panel D: Descriptive statistics for 2001 (n = 401)
Mean Standard
Deviation
quartile 1 Median / 
sum*
quartile 3
Audit A 389.573 1143.4 55 115 293.04
APNAS A 672.278 2599.9 24.241 96 353.90
APNAS/TFEE 0.42193 0.2505 0.2166 0.4430 0.6226
B SIZE 6.20449 2.0756 5 6 7
B DSHIPS 1.60981 0.6022 1.1667 1.5 2
B MEET 10.3848 3.6649 8 10.45 12.556
B FINLIT 0.43760 0.2341 0.25 0.4 0.6
B OUTSIDE 0.627 0.2255 0.5 0.6667 0.8
B CHAIR* 0.69825 0.4596 280*
AC * 0.91272 0.2826 366*
A SIZE 2.88529 1.2910 2 3 3
A MSHIP 1.33561 0.6944 1 1.3333 1.6667
A MEET 2.72750 1.6944 2 2.4 4
A FINLIT 0.48197 0.3324 0.25 0.5 0.6667
A OUTSIDE 0.69019 0.3414 0.5 0.75 1
A CHAIR * 0.87781 0.3279 352*
BLOCK 41.4643 23.663 23.09 40 58.54
BIG5 * 0.80050 0.4001 321*
AUD SPEC * 0.52619 0.4999 211*
ALOCKS 0.86284 1.3033 0 0 1
MINING * 0.16708 0.3735 67*
FINANCIAL * 0.13217 0.3391 53*
UTILITIES * 0.06733 0.2509 27*
Total Assets A 4,130,311 27,332,040 49,229 151,037 695,155
Subsidiaries 32.5811 74.068 4 12 32
RESTRUCT * 0.05985 0.2375 24*
NEWCEO * 0.13217 0.3391 53*
NEWISSUE * 0.22943 0.4210 92*
NEGROI -0.47564 7.5129 0 0 0
LEVERAGE 0.64964 2.4254 0.0034 0.2004 0.6083
NAS SPEC * 0.47631 0.5001 191*
US LIST * 0.08978 0.2862 36*
US SUB * 0.29177 0.4551 117*
YEAR1* 0.02993 0.1706 12*
AIP/GO 0.92199 0.6681 0.5587 0.8794 1.1694
* dichotomous variables expressed as the sum instead of median 
A the mean, medians, and quartiles of these variables are expressed at ($’000)
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Table 6 Descriptive statistics
Panel E: Descriptive statistics for 2002 (n = 414)
Mean Standard
Deviation
quartile 1 Median / 
sum*
quartile3
Audit A 402.350 1052.5 54.25 127.37 325.10
APNAS A 503.589 1476.6 24.188 98.144 361.96
APNAS/TFEE 0.41608 0.2425 0.2322 0.4128 0.5997
B SIZE 6.19807 2.0023 5 6 7
B DSHIPS 1.59199 0.5752 1.1667 1.5 1.8512
B MEET 10.7744 4.5537 8.2589 10.625 12.613
B FINLIT 0.44795 0.2266 0.2857 0.4083 0.6
B OUTSIDE 0.63361 0.2149 0.5 0.6667 0.8
B CHAIR* 0.74155 0.4383 307*
AC * 0.91546 0.2785 379*
A SIZE 2.82609 1.2482 2 3 3
A MSHIP 1.34661 0.7316 1 1.25 1.6667
A MEET 2.91116 1.7926 2 2.9063 4
A FINLIT 0.50589 0.3297 0.3333 0.5 0.6667
A OUTSIDE 0.71556 0.3434 0.5 0.8167 1
A CHAIR * 0.89614 0.3055 371*
BLOCK 41.6456 22.76747 24.492 41.58 58.16
BIG5 * 0.80676 0.3953 334*
AUD SPEC * 0.57488 0.4950 238*
ALOCKS 0.92512 1.4062 0 0 1
MINING * 0.22947 0.421 95*
FINANCIAL * 0.16425 0.3710 68*
UTILITIES * 0.03140 0.1746 13*
Total Assets A 3,294,113 24,547,582 51,206 154,633 690,306
Subsidiaries 28.9008 56.443 5 11 30
RESTRUCT * 0.07488 0.2635 31*
NEWCEO * 0.03382 0.1810 14*
NEWISSUE * 0.31401 0.4647 130*
NEGROI -0.05762 0.1852 0 0 0
LEVERAGE 0.49596 1.4758 0.0013 0.1826 0.4992
NAS SPEC * 0.56280 0.4966 233*
US LIST * 0.08937 0.2856 37*
US SUB * 0.27295 0.4460 113*
YEAR1* 0.16425 0.3710 68*
AIP/GO 0.88627 0.7789 0.5022 0.8294 1.0552
* dichotomous variables expressed as the sum instead of median 
A the mean, medians, and quartiles of these variables are expressed at ($’000)
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Table 6 Descriptive statistics
Panel F: Mean comparison for the 4-years pooled sample and well as for each of the 4 
years
1999-2002 2002 2001 2000 1999
n 1602 414 401 387 400
Audit A 377.4783 402.350 389.573 353.863 362.46
APNAS A 566.7654 503.589 672.278 639.679 455.83
APNAS/TFEE 0.411346 0.41608 0.42193 0.42737 0.3803
B SIZE 6.265918 6.19807 6.20449 6.32558 6.34
B DSHIPS 1.638874 1.59199 1.60981 1.65030 1.7055
B MEET 10.57526 10.7744 10.3848 10.6930 10.446
B FINLIT 0.442357 0.44795 0.43760 0.45278 0.4313
B OUTSIDE 0.622504 0.63361 0.627 0.60688 0.6216
B CHAIR 2.857054 0.74155 0.69825 0.67959 0.69
AC 0.702871 0.91546 0.91272 0.90698 0.925
A SIZE 0.915106 2.82609 2.88529 2.86047 2.8575
A MSHIP 1.361292 1.34661 1.33561 1.33899 1.4238
A MEET 2.861472 2.91116 2.72750 2.87137 2.9348
A FINLIT 0.490075 0.50589 0.48197 0.48432 0.4874
A OUTSIDE 0.687254 0.71556 0.69019 0.64734 0.6936
A CHAIR 0.870162 0.89614 0.87781 0.83721 0.8675
BLOCK 41.51788 41.6456 41.4643 41.6916 41.271
BIG5 0.798377 0.80676 0.80050 0.80362 0.7825
AUD SPEC 0.501873 0.57488 0.52619 0.48837 0.415
ALOCKS 0.954432 0.92512 0.86284 0.94832 1.0825
MINING 0.190387 0.22947 0.16708 0.16538 0.1975
FINANCIAL 0.149189 0.16425 0.13217 0.14729 0.1525
UTILITIES 0.055556 0.03140 0.06733 0.06718 0.0575
Total Assets A 3616336 3,294,113 4,130,311 3,861,449 3,197,430
Subsidiaries 29.98002 28.9008 32.5811 30.8889 27.61
RESTRUCT 0.131086 0.07488 0.05985 0.23256 0.1625
NEWCEO 0.089263 0.03382 0.13217 0.13437 0.06
NEWISSUE 0.262797 0.31401 0.22943 0.27907 0.2275
NEGROI -0.51628 -0.05762 -0.47564 -0.0641 -1.4692
LEVERAGE 1.317706 0.49596 0.64964 0.74963 3.3876
NAS SPEC 0.499376 0.56280 0.47631 0.48320 0.4725
US LIST 0.087391 0.08937 0.08978 0.08786 0.0825
US SUB 0.272784 0.27295 0.29177 0.28165 0.245
YEAR1 0.064295 0.16425 0.02993 0.02326 0.035
AIP/GO 0.944059 0.88627 0.92199 1.02415 0.9485
A The means of these variables are expressed at ($’000)
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Where:
Audit =
APNAS
APNAS/TFEE = 
B SIZE 
BDSHIP 
B MEET
B FINLIT 
BOUTSIDE = 
BCHAIR 
A SIZE 
AC
A MSHIP
A MEET
A FINLIT
A OUTSIDE = 
A CHAIR
BLOCK
BIG5
AUD SPEC = 
ALOCKS
MINING
FINANCIAL = 
UTILITIES 
Total Assets = 
Subsidiaries = 
RESTRUCT = 
NEWCEO 
NEWISSUE
NEGROI 
LEVERAGE = 
NASSPEC 
US LIST 
USSUB 
YEAR1
Audit fee ($’000)
Auditor’s remuneration for services other than audit ($’000) 
non-audit fees / total fees 
number of board members
average number of directorships by outside directors on the board
sum of the total number of board meetings attended by each
director divided by the number of directors
percentage of outside directors with a financial background
percentage of outside directors on the board
1 if chairman is an outside director; 0 otherwise
Number of members in the audit committee
1 if the company has an audit committee; 0 otherwise
average number of audit committee memberships by outside
audit committee members on the board
sum of the total number of audit committee meetings attended by 
each director divided by the number of directors 
percentage of outside audit committee members with a financial 
background on the board
percentage of outside directors in the audit committee 
1 if chairman of audit committee is an outside director; 0 
otherwise
% owned by blockholders
1 if auditor is Big 5, 0 otherwise
1 if auditor has > 15% of audit services
the number of other firms that share the same auditor and
directors
1 if Resource; 0 otherwise
1 if Banking and Finance; 0 otherwise
1 if Infrastructure and Utilities; 0 otherwise
total assets ($’000)
the total number of subsidiaries
1 if firm undergone restructuring; 0 otherwise
1 if there is a change in CEO; 0 otherwise
1 if the firm issued new stocks or equity for cash and/or has listed 
in another exchange during the current year; = 0 otherwise 
two-year average ROI if negative, =0 otherwise 
long term debt to shareholder’s equity 
1 if auditor has > 15% of APNAS
1 if listed on an American stocks exchange, =0 otherwise 
1 if it has an American subsidiary, =0 otherwise 
1 if first year of audit engagement; =0 otherwise
The mean ratio of audit fee to total fee for the 4-year pooled sample was 41%. This is 
slightly lower than prior studies. Houghton and Ikin (2001) reported 54.4% in 1999 
for the top 1,000 Australian firms, whereas the mean for 1999 for the 400 firms in my
109
sample were only 38%. This means that the sample used in this study are generally 
buying less APNAS relative to total fee compared with other top 1000 firms. This 
could mean that the firms in this sample are generally more conservative in buying 
NAS from their auditors. It is also possible that the sample firms have a lower ex ante 
demand for NAS which may weaken the results of the tests. The ratio is also lower 
than American findings, which Frankel et al. (2002) reports as 49% for American 
Finns in 2001.
The means for the four years 1999 to 2002 were respectively 38.0%; 42.7%; 42.2%; 
41.6%. This suggests an increase, followed by a levelling off during 2000-2001 and a 
decrease which is consistent with the events of the sample period.
The means for the pooled four-year sample return a board that meets 10.6 time 
annually, is made up of 6 directors, of which 63% are outsiders and of which 62% is 
chaired by an outsider. The outside directors hold on average 1.64 directorships and 
with 44% being identified as financially literate. The means of the four years are 
fairly similar except that for 2002, the percentage of Finns that had an outside chair is 
higher at 74%.
In the four years 1999-2002, 92% of the Finns in the sample have a separate audit 
committee, which meets on average 2.9 times annually. The mean number of 
members is 2.9, of which 69% are outsiders and on average 87% are chaired by an 
outside chainnan. The outside members of the audit committee hold on average 1.36 
audit committee memberships with 49% of them being identified as financially 
literate. The means for the test variables seem fairly stable over the four years.
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The means for total assets for each of the years are greater than even their 3,d quartiles 
and they all have large standard deviations. This is due to the sample being heavily 
loaded with firms on the high end being significantly larger than the smaller ones.
As expected due possibly to the Y2K problem, the incidences of restructure for the 
year 2000 is significantly higher than the rest of the years. About 23% of firms are 
recorded as having restructuring expenses in that year. It is possible that some of 
these restructuring costs were also spent in the year before with 1999 recording the 
second highest percentage at 16%, still significantly higher than that of 2001 at 6% 
and 2002 at 7%.
With the integration of Andersen Australia and Ernst and Young in 2002, it is also 
unexpected that there is a high number of auditor changes in that year. 68 firms were 
recorded as having changed their auditor, of which 44 firms were identified as having 
Arthur Andersen as an auditor in 2001.
Table 7 documents the Pearson correlation between the variables for the 1999-2002 
pooled sample. The correlations among several of the variables, in particular the test 
variables are significant giving rise to possible concerns regarding the presence of 
high multicollinearity. The Pearson correlations for the individual years of 1999-2002 
are presented in appendix A 1.1.
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Where:
Audit =
APNAS
APNAS/TFEE = 
BSIZE 
B DSHIP 
B MEET
B FINLIT
B OUTSIDE = 
B CHAIR 
A SIZE 
A MSHIP
AMEET
A FINLIT
A OUTSIDE = 
A CHAIR
BLOCK
BIG5
AUD SPEC = 
ALOCKS
Total Assets = 
Subsidiaries = 
RESTRUCT 
NEWCEO 
NEWISSUE
NEGROI 
LEVERAGE = 
NAS SPEC 
US LIST 
US SUB 
YEAR1 
AIP/GO
Audit fee ($’000)
Auditor’s remuneration for services other than audit ($’000) 
non-audit fees / total fees 
number of board members
average number of directorships by outside directors on the board 
sum of the total number of board meetings attended by each 
director divided by the number of directors 
percentage of outside directors with a financial background on 
the board
percentage of outside directors on the board 
1 if chairman is an outside director; 0 otherwise 
Number of members in the audit committee 
average number of audit committee memberships by outside 
audit committee members on the board
sum of the total number of audit committee meetings attended by 
each director divided by the number of directors 
percentage of outside audit committee members with a financial 
background on the board
percentage of outside directors in the audit committee 
1 if chairman of audit committee is an outside director; 0 
otherwise
% owned by blockholders
1 if auditor is Big 5, 0 otherwise
1 if auditor has > 15% of audit services
the number of other firms that share the same auditor and
directors
total assets ($’000)
the total number of subsidiaries
1 if firm undergone restructuring; 0 otherwise
1 if there is a change in CEO; 0 otherwise
1 if the firm issued new stocks or equity for cash and/or has listed 
in another exchange during the current year; = 0 otherwise 
two-year average ROI if negative, =0 otherwise 
long term debt to shareholder’s equity 
1 if auditor has > 15% of APNAS
1 if listed on an American stocks exchange, =0 otherwise
1 if it has an American subsidiary, =0 otherwise
1 if first year of audit engagement; =0 otherwise
accounting book value of total assets divided by the market value
of common equity plus book value of total debt and preferred
stock.
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5.4 Base Model Testing for the 4 years pooled sample 1999-2002
The results of the regression analysis of the base model on the four years pooled 
sample 1999-2002 is reported in Table 8. The model itself is significant (F = 12.695,
TOp = .000) however the explanatory power of the model is modest at 18%. A possible 
explanation for this is that the full sample contains firms that behave significantly 
different in their purchase of APNAS or that simply the control variables does not 
adequately map the variation in APNAS/TFEE.
Further testing below was conducted on sub-samples based on several criteria 
supports this to a certain extent in the changes in significance among the explanatory 
variables, however, none of the models achieved a high explanatory power either.
The residuals of the regression appear to be normally distributed. The probability plot 
of the regression’s standardized residuals and its histogram can be found in appendix 
A1.2.
As pointed out above, the high number of correlated independent variables led to 
concerns about the presence of multicollinearity. To investigate this, auxiliary 
regressions were estimated where each of the test variables were regressed against the
29 The low adjusted R2 is comparable to the ones in Abbott et al. (2003) when they regressed the same 
independent variable against audit committee characteristics and other control variables. Their 
adjusted R2 was 17.4% for the full sample, and 14.9% in a sub-sample of smaller firms and 9.3% in the 
sub-sample of larger firms. The same composite audit committee variable that was used in their study 
is also replicated later in section 5.9.
However, in their study, they used an different dependent variable, using audit fee as the denominator 
instead of total fee. The same variable was used to re-estimate the regression resulting in a much lower 
adjusted R2 (of 9.7%) and lost of significance in the coefficient of B DSHIP. Full regression results 
are in appendix A2.1.
Also, Krishnan, Sami and Zhang (2005) used a fee model to estimate the ratio of APNAS to total fee 
and obtained an adjusted R2 of 25.3%
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rest of the variables. All regression had significant F statistic and most had an 
adjusted R2 larger than that of the base model of 19.3%. This suggests that there 
might be a multicollinearity problem.
Also, the conditional index obtained by the square root of the maximum eigenvalue 
divided by the minimum eigen value is 57.26, which is also indicative of severe 
multicollinearity. This means that the coefficients of the variables will tend to be 
insignificant.
Besides APNAS/TFEE, two other alternative dependent variables were used. 
APNAS/audit fee as well as the natural log of APNAS. As noted above, their results 
are reported in Appendix 2.1. APNAS/TFEE produced better results compared to 
APNAS/AFEE having both a higher adjusted R“ and more significant test variables. 
Although LnAPNAS provided the largest adjusted R2 among the three regressions, it 
produced less significance among the test variables with more of the explanatory 
power coming from the size variable (which has in effect moved from the left to the 
right side of the equation).
Given the significant correlations between the board and audit committee members, 
additional testing was done where one set of variables was removed from the model. 
The results of these tests are reported below in section 5.8.
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Table 8 Regression results: The Ratio of Auditor provided Non-Audit Services to 
Total Fee Regressed on Board and Audit Committee Quality and Independence 
and Control Variables for the Four Years 1999-2002 Pooled Sample
APNAS/TFEE = a  + ß, B SIZE + ß2 B DSHIPS + ß3 B_MEET + ß4 BFINLIT + ß5 B OUTSIDE 
+ ß6 B CHAIR + ß7 A SIZE + ß8 AM SHIP + ß9 A MEET + ß 10 A FINLIT 
+ ß,, AOUTSIDE + ß12 A CHAIR + ß13 BLOCK + ß 14 BIG5 + ß 15 AUDSPEC 
+ ß16 ALOCKS + ß 17 MINING + ß18 FININCIAL + ß19 UTILITIES + ß20 ASSETS 
+ ß21 ALLSUBS + ß22 RESTRUCT + ß23 NEWCEO + ß24 NEWISSUE 
+ ß25 NEGROI + ß26 LEVERAGE + ß27 NAS SPEC + ß28 US LIST + ß29 US SUB 
_______________ +ß30 YEAR1 + e________________
Predicted Estimate T Statistic p-value
Sign (1-tailed)#
(Constant) # 0.0010 0.015 0.988
B o a r d  o f  D ire c to r s  V ariab les
B SIZE + 0.0140 3.560 0.000
B DSHIP - -0.0400 -2.662 0.004
B MEET - 0.0080 5.179 0.000
B FINLIT - -0.0550 -1.590 0.056
B OUTSIDE - -0.0050 -0.139 0.445
B CHAIR - 0.0180 1.201 0.115
A udit C om m ittee Variables
A SIZE - -0.0110 -1.957 0.026
A MSHIP - 0.0130 1.148 0.126
A MEET - -0.0040 -1.098 0.136
A FINLIT - 0.0001 0.003 0.499
A OUTSIDE - 0.0220 0.890 0.187
A CHAIR - 0.0010 0.072 0.472
C ontro l Variables
BLOCK - 0.0000 0.881 0.189
BIG5 + 0.0990 5.595 0.000
AUD SPE C # ? -0.0030 -0.171 0.865
ALOCKS + 0.0070 1.267 0.103
MINING - -0.0460 -2.910 0.002
FINANCIAL - 0.0400 2.069 0.020
UTILITIES - 0.0580 2.237 0.013
ASSETS + 0.0150 2.940 0.002
ALLSUBS + 0.0020 0.320 0.375
RESTRUCT + 0.0530 3.043 0.001
NEW CEO + 0.0600 2.953 0.002
NEW ISSUE + 0.0420 3.193 0.001
NEGROI - -0.0010 -1.050 0.147
LEVERAGE - 0.0000 -0.805 0.211
NAS SPEC + 0.0610 3.882 0 . 0 0 0
US LIST - 0.0100 0.466 0.321
US SUB - 0.0230 1.599 0.055
Y E A R 1# ? -0.0570 -2.425 0.015
Adjusted R2 .180
F statistic 12.695
(significance) .000
# p-values are 1 tailed except for the constant, AUD SPEC and YEAR1 which are 2-
tailed
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Where:
APNAS/TFEE = 
B SIZE 
B DSHIPS 
B MEET
B FINLIT
B OUTSIDE = 
B CHAIR 
A SIZE 
A MSHIP
A MEET
AFINLIT
A OUTSIDE = 
A CHAIR
BLOCK
BIG5
AUD SPEC = 
ALOCKS
MINING
FINANCIAL =
UTILITIES
ASSETS
ALLSUBS
RESTRUCT
NEWCEO
NEWISSUE
NEGROI 
LEVERAGE = 
NASSPEC 
US LIST 
US SUB 
YEAR1
non-audit fees / total fees 
number of board members
average number of directorships by outside directors on the board 
sum of the total number of board meetings attended by each 
director divided by the number of directors 
percentage of outside directors with a financial background on 
the board
percentage of outside directors on the board 
1 if chairman is an outside director; 0 otherwise 
number of audit committee members
average number of audit committee memberships by outside 
audit committee members on the board
sum of the total number of audit committee meetings attended by 
each director divided by the number of directors 
percentage of outside audit committee members with a financial 
background on the board
percentage of outside directors in the audit committee 
1 if chairman of audit committee is an outside director; 0 
otherwise
% owned by blockholders
1 if auditor is Big 5, 0 otherwise
1 if auditor has > 15% of audit services
the number of other firms that share the same auditor and
directors
1 if Resource; 0 otherwise
1 if Banking and Finance; 0 otherwise
1 if Infrastructure and Utilities; 0 otherwise
natural log of total assets
natural log of the total number of subsidiaries
1 if firm undergone restructuring; 0 otherwise
1 if there is a change in CEO; 0 otherwise
1 if the firm issued new stocks or equity for cash and/or has listed 
in another exchange during the current year; = 0 otherwise 
two-year average ROI if negative, =0 otherwise 
long term debt to shareholder’s equity 
1 if auditor has > 15% of APNAS
1 if listed on an American stocks exchange, =0 otherwise 
1 if it has an American subsidiary, =0 otherwise 
1 if first year of audit engagement; =0 otherwise
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5.4.1 Board o f directors variables
The coefficient of B SIZE is positively significant {p = .000, one-tailed). This is in 
the predicted direction, that firms with larger boards tend to purchase more APNAS 
relative to total fee. This supports H l.l.
The coefficient of B DSHIP is negatively significant (p = .004, one-tailed), which is 
also in the predicted direction, that firms with outside directors having a greater 
number of multiple directorships tend to purchase less APNAS relative to total fee. 
This supports HI.2.
However, the coefficient of B MEET is positively significant (p = .000, two-tailed), 
whereas the theory predicts a negative relationship. This does not support HI.3. A 
possible explanation for this is that firms that have a high number of meetings might 
have a higher demand of NAS, either because it is undergoing a crisis, major change 
or simply that the type of firm that requires increased monitoring from directors also 
have a higher demand of NAS. Alternatively this could be due to the substitution 
hypothesis, where a firm substitute a weaker corporate governance mechanism (lower 
quality external audit) with a stronger one (a more diligent board) to maintain an 
equilibrium agency cost minimisation position. As the number of board meetings is 
the easiest to change among the board variables, it is possible that it is used to monitor 
APNAS spending which may fluctuate from year to year. The substitution hypothesis 
is investigated more fully in section 5.9.
The coefficient of B FINLIT is negatively significant (p = .056, one-tailed). This is 
in the predicted direction, that firms with a board of directors that is made up of a
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higher proportion of financially literate directors tend to purchase less APNAS 
relative to total fee. This supports HI.4.
The coefficients of B OUTSIDE and B CHAIR are both insignificant, not supporting 
H2.1 and H2.2. This suggests that the independence of the board as a whole was 
unrelated to the amount of APNAS purchased.
5.4.2 Audit committee variables
The coefficient of A SIZE is negatively significant (p = .026, one-tailed). This is in 
the predicted direction, in which firms with larger audit committees tend to purchase 
less APNAS relative to total fee. This supports H3.1.30
However, the remaining audit committee coefficients of A MSHIP, A MEET, 
A FIN LIT, A OUTSIDE, and A CHAIR are all insignificant at the 10% level, 
finding no support for H3.2, H3.3, H3.4, H4.1 and H4.2.
In addition, the composite variable ACE (defined to be equal to 1 if the audit 
committee is comprised entirely of independent directors and meets at least four times 
during the year; and 0 otherwise) was tested in a replication of the model used by 
Abbott et al. (2003) as well as in a more complete model. While it was found to be 
unexpectedly positive, it seems that it was mainly driven by audit committee meetings 
which was no longer significant after introducing the full set of test variables. A more 
complete discussion of the tests done is in section 5.5.
30 An alternative variable was tried, using the ratio of the number of audit committee members to 
number of directors. The alternative variable produced the same results. The full regression result are 
in appendix A2.2
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5.4.3 Summary o f results for test variables
Table 9 summarises the results of the hypothesis testing for the 1999-2002 four years 
pooled sample.
Table 9 Summary of hypothesis testing result for the four years pooled sample
Hypothesis Variable Predicted sign Supported?
Quality of the 3oard of directors
H l.l B SIZE + yes
HI .2 B DSHIP - yes
HI.3 B MEET -
HI.4 B FINLIT - yes
Independence of the board of directors
H2.1 B OUTSIDE -
H2.2 B CHAIR -
Quality of the audit committee
H3.1 A SIZE - yes
H3.2 A MSH1P -
H3.3 A MEET -
H3.4 A FINLIT -
Independence of the audit committee
H4.1 A OUTSIDE -
H4.2 A CHAIR -
Where:
B SIZE = number of board members
B DSHIPS = average number of directorships by outside directors on the board
B MEET sum of the total number of board meetings attended by each 
director divided by the number of directors
B FINLIT = percentage of outside directors with a financial background on 
the board
B OUTSIDE = percentage of outside directors on the board
B CHAIR = 1 if chairman is an outside director; 0 otherwise
A SIZE = number of audit committee members
A MSHIP = average number of audit committee memberships by outside 
audit committee members on the board
A MEET = sum of the total number of audit committee meetings attended by 
each director divided by the number of directors
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A FINLIT = percentage of outside audit committee members with a financial 
background on the board
A OUTSIDE = percentage of outside directors in the audit committee
A CHAIR = 1 if chairman of audit committee is an outside director; 0
otherwise
Overall, the results suggest that quality and financial literacy of the board of directors 
acts as an effective monitor of audit quality and leads to less spending on APNAS.
Also, the size of the audit committee is negatively related to relative APNAS 
spending, in contrast to the positive relationship board size has with APNAS. While a 
larger board of directors is seen to be less effective, a large audit committee is seen to 
represent the firm allocating increased importance and resources to the audit function, 
leading to a greater monitoring on APNAS spending. This opposite relationship was 
observed in the results.
However, the financial literacy and the diligence of the audit committee does not 
seem to constrain APNAS purchases.
Surprisingly, the results suggest that independence of both the full board and the audit 
committee (as measured by the percentage of outsiders as well as the absence of an 
insider chair) has no relationship to the amount of APNAS being bought relative to 
total fee. One possible explanation for the lack of significance is that most of the 
governance by outside directors are provided by those with financial literacy and/or 
multiple directorships who might be mostly outsiders, especially those with multiple 
directorships.
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It is also interesting to note that although the audit committee is delegated financial 
oversight responsibility, it is the board that produced the strongest association with 
relative APNAS spending rather than the audit committee.
However, due to the high correlation between the board and audit committee 
variables, further testing is done in section 5.8 where the regression is estimated using 
only one of the two sets of test variables at one time, either only the board variables, 
or the audit committee variables.
In addition, a number of supplementary tests were carried out. Firstly, in the 
regression, audit committee size was used as a measure of the amount of resources the 
company devote to the financial accounting process (Anderson et al. 2004). An 
alternate measure of this construct is to use the ratio of audit committee members to 
the number of directors in the full board. The regression results using this alternate 
measure produced qualitative similar results, with full results reported in appendix 
A2.2.
Also, as revealed by the descriptive statistics, the sample contains a small percentage 
of firms that are significantly larger than the small ones. A series of regressions 
shows that the results are sensitive to changes in the sample. They show that the 
significance of B SIZE is largely concentrated on the samples with the larger firms, 
while that of B FINLIT seems to be driven by the smaller Finns. The positive 
significance of B MEET is quite unifonn throughout the various sub-samples though. 
Besides the test variables, the control variables also exhibit some instability across the 
different size sub-samples.
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5.4.4 Control variables: Corporate governance variables
The coefficient for BLOCK is insignificant which suggests that shareholders with 
large amount of shares do not influence the purchase of APNAS relative to total fee. 
This is inconsistent with the results in Abbott et al. (2003) who used US firms and 
found a significantly negative relationship.
5.4.5 Control variables: Audit quality variables
As expected, the coefficient for BIG5 is positively significant (p = .000, one-tailed), 
that is firms with a top tier auditor buys more APNA.S relative to total fee. This is 
consistent with the results in Krishnan et al. (2005). However, Abbott et al. (2003) 
found no relationship between a big 5 auditor and higher relative APNAS.
However the coefficient for ALOCKS is not significant, that firms which share the 
same director and auditor is not related to relative APNAS fee. It suggests that closer 
relationships between the auditors and directors may not necessarily affect the 
company’s APNAS spending.
The coefficient for AUD SPEC is also insignificant, indicating that auditor 
specialisation is not related to APNAS/TFEE. This suggests that the industry 
specialisation in auditing does not command a premium in APNAS. While it was 
expected that it would affect TFEE by increasing the audit fee, the difference does not 
seem to be not large enough to be significant.
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5.4.6 Control variables: Industry variables
The coefficient for MINING is significantly negative {p = .002, one-tailed) and 
supports the prediction that the greater political costs in that industry might lead to 
constraints in APNAS spending.
On the other hand, the coefficient for UTILITIES is positively significant (p = .025, 
two-tailed) suggesting that utility firms tend to buy more APNAS which is 
unexpected and does not support that political cost theory. The last industry variable, 
FINANCIAL, was insignificant. A possible explanation is that the industry dummy 
variables picked up different ex-ante demand for APNAS in these industries (in 
comparison to other firms in the sample) rather than a political cost effect or that the 
demand effect overpowered a weaker political cost effect. This suggests that mining 
firms requires less APNAS while utility firms require more.
5.4.7 Control variables: Variables that proxy for the Auditee ’s ex ante need for NAS
The coefficient for ASSETS is significant (p = .002, one-tailed) supporting the theory 
that increased size places a greater demand on NAS. This was also found in Abbott et 
al. (2003) and Krishnan et al. (2005).
However, ALLSUBS which uses number of subsidiaries proxy the complexity of the 
firm by was insignificant.
One time events such as restructuring (p = .001, one-tailed), a change of CEO (p 
=.002, one-tailed) and issue of new shares (p = .001, one-tailed) were all significant 
and positive, suggesting a fair number of firms increase their demand for NAS for
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short-term projects and do not mind purchasing these services from their incumbent 
auditors. This is not unexpected as these services are seen to have a lower impact on 
auditor independence compared to long term recurring services. Abbott et al. (2003) 
also found a significant positive relationship between restructuring and APNAS/TFEE 
but not for a change in CEO or issue of new shares.
Also the coefficient for NEGROI, meant to pick out firms that are performing badly is 
not significant. This might be due to poorly performing firms not having the cash 
flow to purchase large amounts of NAS.
5.4.8 Control variables: Other variables
Unlike AUD SPEC, which was insignificant, the coefficient for NAS SPEC is 
positively significant {p = .000, one-tailed). This might be because NAS SPEC 
provides a better measurement of auditor specialisation in the industry in respect to 
NAS (or their greater willingness to supply NAS to their audit client) than 
AUD SPEC.
The first year of an audit engagement is negatively related (p = .015, two-tailed), 
suggesting that on average, firms that change their auditor spend less on NAS with 
their new audit finn. This could be due to a lag in NAS contracts that last beyond the 
change in auditor. This would suggest that firms on average spend more NAS with 
their exiting auditor compared to their incoming auditor. It could also be due to audit 
firms using an audit engagement to introduce NAS to their clients, hence the low 
spending in the first year, with increased spending in subsequent years.
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LEVERAGE was insignificant. This was unexpected as leverage was expected to 
increase agency costs and reduce APNAS/TFEE. While this is consistent with the 
findings of Abbott et al. (2003), Krishnan et al. (2005) on the other hand did find a 
negative relationship.
USSUB and US LIST are both insignificant as well, which together suggest that the 
NAS debate in USA did not significantly influence the purchasing decisions regarding 
NAS for Australian firms who list or have subsidiaries in the US.
5.5 Replication of Abbott et al. (2003)
To investigate the association between audit committee characteristics and APNAS, 
Abbott et al. (2003) used a similar model to the one used in this study, and found that 
the composite audit committee variable used in that study was significantly and 
negatively related to the ratio of APNAS to audit fee.
The composite audit committee variable was defined to be equal to 1 if the audit 
committee is comprised entirely of independent directors and meets at least four times 
during the year; and 0 otherwise.
The regression model used in Abbott et al. (2003) is replicated using the Australian 
pooled data from the years 1999-2002 with a few differences. Three of the control 
variables used in that study was not used, INOWN, defined as the cumulative 
percentage of voting control held by managers and directors; ACQ, defined as the 
number of acquisitions made by the company during the year or in the previous two
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years; and RETURN, defined as the fiscal 1999 total stock return less adjustments for 
the 1999 S&P 500 return.
The variable RETURN measures the company’s performance to capture possible 
increased demand for NAS a poorly performing company might have. To replace that 
variable, NEGROl, is used which proxies for the same construct.
The result of the regression is reported in Table 10 below. The regression is 
significant (F = 12.004, p = .000). But its explanatory power is much lower, at 5.8% 
compared to 17.4% which was found in Abbott et al. (2003).
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Table 10 Regression results: The Ratio of Auditor provided Non-Audit Services 
to Audit Fee Regressed on a Abbott et al. (2003)’s Composite Audit Committee 
and Control Variables for the Four Years 1999-2002 Pooled Sample
APNAS/AFEE = a  + + ß, BLOCK + ß2 LEVERAGE + ß3 NEGROI + ß4 ASSETS + ß5 BIG5
+ ß6 NEWISSUE + ß7 NEWCEO + ß8 RESTRUCT + ß9 ACE + e
Predicted Estimate T Statistic p-value
Sign (1-tailed)#
(Constant) # -.817 -2.252 .024
BLOCK - .003 1.276 .101
LEVERAGE - -.002 -.753 .226
NEGROI - -.002 -.514 .304
ASSETS + .104 3.508 .000
BIG5 + .600 4.578 .000
NEWISSUE + .192 1.670 .043
NEWCEO + .514 2.901 .002
RESTRUCT + .756 4.977 .000
ACE - .171 1.403 .081
Adjusted R2 .058
F statistic 12.004
(significance) .000
# p-values are 1 tailed except for the constant which is 2-tailed
Where:
APNAS/AFEE = 
BLOCK
LEVERAGE = 
NEGROI 
ASSETS 
B1G5
NEWISSUE
NEWCEO
RESTRUCT
ACE
non-audit fees / audit fees 
% owned by blockholders 
long term debt to shareholder’s equity 
two-year average ROI if negative, =0 otherwise 
natural log of total assets 
1 if auditor is Big 5, 0 otherwise
1 if the firm issued new stocks or equity for cash and/or has listed 
in another exchange during the current year; = 0 otherwise 
1 if there is a change in CEO; 0 otherwise 
1 if firm undergone restructuring; 0 otherwise 
1 if the audit committee is comprised entirely of independent 
directors and meets at least four times during the year and 0 
otherwise.
Unexpectedly, the composite ACE variable although significant (p = .015. two tailed),
was positive, which is opposite to what Abbott et al. (2003) found in the US.
Abbott et al. (2003) also found large blockholders lead to lower levels of APNAS 
bought relative to the audit fee, but that result was not found in the Australian data.
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In both studies, the size of the firm, measured as the natural log of total assets, and the 
presences of restructuring during the year has lead to relative increased levels of 
APNAS bought. In the Australian data, in addition to that, increased levels of 
APNAS was also related to the audit firm being a big 5 firm, and in the event of a new 
issue of stocks or change of CEO.
In the regression Abbott et al. (2003) used, the dependent variables was the ratio of 
total non-audit fees to audit fees, as opposed to total fees which was used in this 
study. Table 11 shows the result of the same regression but using APNAS/TFEE as 
the dependent variable. The results are more robust and show a highly positively 
significant coefficient for ACE (p = .004, two-tailed) and the same control variables. 
In addition, NEGROI is also significant (p = .072, one-tailed) relating poor company 
performance to higher relative APNAS spending.
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Table 11 Regression results: The Ratio of Auditor provided Non-Audit Services 
to Total Fee Regressed on a Abbott et al. (2003)’s Composite Audit Committee 
and Control Variables for the Four Years 1999-2002 Pooled Sample
APNAS/TFEE = a  + + ß, BLOCK + ß2 LEVERAGE + ß3 NEGROI + ß4 ASSETS + ß5 BIG5
+ ß6 NEWISSUE + ß7 NEWCEO + ß8 RESTRUCT + ß9 ACE + e
Predicted
Sign
Estimate T Statistic p - x  alue 
(1-tailed)#
(Constant) # -.009 -.212 .832
BLOCK - .000 -.796 .213
LEVERAGE - .000 -.794 .214
NEGROI - -.001 -1.458 .072
ASSETS + .023 6.573 .000
BIG5 + .140 9.202 .000
NEWISSUE + .054 4.024 .000
NEWCEO + .064 3.107 .002
RESTRUCT + .067 3.808 .000
ACE - .041 2.909 .004
Adjusted R2 
F statistic 
(significance)
.140
30.043
.000
# p-values are 1 tailed except for the constant which is 2-tailed
Where:
APNAS/TFEE = non-audit fees / total fees
BLOCK = % owned by blockholders
LEVERAGE = long term debt to shareholder’s equity
NEGROI = two-year average ROl if negative, =0 otherwise
ASSETS = natural log of total assets
B1G5 = 1 if auditor is Big 5, 0 otherwise
NEWISSUE = 1 if the firm issued new stocks or equity for cash and/or has listed 
in another exchange during the current year; = 0 otherwise
NEWCEO = 1 if there is a change in CEO; 0 otherwise
RESTRUCT = 1 if firm undergone restructuring; 0 otherwise
ACE 1 if the audit committee is comprised entirely of independent 
directors and meets at least four times during the year and 0 
otherwise.
The model is next expanded with the full list of control variables that was used in this 
study and then in a separate regression, all the board and audit committee variables 
(except for those for audit committee meetings and percentage of outsides on the audit 
committee, which are already incorporated in the ACE variable) are also added to the 
model. These regressions are done with both dependent variables, APNAS/AFEE and 
APNAS/TFEE. The results are reported in Table 12 below.
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Table 12 Regression results: The Ratio of Auditor provided Non-Audit Services 
to Total Fee Regressed on Board, Audit Committee, Abbott et al. (2003)’s 
Composite Audit Committee and Control Variables for the Four Years 1999- 
2002 Pooled Sample
P r e d ic te d
S ig n
D e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e  
A P N A S / A F E E
D e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e  
A P N A S / T F E E
E s t i m a t e p # E s t i m a t e p # E s t i m a t e p # E s t i m a t e p #
(C o n s ta n t )# - 0.812 .048 - 0.784 .106 .043 .373 0.024 .665
B o a r d  o f  D i r e c t o r s  V a r i a b l e s
B S IZ E + 0.080 .007 0.013 .000
B D S H I P - - 0.105 .207 - 0.041 .003
B M E E T - 0.036 .002 0.007 .000
B F I N L I T - - 0.375 .104 - 0.055 .056
B O U T S I D E - 0.010 .487 - 0.006 .426
B C H A I R - 0.180 .082 0.017 .133
A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  V a r i a b l e s
A  S IZ E - - 0.063 .088 - 0.010 .032
A  M S H I P - 0.050 .292 0.014 .098
A  F I N L I T - 0.269 .096 0.000 .493
A  C H A I R - - 0.342 .022 0.005 .403
A C E - 0.136 .131 0.085 .261 .037 .004 0.025 .050
C o n t r o l  V a r i a b l e s
B L O C K - 0.003 .069 0.004 .033 .000 .480 0.000 .201
B IG 5 + 0.300 .024 0.270 .038 .104 .000 0.099 .000
A U D S P E C # ? - 0.176 .199 - 0.158 .246 -.004 .784 - 0.003 .853
A L O C K S + - 0.025 .264 - 0.012 .403 -.002 .325 0.006 .133
(m i n i n g - - 0.121 .182 - 0.090 .254 -.044 .002 - 0.046 .002
F I N A N C I A L - 0.174 .131 0.294 .038 .018 .164 0.040 .018
U T I L IT I E S - 1.212 .000 1.192 .000 .065 .006 0.057 .014
A S S E T S + 0.110 .003 0.077 .035 .017 .000 0.013 .004
A L L S U B S + - 0.048 .167 - 0.068 .086 .004 .223 0.002 .392
R E S T R U C T + 0.769 .000 0.713 .000 .062 .000 0.054 .001
N E W C E O + 0.486 .003 0.488 .003 .061 .001 0.058 .002
N E W I S S U E + 0.144 .103 0.129 .128 .050 .000 0.044 .000
N E G R O I - - 0.002 .301 - 0.002 .330 -.001 .094 - 0.001 .154
L E V E R A G E - - 0.002 .199 - 0.002 .194 .000 .209 0.000 .224
N A S S P E C + 0.639 .000 0.611 .000 .066 .000 0.061 .000
U S L I S T - 0.133 .243 0.177 .177 .014 .266 0.010 .326
U S S U B - 0.041 .371 0.052 .338 .019 .100 0.023 .058
Y E A R 1 # ? - 0.382 .060 - 0.366 .071 -.058 .000 - 0.059 .012
A d j  R 2 .087 .095 .159 .181
F s ta t is t ic 9.062 6.824 16.945 13.183
( s ig n i f ic a n c e ) .000 .000 .000 .000
# /7-values are 1 tailed except for the constant, AUD SPEC and YEAR1 which is 2-
tailed
Where:
APNAS/AFEE 
APNAS/TFEE 
BSIZE 
B DSHIPS
non-audit fees / audit fees 
non-audit fees / total fees 
number of board members
average number of directorships by outside directors on the board
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B MEET sum of the total number of board meetings attended by each 
director divided by the number of directors
B FINL1T = percentage of outside directors with a financial background on 
the board
B OUTSIDE = percentage of outside directors on the board
B CHAIR = 1 if chairman is an outside director; 0 otherwise
A SIZE = number of audit committee members
A MSHIP = average number of audit committee memberships by outside 
audit committee members on the board
A FINLIT percentage of outside audit committee members with a financial 
background on the board
ACHAIR = 1 if chairman of audit committee is an outside director; 0 
otherwise
ACE 1 if the audit committee is comprised entirely of independent 
directors and meets at least four times during the year and 0 
otherwise.
BLOCK = % owned by blockholders
BIG5 = 1 if auditor is Big 5, 0 otherwise
AUD SPEC = 1 if auditor has > 15% of audit services
ALOCKS = the number of other firms that share the same auditor and 
directors
MINING = 1 if Resource; 0 otherwise
FINANCIAL = 1 if Banking and Finance; 0 otherwise
UTILITIES = 1 if Infrastructure and Utilities; 0 otherwise
ASSETS = natural log of total assets
ALLSUBS = natural log of the total number of subsidiaries
RESTRUCT = 1 if firm undergone restructuring; 0 otherwise
NEWCEO = 1 if there is a change in CEO; 0 otherwise
NEWISSUE = 1 if the firm issued new stocks or equity for cash and/or has listed 
in another exchange during the current year; = 0 otherwise
NEGROI = two-year average ROI if negative, =0 otherwise
LEVERAGE = long term debt to shareholder’s equity
NAS SPEC = 1 if auditor has > 15% of APNAS
US LIST = 1 if listed on an American stocks exchange, =0 otherwise
US SUB = 1 if it has an American subsidiary, =0 otherwise
YEAR1 = 1 if first year of audit engagement; =0 otherwise
The ACE variable coefficient remained significant and positive after all the control 
variables are added in when the APNAS was scaled to TFEE but not AFEE(p = .262, 
when APNAS/AFEE was the dependent variable and p = .009, when it was 
APNAS/TFEE, both two-tailed). They lose a lot of significance when estimated 
together with the other board and audit committee variables (p = .522 and .100, two- 
tailed).
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The regression with all the board and audit committee variables also produced the 
similiar significant test variables when compared to the results when the original 
A MEET and A OUTSIDE variables were used instead of ACE. And the 
insignificance of ACE was consistent with the same result for A MEET and 
A OUTSIDE. This suggests that, at least for this sample, the relationship between 
the ACE variable and relative APNAS spending is largely overshadowed by other 
variables.
Finally, the ACE variable was broken up into its components, and the above 
regression is re-estimated. The two variables are D MEET, defined as equal to 1 if 
the audit committee meets at least four times during the year and 0 otherwise; and 
D OUTSIDE, defined as equal to 1 if the audit committee is comprised entirely of 
independent directors and 0 otherwise. The results of the regression are reported in 
Table 13 below.
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Table 13 Regression results: The Ratio of Auditor provided Non-Audit Services 
to Total Fee Regressed on Board, Audit Committee, and Control Variables for 
the Four Years 1999-2002 Pooled Sample
P re d ic te d
S ign
D e p e n d e n t  v a r ia b le  
A P N A S / A F E E
D e p e n d e n t  v a r ia b le  
A P N A S / T F E E
E s t im a te p# E s t im a te p# E s t im a te p# E s t im a te p#
(Constant)# -0.750 .069 -0.727 .133 0.040 .404 0.021 .702
B o a r d  o f  D ir e c to r s  V a r ia b le s
B S I Z E + 0.079 .008 0.013 .000
B DSHIP - -0.094 .235 -0.039 .004
B MEET - 0.034 .003 0.007 .000
B FINLIT - -0.362 .113 -0.053 .063
B OUTSIDE - -0.025 .468 -0.011 .379
B CHAIR - 0.177 .085 0.017 .131
A u d it  C o m m i t t e e  V a r ia b le s
AJSIZE - -0.063 .090 -0.010 .035
A M S H IP - 0.037 .348 0.012 .145
AFIN LIT - 0.244 .122 -0.004 .441
A C H A I R - -0.347 .022 0.003 .444
D MEET - 0.213 .026 0.109 .167 0.024 .029 0.010 .233
D OUTSIDE - 0.069 .251 0.078 .265 0.022 .031 0.020 .083
C o n tr o l  V a r ia b le s
BLOCK - 0.003 .061 0.004 .032 0.000 .486 0.000 .187
BIG5 + 0.300 .024 0.271 .037 0.105 .000 0.100 .000
AUD SPEC# ? -0.179 .189 -0.162 .236 -0.005 .751 -0.003 .827
ALOCKS + -0.029 .231 -0.014 .389 -0.002 .327 0.006 .128
MINING - -0.124 .176 -0.095 .244 -0.045 .002 -0.046 .002
FINANCIAL - 0.177 .127 0.292 .039 0.018 .166 0.039 .020
UTILITIES - 1.204 .000 1.189 .000 0.065 .006 0.058 .013
ASSETS + 0.098 .008 0.072 .046 0.016 .000 0.013 .004
ALLSUBS + -0.052 .148 -0.070 .082 0.004 .240 0.002 .396
RESTRUCT + 0.774 .000 0.717 .000 0.062 .000 0.055 .001
NEWCEO + 0.487 .003 0.489 .003 0.062 .001 0.059 .002
NEWISSUE + 0.156 .086 0.136 .117 0.051 .000 0.044 .000
NEGROI - -0.002 .301 -0.002 .333 -0.001 .090 -0.001 .152
LEVERAGE - -0.002 .213 -0.002 .204 0.000 .225 0.000 .234
NAS SPEC + 0.641 .000 0.614 .000 0.067 .000 0.062 .000
US LIST - 0.130 .248 0.173 .184 0.014 .270 0.010 .333
US SUB - 0.044 .364 0.055 .331 0.019 .092 0.023 .053
YEAR1# ? -0.396 .051 -0.373 .066 -0.059 .013 -0.059 .012
Adj R2 .089 .095 .159 .180
F statistic 8.789 6.631 16.152 12.732
(significance) .000 .000 .000 .000
# /7-values are 1 tailed except for the constant, AUD SPEC and YEAR1 which is 2-
tailed
Where:
APNAS/AFEE 
APNAS/TFEE 
BSIZE 
B DSHIPS 
B MEET
non-audit fees / audit fees 
non-audit fees / total fees 
number of board members
average number of directorships by outside directors on the board 
sum of the total number of board meetings attended by each 
director divided by the number of directors
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B FINLIT
B OUTSIDE 
B CHAIR 
A SIZE 
A MSHIP
A FINLIT
ACHAIR
D MEET
D OUTSIDE
BLOCK
BIG5
AUD SPEC 
ALOCKS
MINING
FINANCIAL
UTILITIES
ASSETS
ALLSUBS
RESTRUCT
NEWCEO
NEW1SSUE
NEGROI
LEVERAGE
NASSPEC
USLIST
US SUB
YEAR1
percentage of outside directors with a financial background on 
the board
percentage of outside directors on the board 
1 if chairman is an outside director; 0 otherwise 
number of audit committee members
average number of audit committee memberships by outside 
audit committee members on the board
percentage of outside audit committee members with a financial 
background on the board
1 if chairman of audit committee is an outside director; 0 
otherwise
1 if the audit committee meets at least four times during the year 
and 0 otherwise.
1 if the audit committee is comprised entirely of independent 
directors and 0 otherwise.
% owned by blockholders
1 if auditor is Big 5, 0 otherwise
1 if auditor has > 15% of audit services
the number of other firms that share the same auditor and
directors
1 if Resource; 0 otherwise
1 if Banking and Finance; 0 otherwise
1 if Infrastructure and Utilities; 0 otherwise
natural log of total assets
natural log of the total number of subsidiaries
1 if fmn undergone restructuring; 0 otherwise
1 if there is a change in CEO; 0 otherwise
1 if the firm issued new stocks or equity for cash and/or has listed 
in another exchange during the current year; = 0 otherwise 
two-year average ROI if negative, =0 otherwise 
long term debt to shareholder’s equity 
1 if auditor has > 15% of APNAS
1 if listed on an American stocks exchange, =0 otherwise 
1 if it has an American subsidiary, =0 otherwise 
1 if first year of audit engagement; =0 otherwise
Among the two dummy variables, D MEET and D OUTSIDE, only D MEET was 
significant in both the APNAS/AFEE and APNAS/TFEE regressions (p = .052 and 
.059, two-tailed) suggesting that the positive significance of the composite ACE 
variable was largely driven by the audit committee meetings component of the 
variable. This is in contrast to Abbott et al.’s (2003) findings where it was the 
D OUTSIDE component of the variable that was significant and D MEET being
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insignificant. Although when APNAS was scaled against total fees, D OUTSIDE 
was also significant (p = .062, two-tailed).
However, when the two dummy variables were regressed together with all the other 
board and audit committee variables, they were insignificant as was the case when 
they were combined into one composite variable.
It is possible that the positive relationship of the ACE variable could be explained by 
the stronger positive relationship between B MEET and APNAS/TFEE which is 
highly correlated with A MEET.
The composite variable ACE (and control variables) was also regressed against 
APNAS/AFEE for each of the four years 1999-2002. The results show that ACE was 
only significant for the year 2000 and seems to confirm the fact that particular year 
produces the strongest relationship between the test variables and relative APNAS 
spending. Full results of the regression are reported in appendix A2.8.
These results shows that the results found in Abbott et al. (2003) should not be 
generalised to the Australian context during the time frame of this study at the least. 
Also it suggests that further testing on US data should be conducted including 
variables that control for variation in board quality as well as other aspects of the audit 
committee not controlled for in their study.
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5.6 Base Model Testing for 2002 and comparison to 1999-2001
To investigate if the events of 2001 caused a change in the relationship between 
APNAS/TFEE, the base model was estimated for 2002 and the result compared 
against those from the pooled sample of the three prior years. The results of the 
regression analysis of the base model are reported in Table 14.
Both models are significant (F = 10.490, p = .000 for the 1999-2001 pooled sample; F 
= 3.382, p  = .000 for 2002) however the explanatory power of the 2002 model is 
14.8% which is substantially lower than the three year pooled regression (19.3). 31
The sharp decline in explanatory power does suggests a significant difference in the 
year 2002 that may be a result of the events of 2001 causing changes in the purchase 
of APNAS that is unrelated to the variables used in the regression.
31 It is possible that the integration of Andersen Australia and Ernst and Young on the 27,h May 2002 
might have confounding effects for the 2002 regression. Therefore, the 2002 regression was re- 
estimated using a reduced sample by removing all firms that were audited by Arthur Andersen in 2001. 
In the regression, both B SIZE, A MSHIP and NEWCEO lost their significance after the Andersen 
firms were removed and A MEET became significantly negative (p = .060, one-tailed). The regression 
also return a fairly similar adjusted R2 of 15%. The full regressions are reported in appendix A2.4.
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Table 14 Regression results: The Ratio of Auditor provided Non-Audit Services 
to Total Fee Regressed on Board and Audit Committee Quality and 
Independence and Control Variables comparing 2002 with the remaining years
APNAS/TFEE = a  + ß, B SIZE + ß2 B DSHIPS + ß3 B MEET + ß4 B FINLIT + ß5 BOUTSIDE 
+ ß6 B CHAIR + ß7 A SIZE + ß8 AM SHIP + ß9 A MEET + ß l0 A FINLIT 
+ ß n A OUTSIDE + ß l2 A CHAIR + ß13 BLOCK + ß14 BIG5 + ß15 AUD SPEC 
+ ß16 ALOCKS + ß |7 MINING + ß18 FININCIAL + ß19 UTILITIES + ß20 ASSETS 
+ ß21 ALLSUBS + ß22 RESTRUCT + ß23 NEWCEO + ß24 NEWISSUE 
+ ß25 NEGROI + ß26 LEVERAGE + ß27 NAS_SPEC + ß28 US_LIST + ß29 US_SUB 
+ ß30 YEAR1 + e
Panel A: Regression result for 3 year pooled sample 1999-2001
Predicted Estimate T Statistic p-value
Sign (1-tailed)#
( C o n s ta n t)  # -0 .0 7 7 0 -1 .2 1 1 .2 2 6
B o a r d  o f  D i r e c t o r s  V a r ia b le s
B  S IZ E + 0 .0 1 4 7 3 .3 3 3 .000
B  D S H IP - -0 .0 3 6 7 -2 .1 4 8 .016
B  M E E T - 0 .0 0 8 9 4 .9 9 7 .000
B  F IN L IT - -0 .0 7 2 2 -1 .7 8 7 .037
B  O U T S ID E - 0 .0 1 6 9 0 .3 9 4 .3 4 7
B C H A IR - 0 .0 1 4 3 0 .8 2 3 .2 0 5
A u d it  C o m m itte e  V a r ia b le s
A  S IZ E - -0 .0 1 0 8 -1 .7 0 9 .044
A  M S H IP - 0 .0 0 7 3 0 .5 8 0 .281
A  M E E T - -0 .0 0 2 5 -0 .5 8 3 .2 8 0
A  F IN L IT - 0 .0 0 7 6 0 .2 6 6 .3 9 5
A  O U T S ID E - 0 .0 0 2 9 0 .1 0 1 .4 6 0
A  C H A IR - 0 . 0 I I 8 0 .5 0 7 .3 0 6
C o n tr o l  V a r ia b le s
B L O C K - 0 .0 0 0 4 1 .2 3 7 .1 0 8
B IG 5 + 0 .0 9 4 2 4 .6 4 2 .000
A U D  S P E C # ? 0 .0 1 0 7 0 .5 8 3 .5 6 0
A L O C K S + 0 .0 0 8 6 1 .3 1 9 .094
M IN IN G - -0 .0 5 3 4 -2 .7 5 5 .003
F IN A N C IA L - 0 .0 2 4 3 1.071 .1 4 2
U T IL IT IE S - 0 .0 7 5 2 2 .6 3 9 .004
A S S E T S + 0 .0 1 9 0 3 .2 8 9 .001
A L L S U B S + -0 .0 0 1 1 -0 .1 5 4 .4 3 9
R E S T R U C T + 0 .0 5 5 6 2 .8 5 5 .002
N E W C E O + 0 .0 6 1 1 2 .8 1 7 .002
N E W IS S U E + 0 .0 5 4 6 3 .3 9 2 .000
N E G R O I - -0 .0 0 0 6 -1 .1 6 7 .1 2 2
L E V E R A G E - -0 .0 0 0 2 -0 .6 7 1 .251
N A S  S P E C + 0 .0 4 3 6 2 .3 5 1 .009
U S  L IS T - -0 .0 1 4 6 -0 .5 6 1 .2 8 7
U S  S U B - 0 .0 1 9 9 1 .1 7 0 .121
Y E A R 1 # ? -0 .0 6 8 6 -1 .7 1 8 .086
A d ju s te d  R 2 .1 9 3
F s ta tis t ic 1 0 .4 9 0
( s ig n if ic a n c e ) .0 0 0
# p-values are 1 tailed except for the constant, AUD SPEC and YEAR1 which are 2- 
tailed
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Table 14 Regression results: The Ratio of Auditor provided Non-Audit Services 
to Total Fee Regressed on Board and Audit Committee Quality and 
Independence and Control Variables for the 2002
Panel B: Regression result for 2002
Predicted Estimate T Statistic p-value
Sign (1-tailed)#
(Constant) # 0.2594 2.114 .035
B oard  o f  D irectors Variables
B SIZE + 0.0106 1.349 .089
B DSHIP - -0.0680 -1.972 .025
B MEET - 0.0031 1.111 .134
B FINLIT - -0.0166 -0.239 .406
B OUTSIDE - -0.0589 -0.792 .215
B CHAIR - 0.0264 0.873 .192
Audit C om m ittee Variables
A SIZE - -0.0076 -0.646 .259
A MSHIP - 0.0464 1.752 .040
A MEET - -0.0100 -1.257 .105
A FINLIT - -0.0316 -0.638 .262
A OUTSIDE - 0.0586 1.160 .123
A CHAIR - -0.0372 -0.854 .197
C ontrol Variables
BLOCK - -0.0002 -0.362 .359
BIG5 + 0.1125 3.077 .001
AUD SPEC# ? -0.0738 -2.213 .028
ALOCKS + 0.0103 0.875 .191
MINING - -0.0046 -0.154 .439
FINANCIAL - 0.0986 2.604 .005
UTILITIES - -0.0039 -0.056 .477
ASSETS + 0.0015 0.147 .442
ALLSUBS + 0.0090 0.813 .208
RESTRUCT + 0.0457 1.034 .151
NEWCEO + 0.0847 1.335 .091
NEWISSUE + 0.0003 0.013 .495
NEGROI - 0.0699 1.041 .149
LEVERAGE - -0.0055 -0.678 .249
NAS SPEC + 0.1292 3.832 .000
US LIST - 0.0846 1.979 .024
US SUB - 0.0348 1.234 .109
YEAR1# ? -0.0483 -1.564 .119
Adjusted R2 .148
F statistic 3.382
(significance) .000
# p-values are 1 tailed except for the constant, AUD SPEC and YEAR1 which are 2- 
tailed
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Table 14 Regression results: The Ratio of Auditor provided Non-Audit Services 
to Total Fee Regressed on Board and Audit Committee Quality and 
Independence and Control Variables for the 2002
Panel C: Comparison between 2002 and 1999-2001
Pred.
Sign.
1 9 9 9 -2 0 0 2  
4 y e a r  p o o le d  
E stim a te p #
1 9 9 9 -2 0 0 1  
3 y e a r  p o o le d  
E stim a te p #
2 0 0 2
E stim a te p #
(C o n stan t) # 0 .0 0 1 0 .9 8 8 -0 .0770 .226 0.2594 .035
B o a r d  o f  D ir e c to r s  V a r ia b le s
B SIZ E + 0 .0 1 4 0 .0 0 0 0.0147 .0 0 0 0.0106 .089
B D SH IP - -0 .0 4 0 0 .0 0 4 -0 .0367 .0 1 6 -0 .0680 .0 2 5
B M E E T - 0 .0 0 8 0 .0 0 0 0.0089 .0 0 0 0.0031 .134
B F I N L I T - -0 .0 5 5 0 .0 5 6 -0 .0722 .0 3 7 -0 .0166 .406
B O U T S ID E - -0 .0 0 5 0 .4 4 5 0.0169 .347 -0 .0589 .215
B C H A I R - 0 .0 1 8 0 .1 1 5 0.0143 .205 0.0264 .192
A u d it  C o m m itte e  V a r ia b le s
A S I Z E - -0 .0 1 1 0 .0 2 6 -0 .0108 .0 4 4 -0 .0076 .259
A M S H I P - 0 .0 1 3 0 .1 2 6 0.0073 .281 0.0464 .040
A M E E T - -0 .0 0 4 0 .1 3 6 -0 .0025 .280 -0 .0100 .105
A F I N L I T - 0 .0 0 0 1 .4 9 9 0.0076 .395 -0 .0316 .262
A O U T S I D E - 0 .0 2 2 0 .1 8 7 0.0029 .460 0.0586 .123
A C H A I R - 0 .0 0 1 0 .4 7 2 0.0118 .306 -0.0372 .197
C o n tr o l V a r ia b le s
B L O C K  20 - 0 .0 0 0 0 .1 8 9 0.0004 .108 -0.0002 .359
B IG 5 + 0 .0 9 9 0 .0 0 0 0.0942 .0 0 0 0.1125 .001
A U D S P E C  # ? -0 .0 0 3 0 .865 0.0107 .560 -0.0738 .028
A L O C K S + 0 .0 0 7 0 .1 0 3 0.0086 .0 9 4 0.0103 .191
M IN IN G - -0 .0 4 6 0 .0 0 2 -0 .0534 .003 -0 .0046 .439
F IN A N C IA L - 0 .0 4 0 0 .0 2 0 0.0243 .142 0.0986 .005
U T IL IT IE S - 0 .0 5 8 0 .0 1 3 0.0752 .0 0 4 -0 .0039 .477
A SS E T S + 0 .0 1 5 0 .0 0 2 0.0190 .001 0.0015 .442
A L L S U B S -1- 0 .0 0 2 0 .3 7 5 -0.0011 .439 0.0090 .208
R E S T R U C T + 0 .0 5 3 0 .0 0 1 0.0556 .002 0.0457 .151
N E W C E O + 0 .0 6 0 0 .0 0 2 0.0611 .0 0 2 0.0847 .091
N E W IS S U E + 0 .0 4 2 0 .0 0 1 0.0546 .0 0 0 0.0003 .495
N E G R O I - -0 .0 0 1 0 .1 4 7 -0 .0006 .122 0.0699 .149
L E V E R A G E - 0 .0 0 0 0 .211 -0 .0002 .251 -0.0055 .249
N A S SPE C + 0 .0 6 1 0 .0 0 0 0.0436 .0 0 9 0.1292 .000
U S L I S T - 0 .0 1 0 0 .321 -0 .0146 .287 0.0846 .024
U S S U B - 0 .0 2 3 0 .055 0.0199 .121 0.0348 .109
Y E A R 1 # ? -0 .0 5 7 0 .0 1 5 -0 .0686 .0 8 6 -0 .0483 .119
Adj R “ .1 8 0 .193 .148
F sta tistic 1 2 .6 9 5 10.490 3.382
(s ig n ifican ce) .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0
# p-values are 1 tailed except for the constant, AUD SPEC and YEAR1 which are 2- 
tailed
Where:
APNAS/TFEE = non-audit fees / total fees
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B SIZE 
BDSHIPS 
B MEET
B FINLIT
B OUTSIDE 
B CHAIR 
A SIZE 
A MSHIP
A MEET
A FINLIT
A OUTSIDE 
A CHAIR
BLOCK
BIG5
AUD SPEC 
ALOCKS
MINING
FINANCIAL
UTILITIES
ASSETS
ALLSUBS
RESTRUCT
NEWCEO
NEWISSUE
NEGROI 
LEVERAGE 
NAS SPEC 
USLIST 
US SUB 
YEAR1
number of board members
average number of directorships by outside directors on the board 
sum of the total number of board meetings attended by each 
director divided by the number of directors 
percentage of outside directors with a financial background on 
the board
percentage of outside directors on the board 
1 if chairman is an outside director; 0 otherwise 
number of audit committee members
average number of audit committee memberships by outside 
audit committee members on the board
sum of the total number of audit committee meetings attended by 
each director divided by the number of directors 
percentage of outside audit committee members with a financial 
background on the board
percentage of outside directors in the audit committee 
1 if chairman of audit committee is an outside director; 0 
otherwise
% owned by blockholders
1 if auditor is Big 5, 0 otherwise
1 if auditor has > 15% of audit services
the number of other firms that share the same auditor and
directors
1 if Resource; 0 otherwise
1 if Banking and Finance; 0 otherwise
1 if Infrastructure and Utilities; 0 otherwise
natural log of total assets
natural log of the total number of subsidiaries
1 if firm undergone restructuring; 0 otherwise
1 if there is a change in CEO; 0 otherwise
1 if the firm issued new stocks or equity for cash and/or has listed 
in another exchange during the current year; = 0 otherwise 
two-year average ROI if negative, =0 otherwise 
long term debt to shareholder’s equity 
1 if auditor has > 15% of APNAS
1 if listed on an American stocks exchange, =0 otherwise 
1 if it has an American subsidiary, =0 otherwise 
1 if first year of audit engagement; =0 otherwise
5.6.1 Board o f directors variables
For the board quality variables, the significant relationships of B SIZE and B DSHIP 
in the full regression was also found in the three year pooled regression (with p = 
.000; and .016, respectively, both one-tailed) and was also replicated in the 2002
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regression (with p = .089; and .025, one-tailed), which are again in the predicted 
direction supporting H 1.1 and H1.2.
Again, similar to the full model regression, in the results of the 3-year 1999-2001 
pooled regression, B MEET was, unexpectedly, positively related to APNAS/TFEE 
(p = .000, two-tailed) while the coefficient for B FINLIT was negative and significant 
(p = .037, one-tailed), supporting HI.4. However, for 2002, B MEET (p = .134, two- 
tailed) and B FINLIT {p = .406, one-tailed) are no longer significant providing no 
support for HI.3 and HI.4.
The two independence variables, B OUTSIDE and B CHAIR are insignificant in 
both regressions, which is consistent with the results found in the 4 years pooled 
regression.
5.6.2 Audit committee variables
A SIZE, which was the only significant audit committee variable in the 4 year 
regression was again negative and significant in the 3 prior years regression (p = .044, 
one-tailed) but loses its significance in 2002 (p = .259, one-tailed).
On the other hand, A MSHIP which was insignificant in the prior three years, is 
significantly positive in 2002 (p = .081, two-tailed) which is unexpected and does not 
support H3.2.
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5.6.3 Summary o f results for test variables
Table 15 summarises the results of the hypothesis testing done for 2002 and compares 
them with the result found in the 3-year pooled regression as well as the full 4-year 
pooled results.
Table 15 Summary of hypothesis testing result for the 3-year pooled regression 
and 2002
Hyijothesis supported
Hypothesis Variable Pred.
sign
1999-2002
pooled
1999-2001
pooled 2002
Quality of the board of directors
H l.l B SIZE + yes yes yes
HI.2 B DSHIP - yes yes yes
HI .3 B MEET -
HI.4 B FINL1T - yes yes
Independence of the board ol directors
H2.1 B OUTSIDE -
H2.2 B CHAIR -
Quality of the audit committee
H3.1 A SIZE - yes yes
H3.2 A MSHIP -
H3.3 A MEET -
H3.4 A FINLIT -
Independence of the audit committee
H4.1 A OUTSIDE -
H4.2 A CHAIR -
Where: 
BSIZE 
B DSHIPS 
B MEET
B F1NLIT
B OUTSIDE 
BCHAIR 
A SIZE
number of board members
average number of directorships by outside directors on the board 
sum of the total number of board meetings attended by each 
director divided by the number of directors 
percentage of outside directors with a financial background on 
the board
percentage of outside directors on the board 
1 if chairman is an outside director; 0 otherwise 
number of audit committee members
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A MSHIP = average number of audit committee memberships by outside 
audit committee members on the board
A MEET = sum of the total number of audit committee meetings attended by 
each director divided by the number of directors 
A FIN LIT = percentage of outside audit committee members with a financial
background on the board
A OUTSIDE = percentage of outside directors in the audit committee 
A CHAIR = 1 if chairman of audit committee is an outside director; 0
otherwise
The drop in explanatory power of the model does suggest that there has been a change 
in the way firm characteristics relate to APNAS/TFEE. However this drop is most 
likely explained by lower significance among the control variables rather than the test 
variables, particularly ASSETS.
The 2002 results were quite weak as well compared to the three prior years, losing the 
support of all the hypothesis except for two. Although, it is interesting to note that the 
two that are significant in 2002 are the board quality variables, B SIZE and 
B DSH1P, suggesting that smaller boards and directors holding multiple directorships 
are more able to restrict large APNAS purchases (relative to the total fee paid to 
auditors).
The lost of significance for B FINLIT might be due to the increasing media attention 
(and hence general awareness) on the possible negative influence APNAS can have 
on the quality of audit.
This increased media attention would also reinforce the relationship with B DSHIP, 
where directors on multiple boards might restrict excessive APNAS spending which 
might attract attention if one of the firms suffers an audit failure. It is possible that 
post-2001, the potential reputation effects is more severe for outside directors with
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multiple directorships where an audit failure in one firm will negatively affect him/her 
in the other firms that he is a director of, as well as other future directorships.
It is strange then to note that A MSHIP is positively significant. Since the audit 
committee is a subset of the full board, it means that firms with a board made up of 
outside directors holding multiple directorships tend to purchase less APNAS relative 
to total fee, unless those directors are members of the audit committee who holds 
multiple audit committee memberships, in which case they tend to buy more. This 
could be due to audit committee members having more experience with different audit 
firms and approve APNAS spending because they are better able to judge the 
incumbent auditor and trust their competence and independence. While it is also 
possible that audit committee members on multiple committees have a closer 
relationship with the audit firms which could lead to a lower independence of the 
committee member. However the insignificance of the ALOCKS variable in 2002 
suggests that that may not be the case.
5.7 Individual year regressions
To test the stability of the results over the first three years, the base model regression 
was re-estimated separately on each of those years. The results of these regressions 
are reported in Table 16 below.
Similar to the regression for the pooled samples and 2002, the three regressions for 
the years 1999-2001 are significant (respectively F = 4.329, p = .000; F = 4.394, p = 
.000; F = 4.202) also, the explanatory power of the models are quite modest
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(respectively, 20%; 20.9%; 19.4%). The three adjusted R2s are fairly similar to their 
pooled sample adjusted R2 (of 19.3%).
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Table 16 Regression results: The Ratio of Auditor provided Non-Audit Services 
to Total Fee Regressed on Board and Audit Committee Quality and 
Independence and Control Variables for the four years 1999-2002 tested 
individually.
P red
sign
1 9 9 9 -2 0 0 2  
p o o led  
E st. p#
1999
E st. p#
2 0 0 0
E st. p #
2001
E st. p #
2 0 0 2
E st. p#
(C o n stan t) # 0 .0010 0.988 -0.0934 .370 -0 .0760 .547 -0 .1002 .367 0.2594 .0 3 5
B o a r d  o f  d ir e c to r s  v a r ia b le s
B SIZ E + 0.0140 0 .0 0 0 0.0055 .219 0.0182 .0 1 3 0.0172 .0 1 4 0.0106 .0 8 9
B D S H IP - -0 .0400 0 .0 0 4 -0 .0558 .0 1 6 -0 .0092 .397 -0.0391 .101 -0 .0680 .025
B M E E T - 0.0080 0 .0 0 0 0.0085 .002 0.0104 .0 0 0 0.0054 .055 0.0031 .134
B F IN L IT - -0 .0550 0 .0 5 6 -0.0841 .115 -0 .1277 .0 4 7 -0 .0355 .296 -0 .0166 .406
B O U T S ID E - -0 .0050 0.445 -0.0322 .328 -0 .0588 .240 0.0750 .151 -0 .0589 .215
B C H A IR - 0.0180 0.115 0.0255 .195 0.0219 .250 0.0002 .497 0.0264 .192
A u d it  c o m m it te e  v a r ia b le s
A SIZ E - -0 .0110 0 .0 2 6 -0 .0096 .185 -0 .0200 .0 4 3 0.0037 .373 -0 .0076 .259
A M S H IP - 0.0130 0.126 0.0123 .234 -0 .0183 .254 0.0111 .344 0.0464 .0 4 0
A M E E T - -0 .0040 0 .136 -0.0067 .158 -0 .0023 .372 0.0014 .437 -0 .0100 .105
A F IN L IT - 0.0001 0 .499 -0.0078 .436 0.0077 .442 0.0296 .270 -0 .0316 .262
A O U T S ID E - 0.0220 0.187 -0 .0019 .484 0.0545 .170 -0 .0102 .421 0.0586 .123
A C H A IR - 0.0010 0.472 0.0254 .268 0 .0126 .379 0.0228 .291 -0 .0372 .197
C o n tr o l v a r ia b le s
B L O C K - 0.0000 0.189 -0.0001 .440 0.0008 .074 0.0002 .346 -0 .0002 .359
B IG 5 + 0.0990 0 .0 0 0 0.0684 .021 0.1154 .001 0.1287 .0 0 0 0.1125 .001
A U D  S P E C # ? -0 .0030 0.865 0.1092 .0 0 0 -0 .0576 .0 7 5 -0 .0503 .168 -0 .0738 .0 2 8
A L O C K S + 0.0070 0.103 0.0182 .041 0 .0160 .111 -0 .0017 .439 0.0103 .191
M IN IN G - -0 .0460 0 .0 0 2 -0.0145 .321 -0 .1262 .0 0 0 -0 .0474 .0 7 9 -0 .0046 .439
F IN A N C IA L - 0.0400 0 .0 2 0 0.0167 .330 0.0411 .163 -0.0093 .407 0.0986 .0 0 5
U T IL IT IE S - 0.0580 0 .0 1 3 0.2070 .000 0.0592 .128 -0.0253 .298 -0 .0039 .477
A SS E T S + 0.0150 0 .0 0 2 0.0309 .0 0 0 0.0185 .0 4 9 0.0161 .0 6 7 0.0015 .442
A L L S U B S + 0.0020 0.375 0.0007 .476 0 .0000 .499 -0 .0100 .201 0.0090 .208
R E S T R U C T + 0.0530 0 .001 0.0204 .261 0.1082 .0 0 0 0.0341 .253 0.0457 .151
N E W C E O + 0.0600 0 .0 0 2 0.0679 .081 0.0582 .0 5 7 0.0501 .0 8 0 0.0847 .091
N E W IS S U E + 0.0420 0 .001 0.0234 .202 0 .0554 .0 3 0 0.0632 .0 1 3 0.0003 .495
N E G R O I - -0 .0010 0.147 -0.0011 .0 2 6 -0 .0552 .137 0.0020 .097 0.0699 .149
L E V E R A G E - 0.0000 0.211 0.0000 .479 -0 .0030 .200 -0.0003 .478 -0.0055 .249
N A S  SPE C + 0.0610 0 .0 0 0 -0 .0440 .088 0.0772 .0 0 8 0.1037 .0 0 2 0.1292 .0 0 0
U S  L IS T - 0.0100 0.321 -0.0517 .126 -0 .0345 .237 0.0464 .148 0.0846 .0 2 4
U S SU B - 0.0230 0.055 0.0130 .331 -0 .0172 .288 0.0527 .032 0.0348 .109
Y E A R 1 # ? -0 .0570 0 .0 1 5 -0.0901 .148 -0 .0529 .522 -0.0668 .328 -0.0483 .119
A dj RJ .180 .200 .209 .194 .148
F sta tistic 12.695 4.329 4 .394 4.202 3.382
(s ig n ifican ce) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
# p-values are 1 tailed except for the constant, AUD SPEC and YEAR1 which are 2- 
tailed
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Where:
APNAS/TFEE = 
BSIZE 
B DSHIPS 
B MEET
B FINL1T
B OUTSIDE = 
B CHAIR 
A SIZE 
A MSHIP
A MEET
A FINLIT
A OUTSIDE = 
A CHAIR
BLOCK
BIG5
AUD SPEC = 
ALOCKS
MINING
FINANCIAL =
UTILITIES
ASSETS
ALLSUBS
RESTRUCT
NEWCEO
NEWISSUE
NEGROI 
LEVERAGE = 
NAS SPEC 
USLIST 
US SUB 
YEAR1
non-audit fees / total fees 
number of board members
average number of directorships by outside directors on the board 
sum of the total number of board meetings attended by each 
director divided by the number of directors 
percentage of outside directors with a financial background on 
the board
percentage of outside directors on the board 
1 if chairman is an outside director; 0 otherwise 
number of audit committee members
average number of audit committee memberships by outside 
audit committee members on the board
sum of the total number of audit committee meetings attended by 
each director divided by the number of directors 
percentage of outside audit committee members with a financial 
background on the board
percentage of outside directors in the audit committee 
1 if chairman of audit committee is an outside director; 0 
otherwise
% owned by blockholders
1 if auditor is Big 5, 0 otherwise
1 if auditor has > 15% of audit services
the number of other firms that share the same auditor and
directors
1 if Resource; 0 otherwise
1 if Banking and Finance; 0 otherwise
1 if Infrastructure and Utilities; 0 otherwise
natural log of total assets
natural log of the total number of subsidiaries
1 if firm undergone restructuring; 0 otherwise
1 if there is a change in CEO; 0 otherwise
1 if the Finn issued new stocks or equity for cash and/or has listed 
in another exchange during the current year; = 0 otherwise 
two-year average ROI if negative, =0 otherwise 
long term debt to shareholder’s equity 
1 if auditor has > 15% of APNAS
1 if listed on an American stocks exchange, =0 otherwise 
1 if it has an American subsidiary, =0 otherwise 
1 if first year of audit engagement; =0 otherwise
5. 7.1 Board o f directors variables
For the board quality variables, both quality measures of the board (B SIZE and 
B DSHIP) were significant and in the predicted direction in the 4-year pooled
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regression. The positive relation of board size to APNAS spending in the 4-year 
regression seems to be driven by the years 2000, 2001 and 2002(p = .013; .014, and 
.089 one-tailed), with 1999 insignificant (p = .219, one-tailed).
On the other hand, the negative relation of B DSHIP seems mainly driven by the 
1999 {p -  .016, one-tailed) and 2002 {p = .025, one-tailed) with 2000 and 2001 
insignificant (p = .397 and .101, one-tailed).
In the pooled regression, the financial literacy of the board was negatively related to 
APNAS/TFEE. When the sample was split into the individual years, the only year in 
which the coefficient of B FINLIT is significant was 2000 (p = .047, one-tailed). It 
is possible that firms with boards made up of a high percentage of financially literate 
directors start placing increased scrutiny and/or restraint on the spending of APNAS 
during the period where there is increased debate over possible threats to auditor 
quality. However following the high profile collapses of 2001, this issue is brought 
into the general domain where even boards with low number of directors with 
financial backgrounds becoming informed of the potential effects of APNAS on 
auditor independence and quality.
It seems as if multiple directorships was the main constraint on excessive APNAS 
spending during 1999 but for 2000, it was a financially literacy coupled with a 
smaller, arguably more effective board that was related to lower buying of APNAS. 
Yet, by 2001, the significance of financial literacy dropped off.
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The coefficient of B MEET was significantly positive in the 4-year pooled regression 
which was not the predicted direction by HI.3. The individual yearly regression 
further supports this result with the coefficient of B MEET being positively 
significant for the earlier two years 1999 and 2000 {p = .004; and .001; both two- 
tailed).
However in 2001 and 2002 it is insignificant. A possible explanation for this effect 
could be that increased media attention to the negative effects of APNAS cause 
diligent boards to become more reluctant to purchase NAS from their auditor.
Similar to the pooled regression, the coefficients of B OUTSIDE and B CHAIR are 
insignificant in all individual years, suggesting that board independence does not 
affect the firms’ purchase of APNAS.
5. 7.2 Audit committee variables
The negative relation of A SIZE in the pooled regression seems to be driven by solely 
by 2000, where it was negatively significant {p = .043, one-tailed).
The coefficients of A MSHIP, A MEET, A FINLIT, A OUTSIDE, and A CHAIR 
are all insignificant for all three years, same as in the pooled three-year regression. 
The only exception to this being A MSHIP for 2002 discussed above.
5.7.3 Summary o f results for test variables
Table 17 summarises the results of the hypothesis testing done for each of the four 
sample years separately as well as the 3 year pooled regression.
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Table 17 Summary of hypothesis testing result for the four years individually 
tested
Hypothesis supported
Hypothesis Variable Pred.
sign
4 years 1999 2000 2001 2002
Quality of the board of directors
H l.l B SIZE + yes yes yes yes
HI.2 B DSHIP - yes yes yes
HI.3 B MEET -
HI.4 B FINLIT - yes yes
Independence of the board ol directors
H2.1 B OUTSIDE -
H2.2 B CHAIR -
Quality of the audit committee
H3.1 A SIZE - yes yes
H3.2 A MSHIP -
H3.3 A MEET -
H3.4 A FINLIT -
Independence of the audit committee
H4.1 A OUTSIDE -
H4.2 A CHAIR -
Where:
B SIZE 
BDSHIPS 
B MEET
B FINLIT
B OUTSIDE 
BCHAIR 
A SIZE 
A MSHIP
AMEET
A FINLIT
A OUTSIDE 
A CHAIR
number of board members
average number of directorships by outside directors on the board 
sum of the total number of board meetings attended by each 
director divided by the number of directors 
percentage of outside directors with a financial background on 
the board
percentage of outside directors on the board 
1 if chairman is an outside director; 0 otherwise 
number of audit committee members
average number of audit committee memberships by outside 
audit committee members on the board
sum of the total number of audit committee meetings attended by 
each director divided by the number of directors 
percentage of outside audit committee members with a financial 
background on the board
percentage of outside directors in the audit committee 
1 if chairman of audit committee is an outside director; 0 
otherwise
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While the earlier comparison of 2002 against the pooled 1999-2001 suggested that the 
relationship between APNAS/TFEE and the test variables changed dramatically, the 
individual years regression show that the results for the first three years were also 
weaker as well.
It would seem that the strongest of the results came from the year 2000 whereas 2001 
was provided the weakest results. Overall, there is less support for the hypotheses in 
the individual years compared to the 4-year pooled regression.
A possible explanation for this could simply be that in each of the years, APNAS 
spending was influenced by different aspects of the board of directors and audit 
committee.
Also, the weaker results could be a result of lost degrees of freedom since the sub­
samples are much smaller and the regression model involves a large number of 
variables. This is made worse with the possible presence of multicollinearity which 
might reduce the power of the tests.
5.7.4 Control variables
Some of the control variables returned interesting results when separate regression 
was estimated on the four years. These are further examined below.
Although AUD SPEC was insignificant in the pooled 4-year regression, it is 
positively significant in 1999 (p = .000, two-tailed), and negatively significant in 2000 
{p = .075, two-tailed) and 2002 (p = .028, two-tailed). On the other hand, NAS SPEC
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is insignificant in 1999 (p = .176, two-tailed) but positively significant in the later 
three years (2000: p = .008, one-tailed; 2001: p = .002, one-tailed; and 2002: p -  .000, 
one-tailed) as well as in the 4-year pooled regression. These results indicate that for 
the year 1999 audit firms identified as specialist auditors in an industry sell more 
APNAS relative to total fee but firms identified as a specialist APNAS provider has 
no influence on the level of APNAS being sold. However for the subsequent three 
years, audit firms identified as specialist auditor in an industry sell less APNAS but 
firms identified as a specialist APNAS provider sell more. This could be a result of 
the NAS arm of the audit firms becoming more mature and separate from the audit 
arm of the firm.
One of the possible explanation for the drop in adjusted R2 is the lost of significance 
of ASSETS, whose significance has been declining over the three years and finally, 
was insignificant in 2002. The increased political costs involved with spending high 
levels of APNAS relative to total fee might be an explanation for this.
The strong positive correlation between RESTRUCT and APNAS/TFEE found in the 
4-year pooled regression seems to be driven by the year 2000, which is the only year 
the coefficient is significant (p= .000, one-tailed). This is probably due to the larger 
incidence of restructuring in that year, where 90 of the 387 sample firms (or 23%) 
were identified as having undergone restructuring (percentage of firms identified as 
having undergone restructuring was 16% for 1999; 6% for 2001; 7% for 2002). The
32 To see if there was any major change in assets for that year, the natural logs of assets for firms in 
2001 and 2002 were compared. The sample yielded 309 matched pairs and had a correlation 
coefficient of 97.64%, which suggests that the assets figure were not dramatically different from the 
previous year. However, there is a survivor bias in the selection for the matched pairs as they were 
firms that remained in the roughly top 500 firms for both years so their assets figures may be more 
stable than the other firms that were dropped out.
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result could be due to IT infrastructure upgrades in relation to the Y2K bug. Given its 
strong significance, it suggests that a substantial part of the restructure expenditure 
was spent buying NAS from their auditor. Given that IT services was one of the 
revenue sources banned in the US by the Sarbanes-Oxley act, it is interesting to note 
that the regression for year 2000 produced the highest adjusted R“ as well as the most 
number of significant test variables.
The coefficients for US LIST are insignificant in the 4-year pooled regression as well 
as each of the three individual year regressions. However, it is positively significant 
in 2002 (p= .049, two-tailed) which is in the unexpected direction. It was expected 
that the firm’s stocks being listed in an American stocks exchange would lead to less 
APNAS spending as a result of the higher level of focus on APNAS there, especially 
after the events of 2001. However the result indicated that for the year 2002, firms 
that are listed in the US spend more APNAS relative to total fee. A possible 
explanation for this could be that the increased regulation and scrutiny has lead to the 
audit firms being more thorough and diligent in their accounting for and reporting of 
NAS provided to their audit clients.
While the pooled result for YEAR1 was highly significant, none of the results for the 
individual years were significant. This is probably due to the low number of audit 
firm changes per year leading to the low power of the test.
5.8 Separately testing board and audit committee variables
The board and audit committee variables are significantly correlated with each other. 
To investigate if multicollinearity between the board and audit committee variables is
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reducing their explanatory power, the regression is estimated with only one set of
variables at a time (either board or audit committee variables).
5.8.1 Board o f directors variables
Firstly, regression is estimated without the audit committee test variables for the 
1999-2002 4-year pooled sample, as well as for each of the four years 1999-2002.
The results of these regressions are reported in Table 18 below. All the regressions 
are significant (4-year pooled F = 15.565; 1999 F = 5.328; 2000 F = 5.296; 2001 F = 
5.263; and 2002 F = 3.896) and have comparable adjusted IT's to the full regression 
(4-year pooled adj R2 = 17.9%; 1999 adj R2 = 20.7%; 2000 adj R2 =21.1%; 2001 adj 
R2 =20.4%; and 2002 adj R2 =14.4%).
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Table 18 Regression results: The Ratio of Auditor provided Non-Audit Services 
to Total Fee Regressed on Board Quality and Independence and Control 
Variables
APNAS/TFEE = a  + ß, B SIZE + ß2 B DSHIPS + ß3 B MEET + ß4 BFINLIT + ß5 B OUTSIDE 
+ ß6 B CHAIR + ß 13 BLOCK + ß l4 BIG5 + ß 15 AUD SPEC + ß 16 ALOCKS 
+ ßj7 MINING + ß 18 FININCIAL + ß 19 UTILITIES + ß20 ASSETS + ß21 ALLSUBS 
+ ß22 RESTRUCT + ß23 NEWCEO + ß24 NEWISSUE + ß25 NEGROI 
+ ß26 LEVERAGE + ß27 NAS_SPEC + ß28 US_LIST + ß29 US_SUB + ß30 YEAR1 
+ e
Pred
sign
4 years* 
Est. p#
1999
Est. p#
2 0 0 0
Est. p#
2 0 0 1
Est. p#
2 0 0 2
Est. p#
(Constant) # 0.006 .915 -0.0727 .465 -0.0772 .530 -0.0952 .364 0.2231 .057
Board of directors variables
B SIZE + 0 .0 1 2 .0 0 1 0.0041 .273 0.0158 . 0 2 1 0.0191 .005 0.0099 .093
B DSHIP - -0.030 .005 -0.0428 .015 -0.0273 .146 -0.0315 .092 -0.0253 .164
B MEET - 0.007 . 0 0 0 0.0078 .003 0.0094 . 0 0 1 0.0059 .034 0.0031 .115
B FINLIT - -0.056 .017 -0.0946 .031 -0 .1 1 0 0 .025 -0.0134 .399 -0.0366 .248
B OUTSIDE - 0 . 0 1 0 .373 -0.0248 .344 -0.0129 .427 0.0814 .093 -0.0384 .273
B CHAIR - 0.016 .137 0.0253 .192 0.0193 .272 0.0035 .452 0 . 0 2 1 2 .240
Control variables
BLOCK - 0 . 0 0 0 .186 0 . 0 0 0 0 .463 0.0007 .1 0 1 0 .0 0 0 2 .337 -0 . 0 0 0 2 .363
BIG5 + 0.098 .0 0 0 0.0733 . 0 1 2 0.1134 . 0 0 2 0.1286 . 0 0 0 0.1160 .0 0 1
AUD SPEC# ? -0.004 .810 0.1094 .0 0 0 -0.0574 .073 -0.0500 .166 -0.0713 .031
ALOCKS + 0.007 .118 0.0164 .056 0.0165 . 1 0 0 -0.0017 .438 0.0076 .258
MINING - -0.044 .003 -0.0098 .375 -0.1158 .0 0 1 -0.0489 .070 -0.0106 .358
FINANCIAL - 0.035 .031 0.0194 .300 0.0361 .189 -0.0135 .364 0.0849 .0 1 1
UTILITIES - 0.060 . 0 1 0 0.2089 . 0 0 0 0.0631 . 1 1 2 -0.0282 .274 -0 . 0 2 2 2 .372
ASSETS + 0.013 .005 0.0273 .0 0 1 0.0179 .053 0.0167 .056 -0.0008 .469
ALLSUBS + 0 .0 0 2 .356 0.0003 .488 -0.0016 .448 -0.0096 .209 0 .0 1 2 1 .134
RESTRUCT + 0.054 .0 0 1 0 .0 2 0 1 .262 0.1027 . 0 0 0 0.0351 .245 0.0454 .151
NEWCEO + 0.059 . 0 0 2 0.0633 .094 0.0490 .089 0.0506 .074 0.0750 .116
NEWISSUE + 0.044 . 0 0 0 0.0284 .151 0.0531 .033 0.0612 .014 0 .0 0 2 0 .468
NEGROI - -0 .0 0 1 .138 -0 .0 0 1 2 .018 -0.0635 .094 0 .0 0 2 0 .091 0.0679 .156
LEVERAGE - 0 . 0 0 0 .190 0 .0 0 0 0 .462 -0.0032 .182 0 . 0 0 0 2 .486 -0.0054 .252
NAS SPEC + 0.064 . 0 0 0 -0.0449 .082 0.0818 .005 0 . 1 0 2 2 .0 0 2 0.1284 . 0 0 0
US LIST - 0 . 0 1 0 .330 -0.0489 .137 -0.0346 .234 0.0435 .160 0.0821 .027
US SUB - 0.023 .057 0.0124 .338 -0.0185 .274 0.0524 .032 0.0334 .118
YEAR1# ? -0.055 .018 -0.0917 .135 -0.0380 .641 -0.0620 .358 -0.0494 .109
AdjR2 .179 .207 .2 1 1 .204 .144
F statistic 15.565 5.328 5.296 5.263 3.896
(significance) .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0
* regression uses the pooled sample from the years 1999-2002
# p-values are 1 tailed except for the constant, AUD SPEC and YEAR1 which are 2- 
tailed
Where:
APNAS/TFEE 
BSIZE 
B DSHIPS
non-audit fees / total fees 
number of board members
average number of directorships by outside directors on the board
158
B MEET
B FINLIT
B OUTSIDE 
BCHAIR 
BLOCK 
BIG5
AUD SPEC 
ALOCKS
MINING
FINANCIAL
UTILITIES
ASSETS
ALLSUBS
RESTRUCT
NEWCEO
NEWISSUE
NEGROI
LEVERAGE
NAS SPEC
USLIST
USSUB
YEAR1
sum of the total number of board meetings attended by each 
director divided by the number of directors 
percentage of outside directors with a financial background on 
the board
percentage of outside directors on the board
1 if chairman is an outside director; 0 otherwise
% owned by blockholders
1 if auditor is Big 5, 0 otherwise
1 if auditor has > 15% of audit services
the number of other firms that share the same auditor and
directors
1 if Resource; 0 otherwise
1 if Banking and Finance; 0 otherwise
1 if Infrastructure and Utilities; 0 otherwise
natural log of total assets
natural log of the total number of subsidiaries
1 if firm undergone restructuring; 0 otherwise
1 if there is a change in CEO; 0 otherwise
1 if the firm issued new stocks or equity for cash and/or has listed 
in another exchange during the current year; = 0 otherwise 
two-year average ROI if negative, =0 otherwise 
long term debt to shareholder’s equity 
1 if auditor has > 15% of APNAS
1 if listed on an American stocks exchange, =0 otherwise 
1 if it has an American subsidiary, =0 otherwise 
1 if first year of audit engagement; =0 otherwise
In the restricted regression for the 4-year pooled regression, the results for the test 
variables are the same as for the full regression which included the audit committee 
variables. The coefficients for B SIZE and B MEET were both positive and 
significant (respectively, p =.001, one-tailed; and p = .000, two-tailed) and the 
coefficients for B DSH1P and B FINLIT are negative and significant {p =.005; andp 
= .017, one-tailed). The coefficients for B OUTSIDE and B CHAIR and 
insignificant.
When the model was estimated for each of the four years, the regression with only 
board variables for 2000 produced the same results as the full model with B SIZE,
159
B MEET and B FIN LIT being significant and of the expected direction (p =.021; p 
=.001; and p = .025, one-tailed).
The restricted regressions for 1999 and 2001 both produced a greater number of 
significant coefficients in the test variables. In the 1999 restricted regression, in 
addition to B DSHIP and B MEET which were significant in the full model, 
B FINLIT was also significant (p = .031) and negative, supporting HI.4.
In the 2001 restricted regression, in addition to BJSIZE which were significant in the 
full model, B DSHIP was also significant (p = .092, one tailed) and negative, 
supporting HI.2. In addition, B MEET was significant (p = .068, two-tailed) and 
positive, which does not support HI.3.
However the restricted regression for 2002 produced less significant results compared 
to the full model, losing significance for B DSHIP.
5.8.2 Audit committee variables
The regressions are also estimated without the board test variables for the 1999-2002 
4-year pooled sample and for each of the four years individually. Because these 
regressions focus on the audit committee, firms without audit committees were 
deleted from the sample.
The full sample was also used with a dummy variable added in which equalled 1 if the 
firm had an audit committee and 0 otherwise. The regression produced the same
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results, and a positive significance for the audit committee dummy variable. The full 
results of the regression are reported in appendix A2.5.
The results of these regressions are reported in Table 19 below. As is with the board 
only variable regressions in the previous sub-chapter, all the regressions are 
significant (4-year pooled F =13.539; 1999 F = 4.758; 2000 F = 4.726; 2001 F = 
4.717; and 2002 F = 3.550) and have comparable adjusted R2s to the full regression 
(4-year pooled adj R2 = 17.0%; 1999 adj R2 = 19.6%; 2000 adj R2 = 20.3%; 2001 adj 
R2 = 19.6%; and 2002 adj R2 = 13.9%).
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Table 19 Regression results: The Ratio of Auditor provided Non-Audit Services 
to Total Fee Regressed on Audit Committee Quality and Independence and 
Control Variables
APNAS/TFEE = a  + ß7 A SIZE + ß8 AMSHI P + ß9 A MEET + ß l0 A FINL1T + ßn AOUTS1DE 
+ ß ,2 ACHAI R + ß l3 BLOCK + ß 14 B1G5 + ß l5 AUD SPEC + ß16 ALOCKS 
+ ß 17 MINING + ß 18 FININCIAL + ß 19 UTILITIES + ß20 ASSETS + ß21 ALLSUBS 
+ ß22 RESTRUCT + ß23 NEWCEO + ß24 NEWISSUE + ß25 NEGROI 
+ ß26 LEVERAGE + ß27 NAS_SPEC + ß28 US_LIST + ß29 US SUB+ ß30 YEAR1 
+ e
Pred
sign
4 years* 
Est. p#
1999
Est. P#
2000
Est. p#
2001
Est. p#
2002
Est. P#
(Constant) # 0.115 .042 0.0703 .536 0.1067 .431 -0.0235 .839 0.2551 .033
Audit committee variables
A SIZE - -0.014 .016 -0.0249 .024 -0.0264 .029 0.0010 .468 -0.0023 .431
A MSHIP - -0.014 .061 -0.0162 .113 -0.0300 .081 -0.0255 .132 0.0109 .299
A MEET - 0.000 .450 -0.0044 .259 0.0036 .303 0.0043 .308 -0.0059 .224
A FINLIT - -0.035 .039 -0.0717 .027 -0.0692 .052 0.0116 .386 -0.0326 .204
A OUTSIDE - -0.003 .458 -0.0582 .113 -0.0055 .458 -0.0100 .422 0.0310 .266
A CHAIR - 0.022 .136 0.0683 .049 0.0371 .184 0.0476 .120 -0.0277 .260
Control variables
BLOCK - 0.000 .169 -0.0004 .221 0.0001 .410 -0.0002 .343 -0.0005 .190
BIG5 + 0.130 .000 0.0934 .004 0.1668 .000 0.1557 .000 0.1398 .000
AUD SPEC# ? -0.017 .311 0.1183 .000 -0.0908 .008 -0.0901 .020 -0.0748 .026
ALOCKS + 0.001 .442 0.0052 .285 0.0157 .080 -0.0045 .340 -0.0019 .428
MINING - -0.040 .008 -0.0242 .230 -0.1162 .002 -0.0443 .101 0.0056 .427
FINANCIAL - 0.030 .059 0.0273 .242 0.0317 .233 -0.0243 .270 0.0607 .044
UTILITIES - 0.093 .000 0.2141 .000 0.1017 .034 -0.0020 .484 0.0313 .339
ASSETS + 0.016 .001 0.0261 .005 0.0194 .053 0.0236 .012 0.0019 .424
ALLSUBS + 0.007 .125 0.0082 .250 0.0051 .352 -0.0084 .246 0.0131 .124
RESTRUCT + 0.065 .000 0.0342 .146 0.1223 .000 0.0341 .252 0.0744 .050
NEWCEO 0.056 .003 0.0713 .071 0.0448 .118 0.0542 .061 0.0990 .062
NEWISSUE + 0.043 .001 0.0333 .128 0.0718 .010 0.0766 .005 -0.0062 .404
NEGROI - 0.002 .112 -0.0169 .423 0.0886 .189 0.0019 .111 0.0518 .238
LEVERAGE - 0.000 .192 0.0000 .486 -0.0027 .226 0.0000 .498 -0.0044 .287
NAS SPEC + 0.076 .000 -0.0481 .078 0.1120 .000 0.1451 .000 0.1270 .000
US LIST - 0.009 .353 -0.0424 .176 -0.0365 .234 0.0501 .145 0.0735 .045
US SUB - 0.017 .124 0.0051 .434 -0.0231 .232 0.0535 .035 0.0302 .142
YEAR1# ? -0.069 .004 -0.1433 .028 -0.0859 .302 -0.0915 .176 -0.0549 .081
Adj R" .170 .196 .203 .196 .139
F statistic 13.539 4.758 4.726 4.717 3.550
(significance) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
* regression uses the pooled sample from the years 1999-2002
# p-values are 1 tailed except for the constant, AUD SPEC and YEAR1 which are 2- 
tailed
Where:
APNAS/TFEE 
A SIZE 
A MSHIP
non-audit fees / total fees 
number of audit committee members
average number of audit committee memberships by outside 
audit committee members on the board
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A MEET
A FIN LIT
AOUTSIDE
ACHAIR
BLOCK
BIG5
AUD SPEC 
ALOCKS
MINING
FINANCIAL
UTILITIES
ASSETS
ALLSUBS
RESTRUCT
NEWCEO
NEWISSUE
NEGROI 
LEVERAGE 
NASSPEC 
US LIST 
US SUB 
YEAR1
sum of the total number of audit committee meetings attended by 
each director divided by the number of directors 
percentage of outside audit committee members with a financial 
background on the board
percentage of outside directors in the audit committee 
1 if chairman of audit committee is an outside director; 0 
otherwise
% owned by blockholders
1 if auditor is Big 5, 0 otherwise
1 if auditor has > 15% of audit services
the number of other firms that share the same auditor and
directors
1 if Resource; 0 otherwise
1 if Banking and Finance; 0 otherwise
1 if Infrastructure and Utilities; 0 otherwise
natural log of total assets
natural log of the total number of subsidiaries
1 if firm undergone restructuring; 0 otherwise
1 if there is a change in CEO; 0 otherwise
1 if the finn issued new stocks or equity for cash and/or has listed 
in another exchange during the current year; = 0 otherwise 
two-year average ROI if negative, =0 otherwise 
long term debt to shareholder’s equity 
1 if auditor has > 15% of APNAS
1 if listed on an American stocks exchange, =0 otherwise 
1 if it has an American subsidiary, =0 otherwise 
1 if first year of audit engagement; =0 otherwise
The audit committee test variables only regression produced much stronger results
compared to the full model. In the full model 4-year pooled regression, only the 
coefficient for A SIZE was significant. In the restricted regression, A SIZE was 
negative and significant (p = .016, one-tailed) as well. In addition, A MSHIP and
AFINLIT were also negative and significant (p = .061, .039, both one-tailed). All
three coefficients were in the expected direction and supports H3.1, H3.2 and H3.4.
The results for 1999 and 2000 were likewise much stronger in the audit committee 
variables only regression. The significance of the coefficient for ASSIZE and 
A FINLIT in the pooled regression was also found in 1999 and 2000 (p = .024, .029
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for A SIZE; p = .027, .052 for A FINLIT, all one-tailed). A MSHIP was only 
significant in 2000 (p -  .081, one-tailed).
The remaining three variables A MEET, A OUTSIDE and A CHAIR are all 
insignificant, as are all the test variables in 2001 and 2002.
An exception to this was A CHAIR in 1999 which had an unexpectedly positive 
relationship with APNAS. It is unclear why an independent audit committee chair 
would be related to higher APNAS spending. A possible reason could be that firms 
with independent audit committee chairs tend to be larger firms and some APNAS 
expenditure not fully controlled by the ASSETS variable was picked up by the 
A CHAIR. The mean total assets of companies with an independent audit committee 
chair was 3 times larger than those with an insider. However, the variable does not 
exhibit high correlation with total assets nor are statistics for 1999 remarkably 
different to those of the other years.
5.8.3 Summary o f results
Table 20 summarises the result of the hypothesis testing done for the pooled sample 
as well as the 4 individual years using only one set of test variables, either the board 
variables, or the audit committee variables. Also replicated in panel B for comparison 
is the result for the same samples tested when the full model was used.
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Table 20 Summary of hypothesis testing results using only one set of test 
variables for the 1999-2002 pooled sample and for the four years individually 
tested
Panel A: Hypothesis testing for the regressions using only one set of test variables
Hypothesis supported
Hypothesis Variable Pred.
sign
4 years 1999 2000 2001 2002
Regression with only board and control variables
H l.l B SIZE + yes yes yes yes
H I.2 B DSHIP - yes yes yes
H I.3 B MEET -
H I.4 B FINLIT - yes yes yes
H2.1 B OUTSIDE -
H2.2 B CHAIR -
Adj. R2 .179 .207 .211 .204 .144
Regression with only audit committee and control varialt>Ies
H3.1 A SIZE - yes yes yes
H3.2 A MSHIP - yes yes
H3.3 A MEET -
H3.4 A FINLIT - yes yes yes
H4.1 A OUTSIDE -
H4.2 A CHAIR -
Adj. R2 .170 .196 .203 .196 .139
Panel B: Hypothesis testing using the full model
Hypothesis supported
Hypothesis Variable Pred.
sign
4 years 1999 2000 2001 2002
Full model: 3oard variables
H l.l B SIZE + yes yes yes yes
H I.2 B DSHIP - yes yes yes
H I.3 B MEET -
H I.4 B FINLIT - yes yes
H2.1 B OUTSIDE -
H2.2 B CHAIR -
Full model: Audit committee variables
H3.1 A SIZE - yes yes
H3.2 A MSHIP -
H3.3 A MEET -
H3.4 A FINLIT -
H4.1 A OUTSIDE -
H4.2 A CHAIR -
Adj. R2 .180 .200 .209 .194 .148
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Where:
BSIZE
BDSHIPS
BM EET
B FINLIT
B OUTSIDE 
BCHAIR 
A SIZE 
A MSHIP
A MEET
A FINLIT
A OUTSIDE 
A CHAIR
number of board members
average number of directorships by outside directors on the board 
sum of the total number of board meetings attended by each 
director divided by the number of directors 
percentage of outside directors with a financial background on 
the board
percentage of outside directors on the board 
1 if chairman is an outside director; 0 otherwise 
number of audit committee members
average number of audit committee memberships by outside 
audit committee members on the board
sum of the total number of audit committee meetings attended by 
each director divided by the number of directors 
percentage of outside audit committee members with a financial 
background on the board
percentage of outside directors in the audit committee 
1 if chairman of audit committee is an outside director; 0 
otherwise
While the restricted regression with only board variables produce the same significant 
test variables in the pooled 4-year sample as well as several of the individual yearly 
regressions, the audit committee variables only regression produce a much stronger 
result. Quite often mimicking their corresponding board variable.
This suggests that most of the variations in APNAS/TFEE that can be explained by 
the audit committee variables are better explained by using board variables instead. 
This is also reflected in the adjusted R s where the board variables only regression 
producing similiar adjusted R2s compared to the full regression and the audit 
committee variables only regression returning lower adjusted R~s.
The restricted regression also produced stronger results for the size of the audit 
committee. And despite the predicted direction being the opposite to board size, the 
significant coefficients for A SIZE and B SIZE are all in their predicted direction 
which supports Hl. l  and H3.1.
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Examining the 4-year pooled regression in greater detail, all the board variables that 
supported the monitoring hypothesis in the full regression (B SIZE, B DSHIP and 
B FINLIT) were once again significant in the restricted board variables only 
regression. Also, their corresponding audit committee variables (A SIZE, A MSHIP 
and A FINLIT) were also significant and supported the monitoring hypothesis in the 
restricted audit committee variables only regression. However in the full model, all 
the audit committee variables except for A SIZE became insignificant. This again 
suggests that variation in the board variables dominate the variation in audit 
committee variables in explaining variations in APNAS/TFEE. The only exception to 
this was A SIZE which theory had predicted was related to APNAS/TFEE in an 
opposite way to B SIZE.
In the later two years 2001 and 2002, the restricted regression for the board 
maintained the significant coefficient for B SIZE and gained significance for 
B DSHIP in 2001 but lost it for 2002, showing some instability to the results.
Overall the results seemed more stable in the earlier years of 1999 and 2000 compared 
to 2001 and 2002, with the year 2000 showing the strongest result, supporting H l.l, 
HI.4, H3.1, H3.2 and H3.4. This was consistent with the full model testing, where 
2000 also produced the strongest result among the four years.
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5.9 Substitution hypothesis
To test the substitution hypothesis, the firms are ranked by their ratio of assets-in- 
place to growth options and then split into three sub-samples. The high growth option 
sub-sample contained the smallest quartile of firms, the moderate contained the 
middle two quartile, and the high assets-in-place sub-sample contained the highest 
quartile. Separate regressions are then run on each of the three sub-samples, high 
growth options; moderate; and high assets-in-place.
The full regression model is run on the three sub-samples. The results of these 
regressions are reported in Table 21. The three regressions are all significant but 
again shows relatively low explanatory power (high growth option sub-sample: F = 
3.843, p = .000, adjusted Rf = 17.5%; Moderate levels of growth options and assets- 
in-place: F = 7.825, p = .000, adjusted R = 20.4%; High assets-in-place sub-sample: 
F = 4.866, p = .000, adjusted R2 = 22.5%)
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Table 21 Regression results: The Ratio of Auditor provided Non-Audit Services 
to Total Fee Regressed on Board and Audit Committee Quality and 
Independence and Control Variables for the Four Years 1999-2002 Pooled 
Sample broken down into 3 sub-samples ranked on AI P/GO.
Pred.
Sign.A
High GO* 
Estimate P#
Moderate*
Estimate p#
High AIP* 
Estimate p#
(Constant) # 0.083 0.520 -0.031 0.722 0.052 0.341
Board of Directors
Variables
B SIZE -, + , - 0.036 0.000 0.011 0.017 0.003 0.346
B DSHIP + , - » + -0.007 0.418 -0.051 0.007 -0.052 0.046
B MEET 0.005 0.061 0.010 0.000 0.005 0.036
B FINLIT + »- » + 0.071 0.183 -0.061 0.099 -0.136 0.026
B OUTSIDE + , - , + 0.091 0.131 0.044 0.197 -0.196 0.004
B CHAIR 0.005 0.434 0.022 0.131 0.025 0.211
Audit Committee Variables
A SIZE + , -, + 0.004 0.365 -0.021 0.003 0.005 0.330
A MSHIP 0.000 0.500 0.010 0.242 0.015 0.286
A MEET -0.008 0.212 -0.007 0.062 -0.005 0.247
A FINLIT + , -, + -0.088 0.055 -0.014 0.343 0.095 0.029
A OUTSIDE + , -, + 0.037 0.257 0.004 0.457 -0.001 0.490
A CHAIR + , -, + -0.110 0.016 0.029 0.138 0.053 0.100
Control Variables
BLOCK 20 - 0.002 0.000 -0.001 0.050 0.000 0.274
BIG5 + 0.058 0.062 0.117 0.000 0.131 0.000
AUD SPEC# ? -0.031 0.398 -0.005 0.813 0.007 0.413
ALOCKS + -0.012 0.197 0.011 0.067 0.015 0.077
MINING - -0.060 0.060 -0.031 0.079 -0.045 0.063
FINANCIAL - 0.040 0.202 0.050 0.037 0.019 0.306
UTILITIES - -0.014 0.384 0.085 0.012 0.157 0.010
ASSETS + -0.012 0.163 0.019 0.010 0.021 0.027
ALLSUBS + 0.021 0.058 0.006 0.237 -0.010 0.202
RESTRUCT + 0.138 0.002 0.029 0.108 0.040 0.105
NEWCEO + 0.030 0.270 0.083 0.001 0.047 0.107
NEWISSUE + 0.065 0.010 0.021 0.128 0.072 0.007
NEGROI - 0.000 0.251 0.034 0.284 0.035 0.343
LEVERAGE - -0.001 0.259 0.000 0.187 -0.002 0.398
NAS SPEC + 0.083 0.014 0.041 0.024 0.075 0.008
US LIST - 0.066 0.072 -0.016 0.298 0.063 0.122
US SUB - 0.034 0.130 0.031 0.060 -0.006 0.436
YEAR1# ? -0.070 0.166 -0.054 0.093 -0.092 0.031
AdjR2 .175 .204 .225
F statistic 3.843 7.825 4.866
(significance) .000 .000 .000
A predicted signs for the sub sample are reported in order High GO, Moderate and 
High AIP where they differ
* Finns are ranked on AIP/GO, the smallest quartile being High GO, middle two 
quartile being Moderate, and the largest quartile being High AIP
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# p-values are 1 tailed except for the constant, AUD SPEC and YEAR1 which are 2- 
tailed
Where:
APNAS/TFEE 
B SIZE 
BDSHIPS 
BM EET
B FINLIT
BOUTSIDE 
BCHAIR 
A SIZE 
A MSHIP
A MEET
AFINLIT
A OUTSIDE 
A CHAIR
BLOCK
BIG5
AUD SPEC 
ALOCKS
MINING
FINANCIAL
UTILITIES
ASSETS
ALLSUBS
RESTRUCT
NEWCEO
NEWISSUE
NEGROI
LEVERAGE
NASSPEC
USLIST
USSUB
YEAR1
AIP/GO
non-audit fees / total fees 
number of board members
average number of directorships by outside directors on the board 
sum of the total number of board meetings attended by each 
director divided by the number of directors 
percentage of outside directors with a financial background on 
the board
percentage of outside directors on the board 
1 if chairman is an outside director; 0 otherwise 
number of audit committee members
average number of audit committee memberships by outside 
audit committee members on the board
sum of the total number of audit committee meetings attended by 
each director divided by the number of directors 
percentage of outside audit committee members with a financial 
background on the board
percentage of outside directors in the audit committee 
1 if chairman of audit committee is an outside director; 0 
otherwise
% owned by blockholders
1 if auditor is Big 5, 0 otherwise
1 if auditor has > 15% of audit services
the number of other firms that share the same auditor and
directors
1 if Resource; 0 otherwise
1 if Banking and Finance; 0 otherwise
1 if Infrastructure and Utilities; 0 otherwise
natural log of total assets
natural log of the total number of subsidiaries
1 if Finn undergone restructuring; 0 otherwise
1 if there is a change in CEO; 0 otherwise
1 if the firm issued new stocks or equity for cash and/or has listed 
in another exchange during the current year; = 0 otherwise 
two-year average ROI if negative, =0 otherwise 
long term debt to shareholder’s equity 
1 if auditor has > 15% of APNAS
1 if listed on an American stocks exchange, =0 otherwise 
1 if it has an American subsidiary, =0 otherwise 
1 if first year of audit engagement; =0 otherwise 
Accounting book value of total assets divided by the sum of the 
market value of common equity and the book value of total debt 
and preferred stock.
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5.9.1 Board o f directors variables
The coefficient for B SIZE is significantly positive in the moderate sub-sample {p = 
.017, one-tailed) as expected. However, the coefficient for the high growth option 
sub-sample was unexpectedly positive as well (p — .000, two-tailed) and the one for 
the high assets-in-place sub-sample was insignificant. This shows no evidence that 
the substitution hypothesis holds in the two extreme sub-samples where it was 
expected to be dominant.
The coefficient for B DSH1P is negatively significant in the moderate sub-sample (p 
= .007, one-tailed). However it is also significantly negative in the high assets-in- 
place sub-sample (p = .091, two-tailed) and insignificant in the high growth options 
sub-sample. Again, no support for the substitution hypothesis was found.
The B MEET coefficients are positively significant for both the high growth options 
sub-sample (p = .061, one-tailed) and the high assets-in-place sub-sample (p = .036, 
one-tailed). However, the coefficient for B MEET is also significantly positive in the 
moderate sub-sample (p = .000, two-tailed) which was unexpected. This could means 
that either the substitution hypothesis is dominant in this variable across the 
investment-production spectrum. Or alternately another possible explanation of the 
results is that, as suggested above, firms with a high number of board meetings may 
have a higher demand for NAS, either because it is undergoing a crisis, major change 
or simply that the type of firm that requires increased monitoring from directors also 
have a higher demand of NAS.
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The coefficient for B FINLIT is negative and significant in the moderate sub-sample 
(p = .099, one-tailed), but also negatively significant in the high assets-in-place sub­
sample {p = .053, two-tailed) and insignificant in the high growth options sub-sample. 
This does not support the substitution hypothesis.
The coefficient for B OUTSIDE is unexpectedly negative in the high assets-in-place 
sub-sample (p = .008, two-tailed) and insignificant in the moderate and high growth 
options sub-samples. This again fails to support the substitution hypothesis.
The coefficient for B CHAIR is insignificant in all three sub-samples.
5.9.2 Audit committee variables
The only audit committee variable that was significant in the full sample regression 
was A SIZE (p = .026, one-tailed), which was negative as expected. When the 
sample is split into the three sub-samples, A SIZE maintained its negative 
relationship in the moderate sub-sample (p = .003, one-tailed) but were insignificant 
in the two extreme sub-samples.
In addition, A MEET was also only significant in the moderate sub-sample (p = .062, 
one-tailed), again negative as expected. This provides limited support for the 
substitution hypothesis.
Despite the lack of significance in the full sample regressions, several other audit 
committee variables are significant in the various sub-section regressions.
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The coefficient for A FINLIT in the high AIP sub-sample is significant and positive 
(p = .029; one-tailed) as predicted by the substitution hypothesis. However the 
coefficient in the high growth options and the moderate sub-sample are insignificant. 
These results do not provide conclusive support for the substitution hypothesis.
The coefficients for A CHAIR is significant and negative for the high growth options 
sub-sample {p = .033; two-tailed), but insignificant in the other two sub-sections.
5.9.3 Summary o f results for test variables
Table 22 summarises the results of the hypothesis testing done for each of the three 
sub-samples, high growth options; moderate; and high assets-in-place.
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Table 22 Summary of hypothesis testing result for the sample broken down into 
3 sub-samples ranked on A1P/GO
hypothesis supported*
Hypothesis Variable Pred 
sign #
Full
sample
High
GO
Moderate High
AIP
Quality of the board of directors
H l.l B SIZE yes yes
HI.2 B DSHIP yes yes
HI.3 B MEET yes yes
HI.4 B FIN LIT yes yes
Independence of the board ol directors
H2.1 B OUTSIDE yes
H2.2 B CHAIR ->+»-»+
Quality of the audit committee
H3.1 A SIZE yes yes
H3.2 A MSHIP
H3.3 A MEET yes
H3.4 A FINLIT -»+»-»+ yes
Independence of the audit committee
H4.1 A OUTSIDE
H4.2 A CHAIR
# The predicted sign listed is the respective predicted signs for the full sample; the 
high growth options sub-sample; the moderate levels sub-sample and the high assets- 
in-place sub-sample.
Where:
B SIZE 
BDSHIPS 
B MEET
BFINLIT
B OUTSIDE 
B CHAIR 
A SIZE 
A MSHIP
A MEET
AFINLIT
A OUTSIDE 
A CHAIR
number of board members
average number of directorships by outside directors on the board 
sum of the total number of board meetings attended by each 
director divided by the number of directors 
percentage of outside directors with a financial background on 
the board
percentage of outside directors on the board 
1 if chairman is an outside director; 0 otherwise 
number of audit committee members
average number of audit committee memberships by outside 
audit committee members on the board
sum of the total number of audit committee meetings attended by 
each director divided by the number of directors 
percentage of outside audit committee members with a financial 
background on the board
percentage of outside directors in the audit committee 
1 if chairman of audit committee is an outside director; 0 
otherwise
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While the regressions produced some interesting results, on the whole, the results only 
provide very limited support for the substitution hypothesis. This suggests that, 
assuming high APNAS leads to a decrease in audit quality, substitution between the 
monitoring provided by these corporate governance mechanisms generally did not 
occur in the sample, or that it was not related to the firm’s production-investment 
attributes.
Although there is little evidence to support the substitution hypothesis, it is interesting 
to note that the sub-sample with the least significance among the test variables was 
the high growth option sub-sample since these finns are argued to have less reliance 
on the external audit as a corporate governance mechanism compared to monitoring 
by the board.
Several variables that were insignificant in the full sample were significant in the 
smaller sub-samples, such as B OUTSIDE and several of the audit committee 
variables.
Also the high assets-in-place sub-sample produced the highest adjusted R2 among the 
three sub-samples (22.5% compared to the moderate sub-sample of .204 and the high 
growth option sub-sample of 17.5%) as well as being higher than that of the full 
sample (18.0%). The results seems to suggests that relative APNAS spending can be 
better mapped by the variables used in this study for the finns with high levels of 
assets-in-place, compared to others. This suggests that while the production- 
investment spectrum may not explain fully when the substitution or monitoring
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hypothesis is dominant, it does affect the way firms purchase APNAS and how it 
relates to corporate governance and other variables. However, it seems odd that 
B SIZE is insignificant in this sub-sample given that its significance was the strongest 
in the full sample and the least sensitive to the different yearly regressions.
Additional testing was conducted where the firms were divided into the three sub­
samples in thirds rather than using quartiles. These results are presented in Appendix 
A2.6 and similarly produced little support for the substitution hypothesis.
5.10 Summary of results
The main model regression for the 4-year pooled sample 1999-2002 shows 
relationships between APNAS/TFEE and board size, multiple board directorships 
board financial literacy and audit committee size consistent with the monitoring 
hypothesis, in that superior boards and audit committee are associated with lower 
APNAS.
Of these results, the significance for board size is the strongest being replicated in 
most of the supplementary regressions that follow.
However in addition to these results, it was found that the number of board meetings 
was unexpectedly positively related to APNAS/TFEE. This suggests that a diligent 
board tended to buy more relative APNAS, counter to the expectations of the 
monitoring hypothesis.
Of particularly note was that none of the independence variables were significant.
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A series of supplementary tests of the base model were calculated and reported in 
Appendix 2. These supplementary tests include:
1. the use of alternate dependent variables, APNAS/AFEE and the natural log of 
APNAS, both of which produced weaker results compared to APNAS/TFEE
2. an alternate measure of audit committee size, measured as the ratio of the 
number audit committee members to the number of directors. The regression 
produced similar results to the main model which used A SIZE, defined as the 
number of audit committee members
3. additional testing on sub-samples divided by firm size, which found that the 
significance of B SIZE is largely concentrated on the larger Finns, that of 
B FINLIT seems to be driven by the smaller firms, while the positive 
significance of B MEET is quite uniform throughout the various sub-samples.
The reader is referred to Appendix 2 for details of the full results from these 
supplementary tests.
Next, the composite audit committee effectiveness (ACE) variable used in Abbott et 
al. (2003) was replicated and a series of regressions were estimated to analyse its 
relationship with APNAS. It was found that in Australia, ACE was unexpectedly 
positively related to APNAS, suggesting that effective audit committees are 
associated with higher APNAS spending. This was found to be driven by the 
frequency of audit committee meetings. However, when board and other audit 
committee characteristics were controlled for, the significance of ACE as well as audit 
committee meeting frequency was lost.
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The main regression model was then estimated for 2002, after the spectacular 
collapses of 2001 which brought auditor independence and APNAS into public 
criticism. The regression model produced a much lower adjusted R (of 14.8%) 
compared to those of 1999-2001 (pooled sample at 19.3 %; and individually 20%, 
20.9%, and 19.4% respectively). The results also find that only board size and 
multiple board directorships remain consistent with the monitoring hypothesis. 
However this has to be interpreted in light of the fact that the regression results for the 
previous 3 years individually were weaker as well. In particular, it seems that the 
2000 regression has the strongest results, while 2001 the weakest. It is possible that 
the reduced sample size of the individual years reduced the power of the test 
producing weaker results.
The model was next split into two, one with only the board of directors and control 
variables while the other had only the audit committee and control variables. This 
was done to try to avoid possible effects of mulitcollinearity among the test variables. 
The board only model produced similar results compared to the full model. However 
when the audit committee variables were regressed without the board variables, in 
addition to audit committee size, multiple audit committee membership and the 
financial literacy of the audit committee were also negatively associated to APNAS. 
This largely mimics the results found in the board variables where size, multiple 
directorship and financial literacy was also found to be negatively associated. This 
suggests that while audit committee characteristics are related to APNAS/TFEE, it 
provided little additional explanation as to variations in APNAS/TFEE over and 
above that provided by the board.
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An interesting exception is the size of the audit committee. Unlike the other 
variables, while the theory predicted a positive relationship between APNAS/TFEE 
and board size, it predicted a negative relationship with audit committee size, which 
was what separately testing the board and audit committee variables found. When the 
full model was estimated, audit committee size was the only audit committee variable 
that retained its significance.
To test the substitution hypothesis, the sample then was split into 3 sub-samples 
ranked on their production-investment attributes, and separate regressions were 
estimated on each sub-sample.
While several of the test variables are in the predicted direction to support the 
substitution hypothesis, the expected opposite relationship between the sub-sample 
with moderate levels of growth options and assets-in-place and the sub-samples with 
extreme levels of both was not observed. The results show no support for the 
substitution hypothesis in this sample.
5.11 Summary and conclusions
This chapter reports and analyses the tests of the hypotheses that were developed in 
Chapter 4. The base model is a multivariate regression testing variables that proxy for 
the quality and independence of the board of directors and audit committee.
The results suggest that it is the quality and financial literacy of the board of directors, 
rather than that of the audit committee, that acts as an effective monitor of audit
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quality restricting spending on APNAS. However, independence of the board of 
directors and the audit committee does not seem to affect APNAS spending.
A significant drop in adjusted R2 in 2002 suggests that a fundamental shift in the way 
APNAS relates to the variables in the model. However given the instability of the 
significances of test variable over the period of 1999-2001, it is difficult to interpret 
its effects.
To test the substitution hypothesis, the sample is then split into three sub-samples with 
the firms ranked on their ratio of assets-in-place to growth options. The results do not 
support the existing substitution hypothesis in the sample of company.
However the results above are to be interpreted with care as additional sensitivity 
testing carried out on the base model shows some sensitivity of the results to model 
specification and sample selection.
The following chapter provides an overview of the thesis. First, it outlines the 
theoretical framework of the study. Second, the hypotheses are explained and 
discussed. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the significance of the findings 
reported in this chapter, research limitations and future research avenues.
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS
6.1 Introduction
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the effects of APNAS on auditor 
independence by observing its relationship with the board of directors and the audit 
committee. Chapter 2 reviewed the theoretical framework of the study. Chapter 3 
developed the hypotheses to be tested. Chapter 4 described the research method while 
chapter 5 presented the results of the proposed hypotheses.
This chapter presents an overview of the thesis. It also comments on the limitations 
of the study and suggests future research directions. Section 6.2 provides an outline 
of the thesis and its findings. Section 6.3 explains the significance of the findings, 
and the limitations of the study are addressed in section 6.4. Section 6.5 suggests 
some future research directions and section 6.6 concludes the study.
6.2 Review of study
6.2.1 Hypotheses
It has been argued that the joint provision of audit and non-audit services will lead to 
possible threats to the independence of the auditor, reducing the quality of the external 
audit. Various corporate governance mechanisms are used to safeguard against such 
potential threats, one of which is the board of directors and its sub-committees, in 
particular, the audit committee. This leads to the monitoring hypothesis, being that 
firms with stronger boards and audit committees will purchase significantly less 
APNAS compared to other firms.
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To test the monitoring hypothesis, several aspects of the board and the audit
committee were investigated in the following hypotheses.
H l. 1: Entities with smaller boards will purchase less APNAS (relative to total fee), 
other things being equal.
HI.2: Entities where the directors have a larger average number of multiple 
directorships among the outside directors will purchase less APNAS (relative 
to total fees) other things being equal.
HI.3: Entities where the board meets more often will purchase less APNAS (relative 
to total fees), other things being equal.
HI.4: Entities where the board is made up of a higher proportion of financially 
literate outside directors will purchase less APNAS (relative to total fees), 
other things being equal.
H2.1: Entities where the board is made up of a higher proportion of outside directors 
will purchase less APNAS (relative to total fees), other things being equal.
H2.2: Entities with an outside director as chairman will purchase less APNAS 
(relative to total fees), other things being equal.
H3.1: Entities with larger audit committees will purchase less APNAS (relative to 
total fee), other things being equal.
H3.2: Entities where the audit committee members have a larger average number of 
multiple audit committee memberships among the outside members will 
purchase less APNAS (relative to total fees), other things being equal.
H3.3: Entities where the audit committee meets more often will purchase less 
APNAS (relative to total fees), other things being equal.
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H3.4: Entities where the audit committee is made up of a higher proportion of 
financially literate outside members will purchase less APNAS (relative to 
total fees), other things being equal.
H4.1: Entities where the audit committee is made up of a higher proportion of 
outside directors will purchase less APNAS (relative to total fees), other 
things being equal.
H4.2: Entities with an outside director as an audit committee chairman will purchase
less APNAS (relative to total fees), other things being equal.
In the period leading up and across that under study, there has been a growing 
scrutiny and public debate regarding APNAS and its potential to threaten auditor 
independence. This reached a peak with the high profile collapses in 2001 of HIH 
Insurance in Australia and Enron in the US, which ultimately led to several regulatory 
changes. This led to the following hypothesis.
H5: Relationship between the proportion of APNAS relative to total fees and board 
and audit committee characteristics will significantly alter between the period 
leading up to 2001 and 2002.
It has been argued that firms rely on a bundle of corporate governance mechanisms to 
manage agency cost, and that some of these mechanisms may be substituted for each 
other (Rediker and Seth 1995). This leads to the substitution hypothesis which 
predicts an opposite relationship between board and audit committee and APNAS 
spending. To determine whether the substitution or monitoring hypothesis is 
dominant, the firms’ production-investment attributes are examined. Firms with
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higher assets-in-place have a greater need for monitoring from auditors, while firms 
with higher growth options rely more on the monitoring from directors (Anderson et 
al. 1993). So it is argued the substitution hypothesis is dominant in firms at the two 
extreme ends of the production-investment spectrum, while the monitoring hypothesis 
is expected to be dominant in firms with moderate levels of assets-in-place and 
growth options.
This leads to the following two hypotheses.
H6.1: For entities with high levels of assets-in-place or growth options, those with 
stronger boards and audit committees will purchase more APNAS (relative to 
total fees) compared to other entities, other things being equal.
H6.2: For entities with moderate levels of assets-in-place and growth options, those 
with stronger boards and audit committees will purchase less APNAS (relative 
to total fees) compared to other entities, other things being equal.
6.2.2 Summary o f findings
The base model regression for the 4-year pooled sample 1999-2002 shows 
relationships between APNAS/TFEE and board size, multiple board directorships 
board financial literacy and audit committee size consistent with the monitoring 
hypothesis in support of H 1.1, H1.2, H1.4 and H3.1.
The composite audit committee effectiveness (ACE) variable used in Abbott et al. 
(2003) was then replicated and a series of regressions were estimated. It was found 
that in Australia, ACE was unexpectedly positively related to APNAS, suggesting that 
effective audit committees are associated with higher APNAS spending. This was
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found to be driven by the frequency of audit committee meetings. However, when 
board and other audit committee characteristics were controlled for, the significance 
of ACE as well as audit committee meeting frequency was lost.
The main regression was next estimated for 2002, which produced a much lower 
adjusted R2 (of 14.8%) compared to those of 1999-2001 (pooled sample at 19.3 %; 
and individually 20%, 20.9%, and 19.4% respectively). The results also find that only 
board size and multiple board directorships remain consistent with the monitoring 
hypothesis. This supports H5. However this has to be interpreted in light of the fact 
that the regression results for the 3 years individually were weaker as well. In 
particular, it seems that the 2000 regression has the strongest results, while 2001 the 
weakest. It is possible that the reduced sample size of the individual years reduced 
the power of the test producing weaker results.
To try to avoid the possible effects of mulitcollinearity among the test variables, the 
board of directors variables were estimated without the audit committee variables and 
vice versa. While the board variables only model produced similar results compared 
to the full model the audit committee variables only model produced significant 
negative relationship between APNAS and audit committee size, multiple audit 
committee membership and the financial literacy of the audit committee, supporting 
H3.1, H3.2 and H3.4.
This largely mimics the results found in the board variables where size, multiple 
directorship and financial literacy was also found to be negatively associated. This 
suggests that while audit committee characteristics are related to APNAS/TFEE, it
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provided little additional explanation as to variations in APNAS/TFEE over and 
above that provided by the board variables.
Finally the firm years was separated into 3 sub-samples ranked on their production- 
investment attributes. The regression estimated however provided little evidence of 
substitution between monitoring by the board and audit committee with monitoring 
from the external audit, with the assumption that high APNAS leads to an decrease in 
audit quality, failing to support H6.1 and H6.2.
6.3 Significance of findings
This study contributes to the literature on the use of the audit committee as well as the 
board of directors as a monitoring tool for corporate governance, and its relationship 
with APNAS. The results of the study do show that the quality and financial literacy 
for the board as well as the resources available to the audit committee are inversely 
related to APNAS purchases. This suggests that the directors view APNAS as a threat 
to independence either in fact or in perception, and effective boards and audit 
committees restricts its purchase by their company. However the results are unstable 
across years and sample selection.
An interesting result of the study is that the percentage of outside directors or audit 
committee members were not associated with APNAS, suggesting that independent 
directors by themselves do not significantly add to the governance of the company in 
respect of APNAS unless they have a financial background or governance expertise 
(measured by multiple directorships/audit committee memberships).
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It also provides some evidence on the substitutability of monitoring from boards and 
audit committee and that from the external audit. Examining partitions of the sample 
where one form of monitoring is more valuable then the other, little evidence was 
found to support the hypothesis that high quality boards and audit committees would 
allow increased APNAS that may threaten the quality of the audit, or that companies 
would seek a less effective board/audit committee while maintaining a high quality 
audit.
6.4 Research limitations
6.4.1 Different types o f APNAS
One limitation on the use of APNAS fee in this study is that it assumes all types of 
APNAS threatens auditor independence equally. Given that SOX specifically bans 
certain APNAS in the US, as well as the prescription by codes of ethics (IFAC Ethics 
Committee 2001; ICAA and CPAA 2004) it is perceived that beyond the magnitude 
of the associated revenues certain NAS impact on auditor independence differently, 
either because of the nature of the work (such as internal auditing) or its time frame 
(recurring vs. non-recurring; short-term vs. long term).
Australian companies are only required to disclose the amount of fees paid to their 
auditor for the external audit as well as for all other services. Since the APNAS fee 
reported is rarely broken down further beyond the regulatory requirements, it was 
impossible to use archival data to control for the different types of NAS purchased by 
the firm.
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6.4.2 Sensitivity o f the results
The biggest limitation to the study involves the sensitivity of the results to changes in 
model specifications and alterations in the sample used to estimate the base model. 
This severely limits any interpretation and generalisation of the results generated.
One possible reason for some of the sensitivity could be the relatively small sample 
size and the large number of variables in the test model. The power of the test may 
have been reduced when several of the supplementary regressions are carried out on 
smaller sub-samples (such as the individual yearly regression). The fact that the 
regression with the strongest result is that of the full four year pooled sample is 
consistent with this argument.
Another possibility lies with the generally low adjusted R s of the regression. This 
shows that a lot of the variation in APNAS/TFEE is unexplained, and uncontrolled 
for, and remains so even after including a substantial number of control variables.
This suggests either there are several omitted control variables or that APNAS/TFEE 
is hard to predict using archival data.
The sensitivity of the results may also lie with the likely presence of multicollinearity 
among the explanatory variables, particularly as the audit committee is a subset of the 
full board of directors. However, the significance of the control variables were 
likewise sensitive to model specification and sample selection (although to a smaller 
extent than the test variables) suggesting that at least part of the problem is not limited 
to multicollinearity among the test variables.
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6.4.3 Link between board, audit committee and APNAS
The results of the study suggest that effective directors are associated with lower 
APNAS but it is not a causal link. This is of particular importance given the sesitivity 
of the results. As the replication of Abbott et al. (2003) shows, the significance of the 
variables may be lost after other variables are controlled for especially considering the 
low adjusted R“s found in the regressions.
If the board or audit committee are the reason for the lower APNAS, the evidence 
shows that effective directors restrict the purchases of APNAS, presumably to 
maintain a high quality audit. One reason for this is to avoid the threat to the 
perceived independence of the auditor.
Care should be taken in interpreting that as APNAS threatening auditor independence 
in fact as the directors may be reacting to the increasing political costs of high 
APNAS in the period under investigation.
6.5 Future research avenues
Additional analysis revealed the results to be sensitive to sample selection. A possible 
avenue for future research would be to investigate those that generated severely 
different results from the rest of the sample. In particular, the largest quarter of 
companies and those with high levels of assets in place relative to growth options.
Replicating Abbott et al. (2003) using Australian data found very different results. 
Furthermore, the significance of the audit committee variable used was lost when it
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was estimated together with a more comprehensive list of audit committee as well as 
board variables. This relationship should be investigated further using US data to see 
if the results in Abbott et al. (2003) hold after controlling for variations in the board.
The removal of firms that were audited by Andersen in 2001 from the 2002 regression 
produced significantly different results. While it does show sensitivity of the result to 
sample selection, it also suggests that the monitoring by the boards of firms audited by 
one auditor may be different compared to others. Possible future research could 
explore more comprehensively those differences.
6.6 Conclusions
APNAS has been highlighted and criticised as a threat to independence and in the 
wake of several spectacular corporate collapses, its provision has been restricted, most 
notably in the US. Following those corporate collapses, there has been an increasing 
interest not only in audit quality but also the monitoring of companies by their boards 
and audit committee as well.
This paper provides evidence that effective boards restrict excessive purchase of 
APNAS by their companies. Similar results were found for the audit committee but 
they provided little additional information over that of the board variables, with the 
exception of the size of the audit committee.
The relationship between board and audit committee variables and APNAS were 
unstable over the sample period, with it being the strongest in 2000, weakening 
substantially in 2001 and strengthening in 2002 again. This might be the result of the
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corporate collapses that occurred during that time frame and the public and regulatory 
reaction to it.
Finally, an attempt was made to predict which firms rely more on monitoring from the 
external audit or the directors based on their production-investment attributes. These 
firms were compared with moderate firms with no preference. However, little 
evidence was found supporting the hypothesis that one type of monitoring was 
substituted for the other.
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APPENDIX 1: ADDITIONAL TABLES AND PLOTS
A l.I Pearson correlations for 1999-2002
Table 23 below documents the Pearson correlation between the variables for the 
individual years 1999-2002. Similar to their pooled sample, several of the 
correlations among the variables are significant, giving rise to possible concerns 
regarding the presence of high multicollinearity.
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W h ere :
A u d it = A u d it fee  ( $ ’0 0 0 )
A P N A S = A u d ito r ’s re m u n e ra tio n  fo r se rv ic e s  o th e r  th a n  a u d it ( $ ’0 0 0 )
A P N A S /T F E E = n o n -a u d it  fees  /  to ta l fees
B S IZ E = n u m b e r  o f  b o a rd  m e m b e rs
B D S H IP = a v e ra g e  n u m b e r  o f  d ire c to rsh ip s  p e r  o u ts id e  d ire c to r
B M E E T su m  o f  th e  to ta l n u m b e r  b o a rd  m e e tin g s  a tte n d e d  b y  e a c h  d ire c to r  
d iv id e d  by  th e  n u m b e r  o f  d ire c to rs
B F IN L IT = p e rc e n ta g e  o f  o u ts id e  d ire c to rs  w ith  a  f in a n c ia l b a c k g ro u n d
B O U T S ID E = p e rc e n ta g e  o f  o u ts id e  d ire c to rs  o n  th e  b o a rd
B C H A IR = 1 i f  c h a irm a n  is an  o u ts id e  d ire c to r ;  0 o th e rw ise
A  S IZ E = N u m b e r  o f  m e m b e rs  in  the  a u d it  c o m m itte e
A  M S H IP a v e ra g e  n u m b e r  o f  a u d it  c o m m itte e  m e m b e rsh ip s  p e r  a u d it 
c o m m itte e  m e m b e r
A  M E E T = su m  o f  th e  to ta l n u m b e r  o f  a u d it  c o m m itte e  m e e tin g s  a tte n d e d  by  
each  d ire c to r  d iv id e d  b y  th e  n u m b e r  o f  d ire c to rs  e
A  F IN L IT — p e rc e n ta g e  o f  a u d it c o m m itte e  m e m b e r  w ith  a  f in a n c ia l 
b a c k g ro u n d
A  O U T S ID E = p e rc e n ta g e  o f  o u ts id e  d ire c to rs  in  th e  a u d it c o m m itte e
A  C H A IR = 1 i f  c h a irm a n  o f  a u d it  c o m m itte e  is an  o u ts id e  d ire c to r ; 0 
o th e rw ise
B L O C K = %  o w n e d  b y  b lo c k h o ld e rs
B IG 5 = 1 i f  a u d ito r  is B ig  5, 0 o th e rw ise
A U D  S P E C = 1 i f  a u d ito r  h as  >  15%  o f  a u d it se rv ic e s
A L O C K S — th e  n u m b e r  o f  o th e r  f irm s th a t sh a re  th e  sa m e  a u d ito r  an d  
d ire c to rs
T o ta l A sse ts = to ta l a s se ts  ( $ ’0 0 0 )
S u b s id ia r ie s = th e  to ta l n u m b e r  o f  su b s id ia r ie s
R E S T R U C T = 1 i f  firm  u n d e rg o n e  re s tru c tu r in g ; 0  o th e rw ise
N E W C E O = 1 i f  th e re  is a  c h a n g e  in  C E O ; 0 o th e rw ise
N E W IS S U E = 1 i f  the  firm  issu e d  n e w  s to c k s  o r  e q u ity  fo r  c a sh  a n d /o r  h as  lis te d  
in  a n o th e r  e x c h a n g e  d u rin g  th e  c u rre n t y e a r; =  0  o th e rw ise
N E G R O I = tw o -y e a r  a v e ra g e  R O I i f  n e g a tiv e , = 0  o th e rw ise
L E V E R A G E = lo n g  te rm  d e b t to  s h a re h o ld e r ’s e q u ity
N A S  S P E C = 1 i f  a u d ito r  h as  >  15%  o f  A P N A S
U S  L IS T = 1 i f  lis te d  o n  an  A m e ric a n  s to c k s  e x c h a n g e , = 0  o th e rw ise
U S S U B = 1 i f  it h a s  an  A m e r ic a n  su b s id ia ry , = 0  o th e rw ise
Y E A R 1 = 1 i f  f irs t y e a r  o f  a u d it  e n g a g e m e n t; = 0  o th e rw ise
A I P /G O a c c o u n tin g  b o o k  v a lu e  o f  to ta l a s se ts  d iv id e d  b y  th e  m a rk e t v a lu e  
o f  c o m m o n  e q u ity  p lu s  b o o k  v a lu e  o f  to ta l d e b t a n d  p re fe rre d  
s to ck .
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A l.2 Probability plot and histogram of base model
The following are the probability plot o f the regression’s standardized residuals and 
its histogram for the base model regression o f the four years 1999-2002 reported in 
chapter 5.4. Both indicate the residuals o f the regression are close to normally 
distributed.
Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual
Dependent Variable: nas_tf
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Histogram
Dependent Variable: nas_tf
O" 6 0 -
Mean -1.85E-15 
Std. Dev. =0.991 
N =1,602
214
APPENDIX 2: SUPPLEMENTARY TESTS
A2.1 Alternate dependent variable
The dependent variable (APNAS/TFEE) used in this study is the ratio of non-audit 
fees to the total fees paid to the auditor (sum of non-audit fees and audit fees). This is 
consistent with the ratio variables used in prior studies such as Frankel et al. (2002) 
and DeFond et al. (2002).
The dependent variable used in Abbott et al. (2003) however was the ratio of non­
audit fees to audit fee (APNAS/AFEE). In addition, earlier studies used levels of 
APNAS rather than its ratios to audit fee or total fee (such as DeBerg et al. 1991 and 
Barkess and Simnett 1994). Levels of APNAS focuses on the magnitude of APNAS 
spending by the firm but fails to control for the scale of the Finn which dividing it by 
either total fee or audit fee does. As a result, it is expected that a lot of the variation in 
it could be due more to size or complexity differences between firms, which may not 
be accounted for completely by the control variable. However, for completeness, the 
natural log of APANS is also used as an alternate dependent variable.
To test the robustness of the results to the different dependent variables, the regression 
was estimated over the 4-year 1999-2002 pooled sample using alternatively 
APANS/AFEE and the natural log of APNAS as the dependent variable. The results 
are listed below in Table 24.
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Table 24: Regression results: Various Dependent Variables Regressed on Board 
and Audit Committee Quality and Independence and Control Variables for the 
Four Years 1999-2002 Pooled Sample
Dep. Var. = a  + ß, B SIZE + ß2 B DSHIPS + ß3 BM EET + ß4 BFINLIT + ß5 B OUTSIDE 
+ ß6 BCHAIR + ß7 A_SIZE% + ß8 AM SHIP + ß9 AM EET + ß10 AFINLIT 
+ ß,, A OUTSIDE + ß,2 A CHAIR + ß13 BLOCK + ß 14 BIG5 + ß15 AUD SPEC 
+ ß l6 ALOCKS + ß 17 MINING + ß 18 FININCIAL + ß 19 UTILITIES + ß20 ASSETS 
+ ß2) ALLSUBS + ß22 RESTRUCT + ß23 NEWCEO + ß24 NEWISSUE + ß25 NEGROI 
+ ß26 LEVERAGE + ß27 NAS_SPEC + ß28 U SLIST + ß29 US_SUB + ß30 YEAR1 + e
Dependent variable used
Pred. A P N A S /T F E E A P N A S /A F E E L n A P N A S
Sign. E stim a te p # E s t im a te p # E stim a te p #
(Constant) # 0.0010 .988 -0.859 .072 -3.316 .000
B o a r d  o f  D ir e c to r s  V a r ia b le s
B SIZE + 0.0140 .000 0.083 .006 0.116 .000
B DSHIP - -0.0400 .004 -0.101 .220 -0.134 .103
BM EET - 0.0080 .000 0.037 .002 0.053 .000
BFINLIT - -0.0550 .056 -0.375 .106 -0.026 .458
B OUTSIDE - -0.0050 .445 0.013 .484 -0.299 .124
BCHAIR - 0.0180 .115 0.184 .077 0.093 .185
A u d it  C o m m it te e  V a r ia b le s
A SIZE - -0.0110 .026 -0.066 .083 -0.034 .187
AM SHIP - 0.0130 .126 0.047 .316 0.079 .159
AM EET - -0.0040 .136 -0.012 .356 0.019 .230
AFINLIT - 0.0001 .499 0.266 .106 -0.192 .133
AOUTSIDE - 0.0220 .187 0.076 .362 0.405 .010
^  CHAIR - 0.0010 .472 -0.353 .023 0.019 .446
C o n tr o l V a r ia b le s
BLOCK20 - 0.0000 .189 0.004 .032 0.000 .402
BIG5 + 0.0990 .000 0.268 .039 0.803 .000
AUD SPEC # ? -0.0030 .865 -0.158 .248 0.144 .096
ALOCKS + 0.0070 .103 -0.009 .426 0.001 .488
MINING - -0.0460 .002 -0.092 .251 -0.600 .000
FINANCIAL - 0.0400 .020 0.292 .039 -0.152 .128
UTILITIES - 0.0580 .013 1.195 .000 0.069 .351
ASSETS + 0.0150 .002 0.082 .028 0.369 .000
ALLSUBS + 0.0020 .375 -0.068 .089 0.338 .000
RESTRUCT + 0.0530 .001 0.710 .000 0.570 .000
NEWCEO + 0.0600 .002 0.493 .002 0.409 .002
NEWISSUE + 0.0420 .001 0.124 .138 0.163 .038
NEGROI - -0.0010 .147 -0.002 .326 -0.009 .009
LEVERAGE - 0.0000 .211 -0.002 .190 -0.001 .319
NASSPEC + 0.0610 .000 0.613 .000 0.349 .001
USLIST - 0.0100 .321 0.178 .177 0.077 .310
USSUB - 0.0230 .055 0.054 .334 0.324 .001
YEAR1 # ? -0.0570 .015 -0.360 .076 -0.407 .006
Adj R2 .180 .095 .515
F statistic 12.695 6.586 57.644
(significance) .000 .000 .000
# p-values are 1 tailed except for the constant, AUD SPEC and YEAR1 which are 2- 
tailed
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Where:
APNAS/TFEE = 
APNAS/AFEE = 
Ln(APNAS)
B SIZE 
B DSHIPS 
B MEET
B FINLIT
B OUTSIDE = 
BCHAIR 
A SIZE 
A_SIZE%
A MSHIP
A MEET
AFINLIT
A OUTSIDE = 
A CHAIR
BLOCK
BIG5
AUD SPEC = 
ALOCKS
MINING
FINANCIAL =
UTILITIES
ASSETS
ALLSUBS
RESTRUCT
NEWCEO
NEWISSUE
NEGROI 
LEVERAGE = 
NASSPEC 
US LIST 
USSUB 
YEAR1
non-audit fees / total fees 
non-audit fees / audit fees 
natural log of non-audit fees 
number of board members
average number of directorships by outside directors on the board 
sum of the total number of board meetings attended by each 
director divided by the number of directors 
percentage of outside directors with a financial background on 
the board
percentage of outside directors on the board 
1 if chairman is an outside director; 0 otherwise 
number of audit committee members
number of audit committee members divided by the number of 
directors
average number of audit committee memberships by outside 
audit committee members on the board
sum of the total number of audit committee meetings attended by 
each director divided by the number of directors 
percentage of outside audit committee members with a financial 
background on the board
percentage of outside directors in the audit committee 
1 if chairman of audit committee is an outside director; 0 
otherwise
% owned by blockholders
1 if auditor is Big 5, 0 otherwise
1 if auditor has > 15% of audit services
the number of other firms that share the same auditor and
directors
1 if Resource; 0 otherwise
1 if Banking and Finance; 0 otherwise
1 if Infrastructure and Utilities; 0 otherwise
natural log of total assets
natural log of the total number of subsidiaries
1 if firm undergone restructuring; 0 otherwise
1 if there is a change in CEO; 0 otherwise
1 if the firm issued new stocks or equity for cash and/or has listed 
in another exchange during the current year; = 0 otherwise 
two-year average ROI if negative, =0 otherwise 
long term debt to shareholder’s equity 
1 if auditor has > 15% of APNAS
1 if listed on an American stocks exchange, =0 otherwise 
1 if it has an American subsidiary, =0 otherwise 
1 if first year of audit engagement; =0 otherwise
While the regression using APNAS/AFEE is significant (F = 6.586, p  = .000), its 
explanatory power is much lower, at 9.5% compared to the regression using
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APNAS/TFEE (whose adjusted R2 was 18.0%). The significances among the test 
variables are weaker as well, with the coefficients of B DSH1P and B FINLIT losing 
their significance in the regression using the alternate APNAS/AFEE dependent 
variable.
The regression using the natural log of APNAS provided a much higher adjusted R“ 
(51.5%), which was largely driven by the control variables. The coefficients for 
B SIZE and B MEET remained significant as with the other two regressions, 
however the other coefficients are no longer significant.
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A2.2 Alternate measure of A SIZE
A SIZE as defined in the study is the total number of members that sit on the audit 
committee. It is one of two variables used to proxy for the ‘quality’ of the audit 
committee (the other being A MSH1P) where it is argued that firms with larger audit 
committees are willing to devote greater resources to the financial accounting process 
(Anderson et al. 2004).
However, given the differences in size between firms, a three member audit 
committee in a large firm might not be representative of the same level of governance 
as a three member audit committee in a small finn. Since the audit committee 
members are drawn from the board of directors, a possible alternate measure of this 
construct is to use the ratio of audit committee members to the number of directors in 
the full board.
Hence,
A SIZE = number of audit committee members
A SIZE% = number of audit committee members divided by the number of 
directors
The main regression was re-estimated using the alternate A SIZE% variable on the 
four years 1999-2002 pooled sample. The results can be seen in Table 25. The 
results are qualitatively similar.
219
Table 25: Regression results: The Ratio of Auditor provided Non-Audit Services 
to Total Fee Regressed on Board and Audit Committee Quality and 
Independence and Control Variables for the Four Years 1999-2002 Pooled 
Sample with alternate auditor size variable
Regression using 
A SIZE
R e g r e s s io n  u s in g  
A  S I Z E 0/«
Pred. Estimate /7 -v a lu e E s t im a te /7 -v a lu e
Sign ( 1 - ta i le d )# (1 - ta i le d )#
(Constant) # 0.0010 .988 0.025 .658
Board o f  Directors Variables
B SIZE + 0.0140 .000 0.009 .011
B DSHIP - -0.0400 .004 -0.041 .004
B MEET - 0.0080 .000 0.008 .000
B FINLIT - -0.0550 .056 -0.055 .058
B OUTSIDE - -0.0050 .445 -0.006 .433
B CHAIR - 0.0180 .115 0.017 .122
Audit Committee Variables
A SIZE - -0.0110 .026
A SIZE% - -0.060 .023
A MSHIP - 0.0130 .126 0.014 .112
A MEET - -0.0040 .136 -0.004 .138
A FINLIT - 0.0001 .499 0.000 .493
A OUTSIDE - 0.0220 .187 0.025 .163
A CHAIR - 0.0010 .472 0.000 .495
Control Variables
BLOCK - 0.0000 .189 0.000 .167
BIG5 + 0.0990 .000 0.098 .000
AUD SPEC# ? -0.0030 .865 -0.003 .860
ALOCKS + 0.0070 .103 0.007 .107
MINING - -0.0460 .002 -0.046 .002
FINANCIAL - 0.0400 .020 0.040 .017
UTILITIES - 0.0580 .013 0.058 .013
ASSETS + 0.0150 .002 0.014 .002
ALLSUBS + 0.0020 .375 0.002 .372
RESTRUCT + 0.0530 .001 0.053 .001
NEWCEO + 0.0600 .002 0.060 .002
NEWISSUE -l- 0.0420 .001 0.042 .001
NEGROI - -0.0010 .147 -0.001 .151
LEVERAGE - 0.0000 .211 0.000 .208
NAS SPEC + 0.0610 .000 0.062 .000
US LIST - 0.0100 .321 0.011 .313
US SUB - 0.0230 .055 0.023 .054
YEAR1 # ? -0.0570 .015 -0.057 .016
Adjusted R: .180 .180
F statistic 12.695 12.702
(significance) .000 .000
# /7-values are 1 tailed except for the constant, AUD SPEC and YEAR1 which are 2- 
tailed
Where:
APNAS/TFEE non-audit fees / total fees
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B S IZ E = n u m b e r  o f  b o a r d  m e m b e r s
B D S H IP S = a v e r a g e  n u m b e r  o f  d i r e c to r s h ip s  b y  o u ts id e  d i r e c to r s  o n  th e  b o a rd
B M E E T s u m  o f  th e  to ta l  n u m b e r  o f  b o a r d  m e e t in g s  a t te n d e d  b y  e a c h  
d i r e c to r  d iv id e d  b y  th e  n u m b e r  o f  d i r e c to r s
B F 1N L 1T = p e r c e n ta g e  o f  o u ts id e  d i r e c to r s  w i th  a  f in a n c ia l  b a c k g r o u n d  o n  
th e  b o a rd
B  O U T S I D E = p e r c e n ta g e  o f  o u ts id e  d i r e c to r s  o n  th e  b o a rd
B  C H A I R = 1 i f  c h a ir m a n  is  a n  o u ts id e  d i r e c to r ;  0  o th e r w is e
A  S IZ E = n u m b e r  o f  a u d i t  c o m m it te e  m e m b e r s
A _ S I Z E % = n u m b e r  o f  a u d i t  c o m m it te e  m e m b e r s  d iv id e d  b y  th e  n u m b e r  o f  
d i r e c to r s
A  M S H IP - a v e ra g e  n u m b e r  o f  a u d i t  c o m m it te e  m e m b e r s h ip s  b y  o u ts id e  
a u d i t  c o m m it te e  m e m b e r s  o n  th e  b o a r d
A  M E E T - s u m  o f  th e  to ta l  n u m b e r  o f  a u d i t  c o m m it te e  m e e t in g s  a t te n d e d  b y  
e a c h  d i r e c to r  d iv id e d  b y  th e  n u m b e r  o f  d i r e c to r s
A  F I N L I T p e rc e n ta g e  o f  o u ts id e  a u d i t  c o m m i t te e  m e m b e r s  w i th  a  f in a n c ia l  
b a c k g r o u n d  o n  th e  b o a rd
A  O U T S I D E = p e rc e n ta g e  o f  o u ts id e  d i r e c to r s  in  th e  a u d i t  c o m m it te e
A C H A I R 1 i f  c h a i r m a n  o f  a u d i t  c o m m it te e  is  a n  o u ts id e  d i r e c to r ;  0  
o th e r w is e
B L O C K = %  o w n e d  b y  b lo c k h o ld e r s
B IG 5 = 1 i f  a u d i to r  is  B ig  5 , 0  o th e r w is e
A U D  S P E C = 1 i f  a u d i to r  h a s  >  1 5 %  o f  a u d i t  s e r v ic e s
A L O C K S - th e  n u m b e r  o f  o th e r  f i rm s  th a t  s h a re  th e  s a m e  a u d i to r  a n d  
d ir e c to r s
M I N I N G = 1 i f  R e s o u rc e ;  0  o th e rw is e
F I N A N C I A L = 1 i f  B a n k in g  a n d  F in a n c e ;  0  o th e r w is e
U T I L I T I E S = 1 i f  I n f r a s t r u c tu r e  a n d  U ti l i t ie s ;  0  o th e r w is e
A S S E T S = n a tu ra l  lo g  o f  to ta l  a s s e ts
A L L S U B S = n a tu ra l  lo g  o f  th e  to ta l  n u m b e r  o f  s u b s id ia r ie s
R E S T R U C T = 1 i f  f i rm  u n d e r g o n e  r e s t r u c tu r in g ;  0  o th e r w is e
N E W C E O = 1 i f  th e r e  is  a  c h a n g e  in  C E O ; 0  o th e r w is e
N E W I S S U E = 1 i f  th e  f i rm  i s s u e d  n e w  s to c k s  o r  e q u i ty  fo r  c a s h  a n d /o r  h a s  l is te d  
in  a n o th e r  e x c h a n g e  d u r in g  th e  c u r r e n t  y e a r ;  =  0  o th e r w is e
N E G R O I = tw o - y e a r  a v e r a g e  R O I  i f  n e g a t iv e ,  = 0  o th e r w is e
L E V E R A G E = lo n g  te rm  d e b t  to  s h a r e h o ld e r ’s e q u i ty
N A S  S P E C = 1 i f  a u d i to r  h a s  >  1 5 %  o f  A P N A S
U S  L IS T = 1 i f  l is te d  o n  a n  A m e r ic a n  s to c k s  e x c h a n g e ,  = 0  o th e r w is e
U S  S U B = 1 i f  it h a s  a n  A m e r ic a n  s u b s id ia r y ,  = 0  o th e rw is e
Y E A R 1 = 1 i f  f i r s t  y e a r  o f  a u d i t  e n g a g e m e n t ;  = 0  o th e r w is e
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A2.3 Additional testing on sub-samples divided by firm size
As revealed by the descriptive statistics, there are a small percentage of firms 
significantly larger than the others. An eye-ball examination of a plot of total assets 
reveals a sharp increase in gradient at about the top 50 and again at the top 10 firms 
for each year. To see if these firms dominate the results, the 10 largest firms based on 
total assets are removed from the sample for each year (roughly equating to 2.5% of 
the firms), and the 4-year pooled 1999-2002 sample were re-estimated. The same is 
done for the 50 largest firms (approximately 12.5% of the firms). The results are 
report in Table 26 below.
Removing the 10 largest firms caused no change in which of the test variables are 
significant. However, B FIN LIT loses its significance after removing the 50 largest 
firms, suggesting that its effect is concentrated among the largest firms in the sample. 
The control variables seem to be fairly stable with the exception of ALOCKS which 
lost its significance when the large firms are removed.
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Table 26 Regression results: The Ratio of Auditor provided Non-Audit Services 
to Total Fee Regressed on Board and Audit Committee Quality and 
Independence and Control Variables excluding the largest 10 and 50 companies 
from each year.
Pred. Full Sample Less top 10 Less top 50
Sign. Estimate p# Estimate p# Estimate p#
(Constant) # 0.0010 0.988 -0.016 .795 -0.043 .266
Board of Directors Variables
B SIZE + 0.0140 0.000 0.015 .000 0.017 .000
B DSHIP - -0.0400 0.004 -0.040 .005 -0.043 .005
B MEET - 0.0080 0.000 0.008 .000 0.008 .000
B FINLIT - -0.0550 0.056 -0.050 .078 -0.015 .347
B OUTSIDE - -0.0050 0.445 -0.005 .449 -0.013 .374
B CHAIR - 0.0180 0.115 0.019 .099 0.017 .148
Audit Committee Variables
A SIZE - -0.0110 0.026 -0.011 .025 -0.013 .012
A MSHIP - 0.0130 0.126 0.013 .134 0.018 .073
A MEET - -0.0040 0.136 -0.004 .176 -0.004 .186
A FINLIT - 0.0001 0.499 -0.004 .433 -0.026 .168
A OUTSIDE - 0.0220 0.187 0.023 .181 0.023 .195
A CHAIR - 0.0010 0.472 -0.001 .487 0.007 .373
Control Variables
BLOCK 20 - 0.0000 0.189 0.000 .245 0.000 .236
BIG5 + 0.0990 0.000 0.097 .000 0.094 .000
AUD SPEC# ? -0.0030 0.865 -0.003 .851 0.001 .481
ALOCKS + 0.0070 0.103 0.007 .130 0.008 .153
MINING - -0.0460 0.002 -0.043 .003 -0.046 .004
FINANCIAL - 0.0400 0.020 0.037 .033 0.017 .214
UTILITIES - 0.0580 0.013 0.072 .003 0.041 .081
ASSETS + 0.0150 0.002 0.015 .002 0.017 .003
ALLSUBS + 0.0020 0.375 0.001 .432 0.002 .360
RESTRUCT + 0.0530 0.001 0.050 .003 0.054 .004
NEWCEO + 0.0600 0.002 0.064 .001 0.058 .005
NEWISSUE + 0.0420 0.001 0.044 .001 0.046 .001
NEGROI - -0.0010 0.147 -0.001 .142 -0.001 .166
LEVERAGE - 0.0000 0.211 0.000 .193 0.000 .196
NAS SPEC + 0.0610 0.000 0.061 .000 0.056 .001
US LIST - 0.0100 0.321 0.014 .270 0.053 .033
US SUB - 0.0230 0.055 0.026 .043 0.028 .042
YEAR1 # ? -0.0570 0.015 -0.057 .017 -0.048 .026
Adj R“ .180 .169 .149
F statistic 12.695 11.620 9.179
(significance) .000 .000 .000
# p-values are 1 tailed except for the constant, AUD SPEC and YEAR1 which are 2- 
tailed
Where:
APNAS/TFEE 
B SIZE
non-audit fees / total fees 
number of board members
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B DSHIPS 
B MEET
B FINLIT
B OUTSIDE 
B CHAIR 
A SIZE 
A MSHIP
A MEET
A FINLIT
A OUTSIDE 
A CHAIR
BLOCK
BIG5
AUD SPEC 
ALOCKS
MINING
FINANCIAL
UTILITIES
ASSETS
ALLSUBS
RESTRUCT
NEWCEO
NEWISSUE
NEGROI
LEVERAGE
NASSPEC
USLIST
US SUB
YEAR1
average number of directorships by outside directors on the board 
sum of the total number of board meetings attended by each 
director divided by the number of directors 
percentage of outside directors with a financial background on 
the board
percentage of outside directors on the board 
1 if chairman is an outside director; 0 otherwise 
number of audit committee members
average number of audit committee memberships by outside 
audit committee members on the board
sum of the total number of audit committee meetings attended by 
each director divided by the number of directors 
percentage of outside audit committee members with a financial 
background on the board
percentage of outside directors in the audit committee 
1 if chairman of audit committee is an outside director; 0 
otherwise
% owned by blockholders
1 if auditor is Big 5, 0 otherwise
1 if auditor has > 15% of audit services
the number of other firms that share the same auditor and
directors
1 if Resource; 0 otherwise
1 if Banking and Finance; 0 otherwise
1 if Infrastructure and Utilities; 0 otherwise
natural log of total assets
natural log of the total number of subsidiaries
1 if firm undergone restructuring; 0 otherwise
1 if there is a change in CEO; 0 otherwise
1 if the firm issued new stocks or equity for cash and/or has listed 
in another exchange during the current year; = 0 otherwise 
two-year average ROI if negative, =0 otherwise 
long term debt to shareholder’s equity 
1 if auditor has > 15% of APNAS
1 if listed on an American stocks exchange, =0 otherwise 
1 if it has an American subsidiary, =0 otherwise 
1 if first year of audit engagement; =0 otherwise
Abbott et al. (2003) pointed out that company size is strongly associated with both 
audit and APNAS fees and that audit fees increase as a nonlinear function of size. 
However, there is no evidence that the association between NAS fees and size is 
similarly concave. To address this, they included supplementary test by partitioning 
the sample into two based on the median company size of the full sample.
224
This is also done below. In addition, due to the largest firms being much bigger in 
this sample, a second set of sub-samples are used where partition is at the third 
quartile.
So, the base model regression was estimated for the following sub-samples, firms 
whose total assets were, (1) greater than the yearly sample median, (2) smaller than 
the yearly sample median, (3) greater than the yearly sample’s third quartile, and (4) 
smaller than the yearly sample’s third quartile. The regression results are recorded in 
Table 27 below.
The results show some instability across the different sizes sub-samples. It seems that 
the significance of B SIZE is largely concentrated on the larger firms, while that of 
B FIN LIT seems to be driven by the smaller firms. The positive significance of 
B MEET is quite uniform throughout the various sub-samples though. On the other 
hand, the control variables also exhibit some instability across the different size sub­
samples.
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Table 27 Regression results: The Ratio of Auditor provided Non-Audit Services 
to Total Fee Regressed on Board and Audit Committee Quality and
i bv size
Pred
sign
Full sam ple 
Est. p#
> m edian 
Est. p#
< m edian 
Est. p#
> 3 rd Q u artile  
Est. p#
< 3 rd Q uartile  
Est. p#
(Constant) # 0.0010 0.988 -0 .003 .976 -0 .1 0 9 .382 -0 .1 6 5 .354 -0 .080 .345
B oard  of d irec to rs  variab les
B SIZE + 0.0140 0.000 0 .0 1 0 .016 0 .0 1 9 .002 0 .0 0 5 .181 0 .019 .000
B DSHIP - -0.0400 0.004 -0 .068 .000 0 .0 0 4 .438 -0 .0 2 8 .161 -0 .030 .052
B MEET - 0.0080 0.000 0 .0 0 6 .004 0 .0 0 8 .000 0 .0 0 7 .028 0 .0 0 7 .000
B FINLIT - -0.0550 0.056 -0 .082 .044 -0 .0 3 4 .259 -0 .146 .024 -0 .027 .256
B OUTSIDE - -0.0050 0.445 0 .022 .352 -0 .0 0 7 .442 0 .0 2 2 .402 -0 .026 .266
B CHAIR - 0.0180 0.115 0 .0 0 5 .412 0 .0 2 8 .091 -0 .037 .108 0.031 .036
A udit com m ittee  variab les
A SIZE - -0.0110 0.026 -0 .018 .012 -0 .0 0 7 .192 0.011 .183 -0 .016 .006
A DSHIP - 0.0130 0.126 0 .0 2 3 .078 -0.001 .479 0 .0 2 2 .144 0 .0 1 0 .230
A M EET - -0.0040 0.136 -0 .005 .169 -0 .0 0 3 .298 0.001 .427 -0 .004 .182
A FINLIT - 0.0001 0.499 0 .0 2 4 .242 -0 .0 3 6 .159 0 .0 4 7 .163 -0.021 .240
A OUTSIDE - 0.0220 0.187 -0 .029 .219 0 .0 6 3 .042 0 .0 3 4 .259 0 .042 .083
A CHAIR - 0.0010 0.472 0.041 .071 -0 .031 .161 -0 .0 1 5 .352 0 .0 0 2 .470
C on tro l variab les
BLOCK - 0.0000 0.189 0 .0 0 0 .498 0 .0 0 0 .273 0 .0 0 0 .433 0 .0 0 0 .124
BIG5 + 0.0990 0.000 0 .1 5 8 .000 0.051 .015 0 .4 0 4 .000 0 .077 .000
AUD S P E C # ? -0.0030 0.865 -0 .044 .028 0 .0 5 3 .033 -0 .062 .026 0 .0 1 6 .419
ALOCKS + 0.0070 0.103 0 .014 .013 -0 .0 0 8 .259 0 .0 0 6 .191 0 .0 0 4 .319
MINING - -0.0460 0.002 -0 .028 .109 -0 .0 5 5 .008 -0 .068 .012 -0 .039 .020
FINANCIAL - 0.0400 0.020 0 .0 5 2 .024 0 .0 3 3 .134 0 .0 9 7 .011 0 .0 2 9 .104
UTILITIES - 0.0580 0.013 0 .0 5 9 .046 0 .0 6 7 .048 0 .0 8 3 .039 0 .0 4 3 .086
ASSETS + 0.0150 0.002 0 .0 1 9 .013 0 .0 1 8 .060 0 .011 .212 0 .0 1 8 .008
ALLSUBS + 0.0020 0.375 0 .0 0 4 .304 0 .0 0 0 .488 -0 .013 .111 0 .0 0 8 .120
RESTRUCT + 0.0530 0.001 0 .0 4 2 .025 0 .0 9 4 .001 0 .0 3 5 .088 0 .0 7 3 .001
NEW CEO + 0.0600 0.002 0 .0 7 0 .003 0 .0 2 6 .208 0 .0 5 3 .061 0.051 .020
NEW ISSUE + 0.0420 0.001 0 .0 4 5 .008 0 .0 3 8 .023 0 .0 3 4 .096 0 .0 4 4 .002
NEGROI - -0.0010 0.147 -0 .073 .283 -0.001 .145 -0 .720 .071 -0.001 .141
LEVERAGE - 0.0000 0.211 0 .0 0 0 .182 -0.001 .206 -0.001 .420 0 .0 0 0 .170
NAS SPEC + 0.0610 0.000 0 .0 7 3 .000 0.041 .053 0 .0 8 2 .001 0 .0 5 3 .004
US LIST - 0.0100 0.321 -0 .033 .117 0 .1 1 0 .002 -0 .005 .431 0 .0 6 3 .028
US SUB - 0.0230 0.055 -0 .003 .435 0.061 .003 0 .0 1 8 .239 0 .0 3 5 .028
Y E A R 1 # ? -0.0570 0.015 I -0 .080 .012 -0 .0 3 4 .332 -0 .0 9 3 .042 -0 .045 .103
Adj R2 .180 .175 .138 .218 .142
F statistic 12.695 6.670 5.273 4.721 7.613
(significance) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
# p-values are 1 tailed except for the constant, AUD SPEC and YEAR1 which are 2- 
tailed
Where:
APNAS/TFEE 
BSIZE 
B DSHIPS 
B MEET
B FINLIT
B OUTSIDE
non-audit fees / total fees 
number of board members
average number of directorships by outside directors on the board 
sum of the total number of board meetings attended by each 
director divided by the number of directors 
percentage of outside directors with a financial background on 
the board
percentage of outside directors on the board
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B CHAIR = 1 if chairman is an outside director; 0 otherwise
A SIZE = number of audit committee members
A MSHIP = average number of audit committee memberships by outside 
audit committee members on the board
A MEET = sum of the total number of audit committee meetings attended by 
each director divided by the number of directors
A FINLIT = percentage of outside audit committee members with a financial 
background on the board
A OUTSIDE 
A CHAIR
= percentage of outside directors in the audit committee 
= 1 if chairman of audit committee is an outside director; 0
otherwise
BLOCK
BIG5
AUD SPEC 
ALOCKS
= % owned by blockholders 
= 1 if auditor is Big 5, 0 otherwise
= 1 if auditor has > 15% of audit services
= the number of other firms that share the same auditor and 
directors
MINING
FINANCIAL
UTILITIES
ASSETS
ALLSUBS
RESTRUCT
NEWCEO
NEWISSUE
= 1 if Resource; 0 otherwise
= 1 if Banking and Finance; 0 otherwise
= 1 if Infrastructure and Utilities; 0 otherwise
= natural log of total assets 
= natural log of the total number of subsidiaries 
= 1 if firm undergone restructuring; 0 otherwise
= 1 if there is a change in CEO; 0 otherwise
= 1 if the firm issued new stocks or equity for cash and/or has listed
in another exchange during the current year; = 0 otherwise
NEGROI = two-year average ROI if negative, =0 otherwise
LEVERAGE = long term debt to shareholder’s equity
N AS SPEC = 1 if auditor has > 15% of APN AS
USLI ST = 1 if listed on an American stocks exchange, =0 otherwise
US SUB = 1 if it has an American subsidiary, =0 otherwise
YEAR1 = 1 if first year of audit engagement; =0 otherwise
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A2.4 Excluding firms that had Andersen as auditors
It is possible that the integration of Andersen in Australia and Ernst and Young might 
have confounding effects on the regression on the 2002 sample. A brief timeline of 
the integration was published by Ernst and Young in a media release (Ernst and 
Young 2002)
• March 28 2002 Ernst & Young and Andersen announced they had signed a 
memorandum of understanding to pursue integration talks
• April 26 2002 an Implementation Agreement was signed giving formal effect 
to the MOU
• May 16 2002 voting process complete
• May 17 2002 votes counted
• May 27 2002 set as integration day.
To remove any potential confounding effects, the 2002 regression was re-estimated 
using the reduced sample by removing all firms that were audited by Andersen in 
2001. It is possible that the reduced sample may have a bias if the audit firm seeks a 
particular type of auditee or if a particular type of firm seeks them as an auditor. In 
total, 44 firms were identified as having Andersen as auditor in 2001, from a full 
sample of 414 firms, leave a testing sample of 370 firms.
The results of the regression are shown below in Table 28.
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Table 28: Regression results: The Ratio of Auditor provided Non-Audit Services 
to Total Fee Regressed on Board and Audit Committee Quality and 
Independence and Control Variables for 2002 using reduced sample removing 
firms audited by Andersen
APNAS/TFEE = a  + ß, B SIZE + ß2 B DSHIPS + ß3 B MEET + ß4 B_FINLIT + ß5 B OUTSIDE 
+ ß6 B CHAIR + ß7 A_SIZE% + ß8 A MSHIP + ß9 A MEET + ß10 A FINLIT 
+ ß n A OUTSIDE + ß 12 A CHAIR + ß13 BLOCK + ß14 BIG5 + ß15 AUD SPEC 
+ ß l6 ALOCKS + ß ,7 MINING + ß 18 FININCIAL + ß19 UTILITIES + ß2ü ASSETS 
+ ß21 ALLSUBS + ß22 RESTRUCT + ß23 NEWCEO + ß24 NEWISSUE 
+ ß25 NEGROI + ß26 LEVERAGE + ß27 NAS SPEC + ß28 US LIST + ß29 US SUB 
+ ß30 YEAR1 +8
Full sample Less audited by AA
Pred. Estimate /7-value Estimate /7-value
Sign (1-tailed)# (1-tailed)#
(Constant) # 0.2594 .035 0.2588 .050
Board o f  Directors Variables
B SIZE + 0.0106 .089 0.0112 .105
B DSHIP - -0.0680 .025 -0.0784 .017
B MEET - 0.0031 .134 0.0027 .174
B FINLIT - -0.0166 .406 -0.0141 .426
B OUTSIDE - -0.0589 .215 -0.0582 .229
B CHAIR - 0.0264 .192 0.0248 .223
Audit Committee Variables
A SIZE - -0.0076 .259 -0.0080 .264
A MSHIP - 0.0464 .040 0.0432 .069
A MEET - -0.0100 .105 -0.0132 .060
A FINLIT - -0.0316 .262 -0.0258 .314
A OUTSIDE - 0.0586 .123 0.0600 .134
A CHAIR - -0.0372 .197 -0.0566 .109
Control Variables
BLOCK - -0.0002 .359 -0.0003 .292
BIG5 + 0.1125 .001 0.1090 .002
AUD SPEC# ? -0.0738 .028 -0.0594 .099
ALOCKS + 0.0103 .191 0.0145 .134
MINING - -0.0046 .439 -0.0258 .215
FINANCIAL - 0.0986 .005 0.0846 .018
UTILITIES - -0.0039 .477 -0.0173 .413
ASSETS + 0.0015 .442 0.0069 .265
ALLSUBS + 0.0090 .208 0.0058 .319
RESTRUCT + 0.0457 .151 0.0401 .197
NEWCEO + 0.0847 .091 0.0756 .138
NEWISSUE + 0.0003 .495 -0.0004 .494
NEGROI - 0.0699 .149 0.0527 .230
LEVERAGE - -0.0055 .249 -0.0075 .185
NAS SPEC + 0.1292 .000 0.1116 .001
US LIST - 0.0846 .024 0.1096 .009
US SUB - 0.0348 .109 0.0298 .165
YEAR1# ? -0.0483 .119 -0.0243 .638
Adjusted R2 .148 .150
F statistic 3.382 3.168
(significance) .000 .000
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# p-values are 1 tailed except for the constant, AUD SPEC and YEAR1 which are 2- 
tailed
Where:
APNAS/TFEE = 
B SIZE 
B DSHIPS 
B MEET
B FINLIT
B OUTSIDE = 
BCHAIR 
A SIZE 
A MSHIP
A MEET
A FINLIT
A OUTSIDE = 
ACHAIR
BLOCK
BIG5
AUD SPEC = 
ALOCKS
MINING 
FINANCIAL = 
UTILITIES 
ASSETS 
ALLSUBS 
RESTRUCT = 
NEWCEO 
NEWISSUE
NEGROI 
LEVERAGE = 
NASSPEC 
US LIST 
USSUB 
YEAR1
non-audit fees / total fees 
number of board members
average number of directorships by outside directors on the board 
sum of the total number of board meetings attended by each 
director divided by the number of directors 
percentage of outside directors with a financial background on 
the board
percentage of outside directors on the board 
1 if chairman is an outside director; 0 otherwise 
number of audit committee members
average number of audit committee memberships by outside 
audit committee members on the board
sum of the total number of audit committee meetings attended by 
each director divided by the number of directors 
percentage of outside audit committee members with a financial 
background on the board
percentage of outside directors in the audit committee 
1 if chairman of audit committee is an outside director; 0 
otherwise
% owned by blockholders
1 if auditor is Big 5, 0 otherwise
1 if auditor has > 15% of audit services
the number of other firms that share the same auditor and
directors
1 if Resource; 0 otherwise
1 if Banking and Finance; 0 otherwise
1 if Infrastructure and Utilities; 0 otherwise
natural log of total assets
natural log of the total number of subsidiaries
1 if Finn undergone restructuring; 0 otherwise
1 if there is a change in CEO; 0 otherwise
1 if the firm issued new stocks or equity for cash and/or has listed 
in another exchange during the current year; = 0 otherwise 
two-year average ROI if negative, =0 otherwise 
long term debt to shareholder’s equity 
1 if auditor has > 15% of APNAS
1 if listed on an American stocks exchange, =0 otherwise 
1 if it has an American subsidiary, =0 otherwise 
1 if first year of audit engagement; =0 otherwise
The explanatory power of the regression improved very slightly from 14.8% to 15%.
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Among the test variables, B SIZE and A MSHIP which was significant in the full 
sample regression (p = .089, one-tailed; p = .081, two-tailed) lost its significance after 
the Andersen firms were removed (p = .105, one-tailed; p = .139, two-tailed). On the 
other hand, A MEET which was insignificant in the full sample regression (p = .105, 
one-tailed) is negatively significant (p = .060, one-tailed).
There was no change in the control variables except NEWCEO lost its significance 
after the Andersen firms were removed.
The change in significance among the test variable is cause for concern given the 
small number of firms deleted from the sample. To compare the firms audited by 
Andersen with the other firms, Table 29 shows the descriptive statistics for the full 
sample of 2002 firms, as well as two sub-samples, one with the firms audited by 
Andersen in 2001 removed, and one comprising only of firms that were audited by 
Andersen in 2001.
The firms that were audited by Andersen in 2001 generally had higher fees for both 
audit and non-audit services (as well as greater variance), with the ration of 
APNAS/TFEE slightly lower than other firms. Their boards are slightly weaker being 
larger and less financially literate but otherwise fairly similar to firms audited by other 
auditors. The audit committee on the other hand tend to be stronger with its members 
tending to have more multiple audit committee memberships, met more often, more 
financially literate, and a greater percentage of whom are independent.
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The firms themselves were generally slightly bigger in terms of its total assets, and 
have lower leverage. The auditor they switched to in 2002 (most but not all being 
Ernst and Young) tend to be specialists in the industry for audit and APNAS which 
isn’t surprising. Those audited by Andersen in 2001 also had proportionally greater 
number of CEO changes, whose removal might be the cause of the lost of significance 
in the new restricted regression.
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Table 29 Descriptive statistics for 2002
Full sample 
(n = 414)
Less firms audited by 
Andersen in 2001 
(n =3 70)
Only firms audited by 
Andersen in 2001 
(n -  44)
Mean Standard
Deviation
Mean Standard
Deviation
Mean Standard
Deviation
Audit A 402.350 1052.5 376.618 838.9 618.734 2132.2
APNAS A 503.589 1476.6 490.534 1297.2 613.375 2547.2
APNAS/TFEE 0.41608 0.2425 0.41928 0.2470 0.38916 0.2011
B SIZE 6.19807 2.0023 6.11892 1.9372 6.86364 2.4073
B DSHIPS 1.59199 0.5752 1.59165 0.5867 1.59487 0.4734
B MEET 10.7744 4.5537 10.7751 4.6607 10.7688 3.5725
B FINLIT 0.44795 0.2266 0.45402 0.2238 0.39690 0.2459
B OUTSIDE 0.63361 0.2149 0.62953 0.2182 0.66788 0.1831
B CHAIR* 0.74155 0.4383 0.73514 0.4419 0.79546 0.4080
AC * 0.91546 0.2785 0.90541 0.2931 1 0
A SIZE 2.82609 1.2482 2.80541 1.2878 3 0.8352
A MSHIP 1.34661 0.7316 1.33260 0.7416 1.46439 0.6370
A MEET 2.91116 1.7926 2.86828 1.8147 3.27167 1.5667
A FINLIT 0.50589 0.3297 0.50195 0.3291 0.53901 0.3362
A OUTSIDE 0.71556 0.3434 0.70557 0.3513 0.79962 0.2553
A CHAIR* 0.89614 0.3055 0.89189 0.3109 0.93182 0.2550
BLOCK 41.6456 22.76747 41.5654 22.899 42.3199 21.870
BIG5 * 0.80676 0.3953 0.78649 0.4103 0.97727 0.1508
AUD SPEC* 0.57488 0.4950 0.54054 0.4990 0.86364 0.3471
ALOCKS 0.92512 1.4062 0.89189 1.3946 1.20454 1.4876
MINING * 0.22947 0.421 0.23243 0.4229 0.20454 0.4080
FINANCIAL * 0.16425 0.3710 0.17027 0.3764 0.11363 0.3210
UTILITIES * 0.03140 0.1746 0.02702 0.1624 0.06818 0.2550
Total Assets A 3,294,113 24,547,582 3,419,023 25,708,813 2,243,728 10,701,875
Subsidiaries 28.9008 56.443 28.8946 58.524 28.9546 34.749
RESTRUCT * 0.07488 0.2635 0.07836 0.2691 0.04546 0.2107
NEWCEO * 0.03382 0.1810 0.03243 0.1774 0.04546 0.2107
NEWISSUE * 0.31401 0.4647 0.31892 0.4667 0.27273 0.4505
NEGROI -0.05762 0.1852 -0.0572 0.1867 -0.0612 0.1748
LEVERAGE 0.49596 1.4758 0.51594 1.5477 0.32792 0.5756
NAS SPEC* 0.56280 0.4966 0.54595 0.4986 0.70455 0.4615
US LIST* 0.08937 0.2856 0.09189 0.2893 0.06818 0.2550
US SUB* 0.27295 0.4460 0.27297 0.4460 0.27273 0.4505
YEAR1* 0.16425 0.3710 0.06487 0.2466 1 0
AI P/GO 0.88627 0.7789 0.88750 0.8151 0.87595 0.3545
A the mean, medians, and quartiles of these variables are expressed at ($’000)
Where:
Audit 
APNAS 
APNAS/TFEE 
B SIZE 
BDSHIP 
B MEET
B FINLIT
Audit fee ($’000)
Auditor’s remuneration for services other than audit ($’000) 
non-audit fees / total fees 
number of board members
average number of directorships by outside directors on the board 
sum of the total number of board meetings attended by each 
director divided by the number of directors 
percentage of outside directors with a financial background
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B OUTSIDE 
B CHAIR 
A SIZE 
AC
A MSHIP
A MEET
A FINLIT
A OUTSIDE 
A CHAIR
BLOCK
BIG5
AUD SPEC 
ALOCKS
MINING
FINANCIAL
UTILITIES
Total Assets
Subsidiaries
RESTRUCT
NEWCEO
NEWISSUE
NEGROl 
LEVERAGE 
NAS SPEC 
US LIST 
USSUB 
YEAR1
percentage of outside directors on the board 
1 if chairman is an outside director; 0 otherwise 
Number of members in the audit committee 
1 if the company has an audit committee; 0 otherwise 
average number of audit committee memberships by outside 
audit committee members on the board
sum of the total number of audit committee meetings attended by 
each director divided by the number of directors 
percentage of outside audit committee members with a financial 
background on the board
percentage of outside directors in the audit committee 
1 if chairman of audit committee is an outside director; 0 
otherwise
% owned by blockholders
1 if auditor is Big 5, 0 otherwise
1 if auditor has > 15% of audit services
the number of other firms that share the same auditor and
directors
1 if Resource; 0 otherwise
1 if Banking and Finance; 0 otherwise
1 if Infrastructure and Utilities; 0 otherwise
total assets ($’000)
the total number of subsidiaries
1 if firm undergone restructuring; 0 otherwise
1 if there is a change in CEO; 0 otherwise
1 if the firm issued new stocks or equity for cash and/or has listed 
in another exchange during the current year; = 0 otherwise 
two-year average ROl if negative, =0 otherwise 
long term debt to shareholder’s equity 
1 if auditor has > 15% of APNAS
1 if listed on an American stocks exchange, =0 otherwise 
1 if it has an American subsidiary, =0 otherwise 
1 if first year of audit engagement; =0 otherwise
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A2.5 Additional testing for model with only audit committee variables
In section 5.7.2, a regression model with only audit committee variables was used. 
Because those regressions focused on the audit committee, firms without audit 
committees were deleted from the sample.
As an alternative, the full sample is used but the model was modified to include a 
dummy variable which equalled 1 if the firm had an audit committee and 0 otherwise.
The results of the regression on the 4-year pooled sample are reported in Table 30 
below. They are qualitatively similar to the regression with the no audit committee 
firms removed. However, unexpectedly the coefficient for AC is positive relating the 
presence of an audit committee to higher relative APNAS spending. 
A possible reason for this might be uncontrolled relationship between APNAS/TFEE 
and the size of the board of directors, whose coefficient is highly significant and 
positive in the full model, with a small board being the most often used reason for not 
having an audit committee. Or it could be that the firms without audit committees 
were less complex firms that had a lower demand for NAS.
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Table 30 Regression results: The Ratio of Auditor provided Non-Audit Services 
to Total Fee Regressed on Audit Committee Quality and Independence and 
Control Variables for the 1999-2002 pooled sample
APNAS/TFEE = a  + ß, AC + ß7 A_SIZE + ß8 A MSH1P + ß9 A MEET + ß10 A FINLIT
+ ßn A OUTSIDE + ß12 A CHAIR + ß13 BLOCK + ß,4 BIG5 + ß,5 AUD SPEC 
+ ßl6 ALOCKS + ß 17 MINING + ß!8 FININCIAL + ß19 UTILITIES + ß20 ASSETS 
+ ß2] ALLSUBS + ß22 RESTRUCT + ß23 NEWCEO + ß24 NEWISSUE 
+ ß25 NEGROI + ß26 LEVERAGE + ß27 NAS SPEC + ß28 US LIST 
+ ß29 US SUB+ ß30 YEAR1 + e
P r e d ic te d E s t im a te T S ta t is t ic /7 -v a lu e
S ig n (1 - ta i le d )#
(Constant) # -0.0373 -0.6774 .498
A udit C om m ittee Variables
AC - 0.1318 3.2384 .001
A SIZE - -0.0146 -2.2033 .014
A MSHIP - -0.0164 -1.8373 .033
A MEET - -0.0008 -0.2194 .413
A FINLIT - -0.0331 -1.6795 .047
A OUTSIDE - -0.0003 -0.0131 .495
A CHAIR - 0.0217 1.0469 .148
C ontrol Variables
BLOCK - 0.0000 -0.1724 .432
BIG5 + 0.1015 5.7177 .000
AUD SPEC# 9 -0.0073 -0.4583 .647
ALOCKS + 0.0026 0.5181 .302
MINING - -0.0476 -3.0164 .001
FINANCIAL - 0.0218 1.1916 .117
UTILITIES - 0.0701 2.6846 .004
ASSETS + 0.0195 4.0879 .000
ALLSUBS + 0.0053 0.9208 .179
RESTRUCT + 0.0653 3.6924 .000
NEWCEO + 0.0596 2.9157 .002
NEWISSUE + 0.0498 3.7487 .000
NEGROI - -0.0008 -1.4986 .067
LEVERAGE - -0.0002 -0.8301 .203
NAS SPEC + 0.0670 4.1919 .000
US LIST - 0.0123 0.5483 .292
US SUB - 0.0182 1.2436 .107
YEAR1# ? -0.0590 -2.4872 .013
Adjusted R2 .160
F statistic 13.212
(significance) .000
# p -values are 1 tailed except for the constant, AUD SPEC and YEAR1 which are 2- 
tailed
Where:
APNAS/TFEE = 
AC
A SIZE
non-audit fees / total fees
1 if the company has an audit committee; 0 otherwise 
number of audit committee members
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A MSHIP
A MEET
A FINLIT
A OUTSIDE 
A CHAIR
BLOCK
BIG5
AUD SPEC 
ALOCKS
MINING
FINANCIAL
UTILITIES
ASSETS
ALLSUBS
RESTRUCT
NEWCEO
NEWISSUE
NEGROI
LEVERAGE
NASSPEC
USLIST
US SUB
YEAR1
average number of audit committee memberships by outside 
audit committee members on the board
sum of the total number of audit committee meetings attended by 
each director divided by the number of directors 
percentage of outside audit committee members with a financial 
background on the board
percentage of outside directors in the audit committee 
1 if chairman of audit committee is an outside director; 0 
otherwise
% owned by blockholders
1 if auditor is Big 5, 0 otherwise
1 if auditor has > 15% of audit services
the number of other firms that share the same auditor and
directors
1 if Resource; 0 otherwise
1 if Banking and Finance; 0 otherwise
1 if Infrastructure and Utilities; 0 otherwise
natural log of total assets
natural log of the total number of subsidiaries
1 if firm undergone restructuring; 0 otherwise
1 if there is a change in CEO; 0 otherwise
1 if the firm issued new stocks or equity for cash and/or has listed 
in another exchange during the current year; = 0 otherwise 
two-year average ROI if negative, =0 otherwise 
long term debt to shareholder’s equity 
1 if auditor has > 15% of APNAS
1 if listed on an American stocks exchange, =0 otherwise 
1 if it has an American subsidiary, =0 otherwise 
1 if first year of audit engagement; =0 otherwise
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A2.6 Sensitivity testing for substitution hypothesis: using thirds to divide the sub- 
sample
In chapter 5.8, the 1999-2002 4-year pooled sample was divided into quartiles ranked 
on AIP/GO for each year. Three sub-samples were created with the high GO sub­
sample containing all the firms that were in the smallest quartiles, the moderate sub­
sample the middle two quartiles, and the high AIP sub-sample being the largest 
quartiles. Separate regression analysis was then carried out on each of the three sub­
samples.
As an alternative, the sample is divided into three equal samples instead. The 
regression results on the three sub-samples are recorded in Table 31 below.
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Table 31 Regression results: The Ratio of Auditor provided Non-Audit Services 
to Total Fee Regressed on Board and Audit Committee Quality and 
Independence and Control Variables for the Four Years 1999-2002 Pooled 
Sample ranked on AIP/GO and broken down into 3 sub-samples using thirds.
Pred.
Sign.
H igh G O *  
E stim ate p#
M od erate*
E stim ate p#
H igh A IP*  
E stim ate p#
(Constant) # -0 .0874 .487 -0 .1 4 8 9 .272 -0 .0268 .819
B oard o f  D irectors V ariab les
B SIZE - ,  +  , - 0 .0 2 1 4 .006 0 .0 1 6 0 .029 0.0021 .390
B D S H IP +  , - ,  + -0 .0023 .474 -0 .0 1 9 7 .263 -0 .0448 .049
B M EET +  » - > + 0 .0095 .005 0 .0 1 1 7 .000 0 .0058 .016
B F IN L IT +  , - , + 0 .0565 .249 -0 .0 9 2 5 .082 -0 .1884 .003
B OUTSIDE +  , - , + 0 .1 4 9 7 .030 0.0271 .366 -0 .1485 .020
B C H A I R +  , - , + -0 .0105 .376 0.0241 .203 0 .0333 .133
A udit C om m ittee  V ariab les
A SIZE +  » - » + 0 .0 0 8 0 .263 -0 .0 2 3 8 .012 0 .0 0 2 6 .403
A M S H I P +  , - ,  + -0 .0114 .308 -0 .0 1 6 5 .257 0 .0038 .434
A M E E T -0 .0051 .295 -0 .0 1 0 5 .056 -0 .0 0 1 0 .442
A FINLIT + , - , + -0 .0993 .035 0 .0 0 8 8 .429 0 .1 1 2 4 .011
A O U T S I D E + , - ,  + 0 .0 0 9 8 .432 0 .0 1 2 0 .403 -0.0331 .250
A C H A I R +  , - ,  + -0 .0 6 8 6 .079 0 .0265 .228 0 .0822 .023
C ontrol V ariab les
B L O C K 2 0 - 0 .0013 .010 -0 .0011 .020 0 .0008 .051
BIG5 + 0 .0 4 7 4 .111 0 .0 9 1 8 .004 0 .1 3 6 6 .000
AUD SPEC # ? 0 .0 0 8 2 .818 -0 .0 0 6 6 .833 0 .0 4 1 6 .162
ALOCKS + 0 .0 0 2 7 .428 -0 .0041 .359 0 .0184 .026
MINING - -0 .0 6 9 9 .036 -0 .0383 .139 -0 .0606 .024
FINANCIAL - 0 .0 3 4 9 .228 0 .0 4 3 9 .157 0 .0200 .295
UTILITIES - 0 .0 0 9 4 .417 0 .0 9 7 2 .028 0.2261 .000
ASSETS + 0 .0 0 8 8 .236 0 .0311 .009 0 .0 2 0 0 .029
ALLSUBS + 0 .0 0 7 7 .290 -0 .0 0 0 4 .489 -0 .0033 .382
RESTRUCT + 0 .0933 .014 0 .0133 .341 0 .0413 .086
NEW CEO + 0 .0695 .057 0 .0 8 4 6 .010 0 .0 3 8 6 .128
NEW ISSUE + 0.0453 .054 0 .0575 .023 0 .0675 .011
NEGROI - -0 .0 0 0 6 .172 -0 .2233 .028 0 .0 3 1 6 .376
LEVERAGE - -0 .0 0 0 4 .381 0 .0 0 0 4 .465 -0 .0001 .340
N A S S P E C + 0 .0375 .153 0 .0 2 1 5 .243 0 .0662 .014
U S L I S T - -0 .0 0 0 6 .495 -0 .0533 .111 0 .0678 .101
U S S U B - 0 .0293 .165 0 .0 3 9 7 .098 -0.0001 .499
Y E A R 1 # ? -0 .1043 .139 -0 .0 8 0 5 .382 -0 .0685 .251
Adj R- .162 .201 .299
F statistic 3 .538 4 .3 1 7 6 .614
(significance) .000 .000 .000
* Firms are ranked on AIP/GO, the smallest third being High GO, middle third being
Moderate, and the largest third being High AIP
# p-values are 1 tailed except for the constant, AUD SPEC and YEAR1 which are 2- 
tailed
Where:
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APNAS/TFEE = 
B SIZE 
B DSHIPS 
B MEET
B FINLIT
B OUTSIDE = 
B CHAIR 
A SIZE 
A MSHIP
A MEET
A FINLIT
A OUTSIDE = 
A CHAIR
BLOCK
BIG5
AUD SPEC = 
ALOCKS
MINING
FINANCIAL =
UTILITIES
ASSETS
ALLSUBS
RESTRUCT
NEWCEO
NEWISSUE
NEGROI 
LEVERAGE = 
NASSPEC 
US LIST 
USSUB 
YEAR1 
AI P/GO
non-audit fees / total fees 
number of board members
average number of directorships by outside directors on the board 
sum of the total number of board meetings attended by each 
director divided by the number of directors 
percentage of outside directors with a financial background on 
the board
percentage of outside directors on the board 
1 if chairman is an outside director; 0 otherwise 
number of audit committee members
average number of audit committee memberships by outside 
audit committee members on the board
sum of the total number of audit committee meetings attended by 
each director divided by the number of directors 
percentage of outside audit committee members with a financial 
background on the board
percentage of outside directors in the audit committee 
1 if chairman of audit committee is an outside director; 0 
otherwise
% owned by blockholders
1 if auditor is Big 5, 0 otherwise
1 if auditor has > 15% of audit services
the number of other firms that share the same auditor and
directors
1 if Resource; 0 otherwise
1 if Banking and Finance; 0 otherwise
1 if Infrastructure and Utilities; 0 otherwise
natural log of total assets
natural log of the total number of subsidiaries
1 if firm undergone restructuring; 0 otherwise
1 if there is a change in CEO; 0 otherwise
1 if the firm issued new stocks or equity for cash and/or has listed 
in another exchange during the current year; = 0 otherwise 
two-year average ROI if negative, =0 otherwise 
long term debt to shareholder’s equity 
1 if auditor has > 15% of APNAS
1 if listed on an American stocks exchange, =0 otherwise 
1 if it has an American subsidiary, =0 otherwise 
1 if first year of audit engagement; =0 otherwise 
Accounting book value of total assets divided by the sum of the 
market value of common equity and the book value of total debt 
and preferred stock.
The following is a comparison of the results with those of the quartile sub-samples in 
chapter 5.8.
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Among the board variables, the significance of B SIZE, B MEET, and B OUTSIDE 
are unchanged, as is the insignificance of B CHAIR. However, the negative 
significance of B DSHIP has moved from the quartile moderate sub-sample to the 
thirds high AIP sub-sample, which does not support the substitution hypothesis. In 
addition, the coefficient of B FINLIT in the thirds moderate sub-sample is significant 
and negative as expected {p = .082, one-tailed) whereas it was insignificant in the 
quartile moderate sub-sample.
Among the audit committee variables, A SIZE maintained its significance only in the 
moderate sub-sample in both sets of regression, and AJV1SHIP is insignificant in all 
sub-samples. A MEET on the other hand is significant and negative as expected in 
the thirds moderate sub-sample, despite being insignificant in all sub-samples when 
they were divided by quartiles.
Finally, A FINLIT and A CHAIR were both consistently positive and significant in 
the high AIP sub-samples in both sets of regression as expected. However in the high 
GO sub-sample, A CHAIR was significant though unexpectedly negative when the 
sub-samples were divided using quartiles, but insignificant when it was done in thirds. 
Yet the opposite was found for A FINLIT, with the coefficient negative and 
significant in the thirds high GO sub-sample and insignificant in the corresponding 
quartiles sub-sample.
The instability of the results also shows that the regression is quite sensitive to the 
sample make-up. However, both sets of results do provide only very isolated support
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for the substitution hypothesis being dominant in the extreme levels of growth options
and assets in place.
Additionally, the control variables showed several differences in results as well, 
suggesting that the instability of the results was not restricted to the test variable.
242
A2.7 Additional analysis for the substitution hypothesis: yearly regressions
In chapter 5.8, the 1999-2002 4-year pooled sample was divided into quartiles ranked 
on AIP/GO for each year. Three sub-samples were created with the high GO sub­
sample containing all the firms that were in the smallest quartiles, the moderate sub­
sample the middle two quartiles, and the high A1P sub-sample being the largest 
quartiles. Separate regression analysis was then carried out on each of the three sub­
samples.
Additional regressions are carried out for each of the four years 1999-2002. The 
results are in Table 32 below. Several of the regressions are insignificant with very 
low adjusted R"s, possibly due in part to the much smaller sample sizes. In particular, 
the high growth options sub-sample for 1999 (F = 1.112; adj R2 = 3.3%) and the high 
assets-in-place sub-samples for 2000 (F = 1.362; adj R2 = 10.2%) and 2002 (F = 
1.038; adj R2 = 1.1%).
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Table 32 Regression results: The Ratio of Auditor provided Non-Audit Services 
to Total Fee Regressed on Board and Audit Committee Quality and 
Independence and Control Variables for each of the four years 1999-2002 Pooled 
Sample ranked on AIP/GO and broken down into 3 sub-samples using quartiles.
Panel A: Regression results for 1999
Pred.
Sign.
High G O * 
E stim ate p#
M oderate*
E stim ate p#
High AIP* 
E stim ate p#
(Constant) # -0 .0065 .982 -0 .0 9 2 7 .609 -0 .1953 .476
B oard  o f D irec to rs V ariab les
B SIZE - ,  +  , - 0 .0 2 7 5 .065 0 .0 1 3 7 .093 -0 .0162 .152
B D S H IP + , - ,  + -0 .0 4 2 4 .310 -0 .0 6 2 9 .042 0 .0182 .368
B M EET 0 .0 0 1 6 .428 0 .0 1 6 2 .000 0 .0033 .270
B F IN L IT + , - ,  + 0 .0221 .459 -0 .0 2 4 7 .396 -0 .1963 .091
B O U T S ID E + , - ,  + 0 .0625 .390 -0 .0955 .183 0 .0 4 0 0 .391
B C H A IR -0 .0 3 1 9 .348 0 .0 4 6 9 .125 -0 .0 1 0 0 .446
A udit C om m ittee  V ariab les
A S IZ E + , - ,  + 0 .0043 .442 -0 .0 2 0 2 .074 0 .0 4 5 0 .046
A M S H IP + , - ,  + -0 .0 2 8 6 .328 0 .0 0 7 6 .355 0 .0123 .408
A M E E T + , - ,  + -0 .0221 .172 -0 .0 1 0 8 .102 -0 .0095 .279
A F IN L IT + , - ,  + -0 .0 2 2 6 .430 -0 .0 7 1 0 .152 0.1141 .141
A O U T S ID E + , - ,  + -0 .0013 .496 0 .0423 .247 -0 .1 0 7 6 .172
A C H A IR + , - ,  + -0 .1 2 3 5 .145 0 .0563 .135 0 .0862 .207
C on tro l V ariab les
B L O C K 2 0 - 0 .0 0 1 9 .084 -0 .0 0 0 8 .147 0 .0 0 0 8 .268
BIG5 + 0 .0 0 5 6 .476 0 .0 7 0 4 .062 0 .1138 .060
A U D S P E C  # ? 0 .0 1 0 5 .901 0 .0921 .026 0 .1 8 4 0 .018
ALOCKS + 0 .0 4 1 2 .141 0 .0 1 6 6 .104 -0 .0 0 0 4 .493
MINING - 0 .0 0 1 2 .495 -0 .0 1 6 6 .354 -0 .0731 .128
FINANCIAL - 0 .0 4 2 5 .347 -0 .0021 .486 -0 .0 1 4 6 .429
UTILITIES - 0 .2 4 0 2 .012 0.2221 .002 0 .2 9 0 9 .049
ASSETS + 0 .0 2 1 0 .219 0 .0 2 7 9 .044 0.0251 .156
ALLSUBS + -0 .0091 .384 0 .0 0 0 9 .478 0 .0 0 7 0 .399
RESTRUCT + 0 .0 9 9 0 .203 -0 .0523 .108 0 .0 5 7 7 .204
NEW CEO + -0 .0 3 4 9 .384 0.1941 .010 0 .0 3 9 9 .334
NEW ISSUE + 0 .0 7 5 5 .163 -0 .0 1 2 9 .370 0 .1178 .050
NEGROI - -0 .0 0 1 4 .064 -0 .0 6 4 9 .325 -0 .0 9 8 0 .342
LEVERAGE - 0 .0 0 0 4 .412 -0 .0 0 0 2 .244 0 .0 1 1 0 .373
N A S S P E C + 0 .0 5 9 6 .245 -0 .0 7 0 6 .054 -0 .0915 .117
U S L IS T - -0 .1 8 2 4 .050 0 .0 0 9 0 .445 0 .1 7 0 7 .083
U S S U B - 0.0451 .257 0 .0 5 7 0 .089 -0 .1 0 6 6 .139
Y E A R 1 # ? -0 .1 3 6 5 .346 -0 .1161 .244 0.0541 .742
Adj R2 .033 .275 .187
F s ta t i s t ic 1.112 3 .518 1.758
( s ig n i f ic a n c e ) .350 .000 .028
* Finns are ranked on AIP/GO, the smallest third being High GO, middle third being
Moderate, and the largest third being High AIP
# p-values are 1 tailed except for the constant, AUD SPEC and YEAR1 which are 2-
tailed
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Table 32 Regression results: The Ratio of Auditor provided Non-Audit Services 
to Total Fee Regressed on Board and Audit Committee Quality and 
Independence and Control Variables for each of the four years 1999-2002 Pooled 
Sample ranked on AIP/GO and broken down into 3 sub-samples using quartiles.
Panel B: Regression results for 2000
Pred.
Sign.
High G O * 
E stim ate p#
M odera te*
E stim ate p#
High AIP* 
E stim ate p#
(Constant) # -0.5401 .143 -0 .0 1 7 9 .931 0 .1 2 9 6 .675
B oard  of D irec to rs V ariab les
B SIZE - ,  + , - 0 .0682 .004 0 .0 0 3 4 .393 -0 .0022 .450
B DSHIP + , - ,  + 0 .0 9 0 4 .153 -0 .0 3 4 3 .248 -0 .0279 .374
B M EET + , - ,  + 0 .0174 .019 0 .0 0 5 0 .145 0 .0053 .214
B F IN L IT + > - ,  + -0 .0321 .434 -0 .2 1 6 4 .022 0 .0403 .415
B O U T S ID E 0 .2 9 2 2 .105 -0 .0 8 6 7 .237 -0 .1814 .173
B C H A IR + , - ,  + -0 .0 4 5 6 .303 0 .0271 .271 0 .1 0 5 0 .097
A udit C om m ittee  V ariab les
A S IZ E + , - ,  + 0 .0 1 3 2 .334 -0 .0271 .039 0 .0098 .380
A M S H IP + , - ,  + -0 .0788 .146 0 .0 0 0 4 .496 -0 .0202 .390
A M E F .T + , - ,  + 0 .0 0 7 4 .374 -0 .0041 .322 0 .0 0 5 0 .402
A F IN L IT + , - ,  + -0 .1314 .171 0.0211 .388 0 .0 4 2 0 .373
A O U T S ID E + , - ,  + 0 .0313 .422 0 .0 0 1 0 .495 0 .0 6 0 9 .314
A C H A IR + , - ,  + -0 .1058 .179 0 .0 6 0 0 .115 0 .0 1 7 4 .442
C on tro l V ariab les
B L O C K 2 0 - 0 .0 0 1 4 .178 -0 .0 0 0 2 .404 0 .0 0 1 6 .108
BIG5 + 0 .0 1 9 0 .420 0.1521 .004 0.1611 .052
AUD SPEC # 7 -0 .0453 .589 -0 .0851 .056 -0 .0165 .838
ALOCKS + -0 .0225 .304 0 .0091 .312 0 .0 3 9 0 .092
MINING - -0 .1325 .093 -0 .1 5 0 3 .005 -0 .1032 .102
FINANCIAL - 0 .0 2 9 6 .390 0 .0 4 2 7 .249 -0 .0 1 9 6 .424
UTILITIES - 0 .0 2 9 7 .378 0 .1 0 2 9 .144 0 .2 1 4 0 .087
ASSETS + 0 .0225 .266 0 .0 3 1 8 .053 -0 .0048 .428
ALLSUBS + -0 .0375 .173 0 .0 0 9 0 .317 0 .0 0 3 6 .454
RESTRUCT + 0 .1 9 1 6 .021 0 .0 9 9 8 .007 0 .0 5 0 9 .264
NEW CEO + 0 .0 2 8 9 .390 0 .0 8 3 8 .044 0 .0697 .205
NEW ISSUE + 0 .0 3 7 9 .300 0 .0 8 6 5 .021 0 .0864 .142
NEGROI - -0 .0473 .265 -0 .0 0 8 0 .481 -0 .1112 .372
LEVERAGE - 0 .0073 .332 -0 .0 0 4 7 .109 0 .0188 .199
N A S S P E C + -0 .0157 .427 0 .1 0 4 0 .007 0.0903 .140
U S L IS T - 0 .1 0 3 4 .168 -0 .1 1 6 8 .041 0 .0346 .396
U S S U B - -0 .0113 .439 0 .0 1 7 2 .342 0 .0043 .478
Y E A R 1 # ? -0 .0155 .928 0 .0 5 4 5 .741 -0 .2 9 4 6 .102
A d jR 2 .206 .222 .102
F statistic 1.828 2 .8 2 4 1.362
(significance) .021 .000 .148
* Firms are ranked on AIP/GO, the smallest third being High GO, middle third being
Moderate, and the largest third being High AIP
# p-values are 1 tailed except for the constant, AUD SPEC and YEAR1 which are 2- 
tailed
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Table 32 Regression results: The Ratio of Auditor provided Non-Audit Services 
to Total Fee Regressed on Board and Audit Committee Quality and 
Independence and Control Variables for each of the four years 1999-2002 Pooled 
Sample ranked on AIP/GO and broken down into 3 sub-samples using quartiles.
Panel C: Regression results for 2001
Pred.
Sign.
High G O * 
E stim ate p#
M oderate*
E stim ate p#
High AIP* 
E stim ate p#
(Constant) # -0 .1407 .608 -0 .0602 .739 -0 .1812 .531
B oard  of D irec to rs V ariab les
B SIZE 0 .0395 .025 0.0101 .167 0 .0 1 5 4 .187
B DSHIP + , - ,  + 0 .0 1 7 0 .407 -0 .0 3 3 0 .220 -0 .0 0 5 9 .466
B M EET 0 .0 0 0 6 .468 0 .0 0 3 6 .225 0 .0083 .159
B F IN L IT + , - , + 0 .1633 .145 0 .0 1 8 4 .422 -0 .2 5 1 6 .054
B O UTSIDE + , - ,  + 0 .2 2 6 0 .082 0.2831 .003 -0 .3917 .019
B C H A I R + , - ,  + 0 .0 6 7 2 .130 -0 .0 3 7 3 .180 -0 .0495 .257
A udit C om m ittee  V ariab les
A S I Z E + , - ,  + 0 .0063 .408 0 .0122 .219 0 .0121 .319
A M S H I P + , - , + -0 .0352 .288 0 .0 0 9 6 .400 -0 .0 3 8 0 .279
A M E F .T + > - ,  + 0.0111 .339 0 .0 0 7 4 .261 -0 .0152 .213
A F I N L I T + , - ,  + -0 .0244 .412 -0 .0485 .241 0 .2205 .020
A OUTSIDE 0 .0 8 4 4 .239 -0 .0 8 9 2 .109 0 .0 5 3 7 .305
A CHAIR + , - ,  + -0 .1671 .076 0 .0543 .174 0 .1 6 7 6 .024
C o n tro l V ariab les
B L O C K 2 0 - 0 .0 0 1 8 .076 -0 .0005 .271 -0 .0001 .456
BIG5 + 0 .0173 .412 0 .1 7 7 8 .000 0 .1371 .051
AUD SPEC # 9 -0 .0 8 3 6 .410 -0 .0 2 8 9 .562 -0 .0511 .448
ALOCKS + -0 .0 2 0 7 .231 -0 .0 0 1 6 .463 0 .0 1 8 8 .181
M INING - 0 .0018 .491 -0 .0465 .163 -0 .0 3 1 6 .332
FINANCIAL - -0 .1545 .056 0 .0375 .269 -0 .0793 .176
UTILITIES - -0 .1387 .096 -0 .0 3 0 0 .310 0 .3095 .021
ASSETS + -0 .0015 .480 0 .0 0 5 2 .387 0 .0363 .084
ALLSUBS + 0 .0 2 3 8 .203 0.0081 .332 -0 .0 1 9 8 .205
RESTRUCT + -0 .1982 .139 0 .0155 .426 -0 .0181 .410
NEW CEO + 0 .0 7 2 8 .225 0 .0645 .084 -0 .0 8 4 2 .124
NEW ISSUE + 0 .1 4 3 6 .009 0 .0 1 6 8 .338 0 .0413 .289
NEGROI - 0 .0 0 1 9 .139 -0 .0 9 9 7 .175 0 .0 2 8 6 .440
LEVERAGE - 0 .0 0 0 6 .463 0 .0 1 7 6 .198 -0 .0081 .354
N A S S P E C + 0 .1 1 7 2 .118 0.0411 .193 0 .2 1 1 8 .001
U S L I S T - 0 .0 1 5 4 .436 0 .0 6 5 4 .134 0 .1 9 7 7 .062
U S S U B - 0 .1 1 2 7 .034 0 .0013 .487 0 .0 0 5 9 .469
YEAR1 # ? -0 .0 7 8 4 .637 -0 .1 2 9 0 .131 -0 .0 0 3 9 .983
A d j R j .223 .200 .345
F statistic 1.954 2 .655 2 .7 3 7
(significance) .011 .000 .000
* Firms are ranked on AIP/GO, the smallest third being High GO, middle third being
Moderate, and the largest third being High AIP
# p-values are 1 tailed except for the constant, AUD SPEC and YEAR1 which are 2- 
tailed
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Table 32 Regression results: The Ratio of Auditor provided Non-Audit Services 
to Total Fee Regressed on Board and Audit Committee Quality and 
Independence and Control Variables for each of the four years 1999-2002 Pooled 
Sample ranked on AIP/GO and broken down into 3 sub-samples using quartiles.
Panel D: Regression results for 2002
Pred.
Sign.
High G O *  
Estimate p#
M oderate*
Estim ate p#
High AIP*  
E stim ate p#
(Constant) # 0 .031 .7 7 4 - 0 .0 6 0 .5 9 8 0 .0 5 9 .5 6 9
B oard o f  D irectors Variables
B SIZE - ,  + , - 0 .0 1 8 .0 0 7 0 .0 1 3 .031 0 .0 0 6 .1 6 2
B D S H I P + , - , + -0 .0 0 9 .3 7 6 -0 .0 3 9 .0 7 2 - 0 .0 4 8 .0 2 8
B M EET + , - ,  + 0 .0 0 6 .0 1 3 0 .0 1 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 6 .0 0 6
B F I N L I T + , - ,  + 0 .0 9 5 .0 8 5 - 0 .1 0 2 .0 3 7 -0 .1 4 9 .0 0 6
B O U T S I D E + , - ,  + 0 .0 7 4 .1 3 6 0 .0 4 5 .2 4 9 -0 .1 4 9 .0 0 9
B C H A I R +  , - ,  + 0 .0 0 6 .4 1 3 0 .0 2 3 .173 0 .0 3 0 .1 2 6
A udit  C o m m ittee  Variables
A S I Z E + , - » + 0 .0 0 8 .211 -0 .0 2 6 .0 0 2 -0 .0 0 3 .3 8 7
A M S H I P + , - ,  + 0 .0 0 1 .4 8 2 - 0 .0 0 2 .4 5 8 0 .0 0 9 .3 4 0
A M E E T + , - , + -0 .0 0 6 .2 3 9 -0 .0 1 4 .0 0 6 0 .0 0 0 .498
A F I N L I T + , - ,  + -0 .1 0 1 .0 1 6 0 .0 1 5 .3 5 5 0 .0 7 1 .051
A O U T S I D E +  , - ,  + 0 .0 4 8 .1 5 6 0 .0 1 3 .3 7 8 - 0 .0 0 5 .4 5 2
A C H A I R +  , - ,  + - 0 .0 7 2 .0 4 4 0 .0 1 1 .3 6 3 0 .0 5 6 .0 5 7
C ontro l  Variables
B L O C K 2 0 - 0 .0 0 1 .0 0 2 -0 .0 0 1 .0 1 3 0 .0 0 0 .2 2 2
BIG5 + 0 .0 6 9 .0 1 5 0 .0 9 6 .001 0 .1 3 3 .0 0 0
A U D  SPEC # 7 - 0 .0 1 5 .6 3 4 - 0 .0 2 5 .3 4 0 0 .0 2 2 .397
ALO CK S + -0 .0 0 6 .3 1 5 0 .0 0 9 .1 7 5 0 .0 1 3 .0 5 8
MINING - -0 .0 8 1 .0 0 5 -0 .0 1 4 .3 0 8 - 0 .0 4 2 .0 4 8
FINANCIAL - 0 .0 5 0 .1 1 2 0 .0 6 5 .0 3 4 0 .0 2 8 .1 8 2
UTILITIES - - 0 .0 1 8 .3 2 7 0 .1 0 7 .011 0 .1 4 3 .0 0 5
A SSET S + 0 .0 0 1 .4 4 7 0 .0 2 6 .011 0 .0 1 5 .0 4 7
A L L SU B S + 0 .0 1 0 .1 8 5 0 .0 0 7 .251 - 0 .0 0 2 .431
RESTRUCT + 0 .0 9 2 .0 0 7 0 .0 1 9 .2 6 4 0 .0 4 7 .0 4 3
NEW CEO + 0 .0 4 7 .1 1 9 0 .0 9 7 .0 0 2 0 .0 4 1 .105
NEW 1SSUE + 0 .0 4 4 .0 3 0 0 .0 4 3 .0 2 9 0 .0 4 0 .0 4 9
NEGROI - -0 .0 0 1 .1 8 8 -0 .1 4 7 .0 7 6 0 .0 4 4 .2 8 2
LEVERAGE - -0 .0 0 1 .3 2 4 0 .0 0 0 .4 7 8 0 .0 0 0 .301
N A S S P E C + 0 .0 6 7 .0 1 6 0 .0 4 0 .061 0 .0 7 4 .0 0 2
U S L I S T - 0 .0 5 5 .0 7 6 - 0 .0 1 9 .2 9 9 0 .0 3 2 .2 4 4
U S S U B - 0 .031 .1 0 5 0 .0 2 7 .1 5 2 0 .0 0 2 .4 7 0
YEAR1 # ? -0 .0 8 7 .0 3 9 0 .0 0 4 .9 2 4 - 0 .0 8 2 .0 3 0
Adj R 1 .161 .1 9 7 .253
F statistic 4 .4 0 0 5 .3 7 4 .6 9 8 0
(signif icance) .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0
* Firms are rankec on AIP/GO, the smallest third being High GO, middle third being
Moderate, and the largest third being High AIP
# p-values are 1 tailed except for the constant, AUD SPEC and YEAR1 which are 2-
tailed
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Where:
APNAS/TFEE = 
B SIZE 
B DSHIPS 
B MEET
B FINLIT
B OUTSIDE = 
BCHAIR 
A SIZE 
A MSHIP
A MEET
A FINLIT
A OUTSIDE = 
A CHAIR
BLOCK
BIG5
AUD SPEC = 
ALOCKS
MINING
FINANCIAL =
UTILITIES
ASSETS
ALLSUBS
RESTRUCT
NEWCEO
NEWISSUE
NEGROI 
LEVERAGE = 
NAS SPEC 
USLIST 
USSUB 
YEAR1 
AI P/GO
non-audit fees / total fees 
number of board members
average number of directorships by outside directors on the board 
sum of the total number of board meetings attended by each 
director divided by the number of directors 
percentage of outside directors with a financial background on 
the board
percentage of outside directors on the board 
1 if chairman is an outside director; 0 otherwise 
number of audit committee members
average number of audit committee memberships by outside 
audit committee members on the board
sum of the total number of audit committee meetings attended by 
each director divided by the number of directors 
percentage of outside audit committee members with a financial 
background on the board
percentage of outside directors in the audit committee 
1 if chairman of audit committee is an outside director; 0 
otherwise
% owned by blockholders
1 if auditor is Big 5, 0 otherwise
1 if auditor has > 15% of audit services
the number of other firms that share the same auditor and
directors
1 if Resource; 0 otherwise
1 if Banking and Finance; 0 otherwise
1 if Infrastructure and Utilities; 0 otherwise
natural log of total assets
natural log of the total number of subsidiaries
1 if firm undergone restructuring; 0 otherwise
1 if there is a change in CEO; 0 otherwise
1 if the Finn issued new stocks or equity for cash and/or has listed 
in another exchange during the current year; = 0 otherwise 
two-year average ROI if negative, =0 otherwise 
long term debt to shareholder’s equity 
1 if auditor has > 15% of APNAS
1 if listed on an American stocks exchange, =0 otherwise 
1 if it has an American subsidiary, =0 otherwise 
1 if first year of audit engagement; =0 otherwise 
Accounting book value of total assets divided by the sum of the 
market value of common equity and the book value of total debt 
and preferred stock.
As expected, the results are generally weaker compared to the pooled 4-year 
regression. While the pooled regression showed the AIP sub-sample to be have the 
strongest results, most of the yearly regressions favour the moderate sub-sample, with
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2001 being the notable exception whose AIP sub-sample produced the strongest 
results. However it is possible that the smaller sample sizes of the high GO and high 
AIP sub-samples might be a cause.
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A2.8 Additional analysis for the replication of Abbott et al. (2003): yearly 
regressions
In chapter 5.9, the regression model used in Abbott et al. (2003) was replicated. In 
particular, the ACE variable used in that paper was used instead of the board and audit 
committee variables used in this thesis. It was found that when used by itself, that it 
was positively significant in the 4-year pooled sample.
The regression is estimated for each of the four years in the sample separately and the 
results are reported in Table 33 below.
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Table 33 Regression results: The Ratio of Auditor provided Non-Audit Services 
to Audit Fee Regressed on Board, Audit Committee, and Control Variables for 
each of the four years 1999-2002
Predicted 1999 2000 2001 2002
Sign E s tim a te p# E s tim a te p# E s tim a te p# E s tim a te p#
(C onstant)# -0 .6 5 1 0 .2 2 4 -1 .1 7 0 6 .191 -1 .1 7 4 9 .1 6 5 -1 .4 3 8 4 .1 9 0
T e s t V a r ia b le
A CE - 0 .2 0 7 5 .0 9 5 2 .5 5 5 .0 0 6 0 .0 8 5 4 .3 6 4 -0 .3 5 9 5 .1 1 8
C o n tro l  V a r ia b le s
B L O C K - -0 .0 0 1 4 .3 2 2 0 .0 0 6 9 .051 0 .0 0 4 6 .1 3 7 0 .0 0 1 0 .431
BIG5 + 0 .2 1 1 8 .1 4 0 0 .4 4 0 7 .0 7 2 0 .3 9 2 7 .0 9 8 0 .4 6 0 3 .1 2 4
A U D S P E C # ? 0 .6 4 6 5 .0 0 1 -0 .5 2 8 0 .0 3 8 -0 .4 7 9 3 .1 2 5 -0 .5 2 2 7 .1 4 7
A L O C K S + 0 .0 3 3 7 .2 3 2 0 .0 6 9 4 .1 8 6 -0 .0 1 7 4 .4 2 2 -0 .1 3 2 7 .1 0 7
M IN IN G - -0 .1 4 1 8 .2 1 8 -0 .7 5 6 0 .0 0 5 -0 .0 1 2 1 .4 8 3 0 .1 0 4 3 .371
F IN A N C IA L - -0 .0 6 2 5 .3 8 5 0 .3 9 4 1 .101 0 .0 3 6 8 .4 5 4 0 .3 5 6 9 .1 7 0
U T ILITIES - 0 .8 7 6 7 .0 0 2 1 .0 9 2 6 .0 0 4 0 .5 5 6 4 .0 8 5 3 .3 9 8 3 .0 0 0
A SSE T S + 0 .1 0 2 5 .0 2 4 0 .1 1 4 1 .0 8 7 0 .1 4 3 3 .0 4 5 0 .1 8 6 1 .0 3 6
A L L S U B S + -0 .0 1 0 4 .4 3 9 -0 .0 2 2 3 .4 1 0 -0 .0 8 3 0 .2 0 6 -0 .1 1 3 0 .1 7 3
R E S T R U C T + 0 .1 7 1 4 .1 8 5 0 .5 2 7 0 .0 1 5 0 .7 4 3 8 .0 4 6 2 .2 3 1 0 .0 0 0
N E W C E O + -0 .0 8 2 8 .3 8 8 0 .5 8 9 1 .0 2 1 0 .3 5 4 6 .1 1 8 1 .7 8 4 4 .0 0 5
N E W IS S U E + 0 .3 3 3 3 .0 2 3 0 .3 1 7 1 .0 8 2 0 .1 8 4 8 .2 1 9 -0 .2 3 6 0 .1 9 0
N E G R O I - -0 .0 0 2 8 .2 1 4 -0 .3 5 8 4 .1 7 2 0 .0 0 4 9 .3 5 3 0 .0 3 2 2 .4 8 2
L E V E R A G E - 0 .0 0 0 2 .4 4 6 0 .0 0 5 1 .4 2 7 -0 .0 2 0 4 .3 1 2 -0 .0 6 0 0 .2 4 8
N A S S P E C + -0 .1 1 3 1 .281 0 .8 5 8 7 .0 0 0 0 .8 7 7 1 .0 0 2 1 .0 5 0 7 .0 0 2
U S L I S T - 0 .0 3 7 2 .4 4 5 -0 .1 7 8 6 .3 1 7 0 .4 7 2 8 .1 0 7 0 .2 3 0 8 .3 1 0
U S S U B - -0 .1 7 1 2 .1 6 9 -0 .1 3 7 9 .2 8 6 0 .2 7 4 5 .1 3 2 0 .1 8 0 4 .2 7 8
Y E A R 1 # ? -0 .3 1 4 9 .397 0 .2 2 5 5 .727 -0 .4 3 9 5 .4 5 2 -0 .7 1 0 5 .0 3 6
Adj R “ .0 9 8 .1 3 7 .0 6 6 .1 1 9
F statistic 3 .2 7 0 4 .2 3 8 2 .4 7 7 3 .9 3 1
(significance) .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0
# p-values are 1 tailed except for the constant, AUD SPEC and YEAR1 which is 2-
tailed
Where:
APNAS/AFEE = 
ACE
BLOCK
BIG5
AUD SPEC = 
ALOCKS
MINING
FINANCIAL =
UTILITIES
ASSETS
ALLSUBS
RESTRUCT
NEWCEO
non-audit fees / audit fees
1 if the audit committee is comprised entirely of independent 
directors and meets at least four times during the year and 0 
otherwise.
% owned by blockholders
1 if auditor is Big 5, 0 otherwise
1 if auditor has > 15% of audit services
the number of other firms that share the same auditor and
directors
1 if Resource; 0 otherwise
1 if Banking and Finance; 0 otherwise
1 if Infrastructure and Utilities; 0 otherwise
natural log of total assets
natural log of the total number of subsidiaries
1 if firm undergone restructuring; 0 otherwise
1 if there is a change in CEO; 0 otherwise
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NEWISSUE
NEGROI 
LEVERAGE 
NAS SPEC 
US LIST 
USSUB 
YEAR1
1 if the firm issued new stocks or equity for cash and/or has listed 
in another exchange during the current year; = 0 otherwise 
two-year average ROI if negative, =0 otherwise 
long term debt to shareholder’s equity 
1 if auditor has > 15% of APNAS 
1 if listed on an American stocks exchange, =0 otherwise 
1 if it has an American subsidiary, =0 otherwise 
1 if first year of audit engagement; =0 otherwise
The results show 2000 to be the only year in which ACE was significant (p = .011, 
two-tailed) and seems to confirm the fact that the year 2000 produces the strongest 
relationship between the test variables and relative APNAS spending. The 2000 
regression also produced the highest adjusted R" among the four years as well, which 
is consistent with the findings of the full model used earlier in the study.
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